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Application seeking recall of compromise decree can be filed before the Decreeing Court

Citation : Vipan Aggarwal & Anr. vs Raman Gandotra & Ors., Civil Appeal  No.3492 Of 2022 (@ SLP(C) No.20075/2021)

Date of Judgment/Order : 29th April, 2022

Court/Tribunal : The Supreme Court Of India

Corum : Hemant Gupta & V. Ramasubramanian, JJ

Background

A compromise decree is said to have been passed on 13.09.2008. The appellants filed an application for recall of the said compromise decree for the reasons that such decree suffers from fraud and collusion. Such application was filed before the Court which granted the decree. The trial Court returned a finding that such application is not maintainable and such view was affirmed by the High Court.

Judgment

Referring  to judgment in Banwari Lal V. Chando Devi (Smt.) (Through LRS.) & Anr.’ (1993) 1 SCC 581 while setting aside the order passed by the High Court, the SC observed that on the question as to whether an aggrieved person against the compromise decree has a right to file an application before the Court which granted the decree or an appeal in terms of Order 43 Rule 1A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the CPC’), it has been held that the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement.

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