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Binding nature of judgment - superiority of benches

Cause Title :   M/s Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. vs Government Of N.C.T. Of Delhi, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 33322/2017, Supreme Court Of India

Date of Judgment/Order : September 19, 2022

Corum : Indira Banerjee; J., Hemant Gupta; J., Surya Kant; J., M.M. Sundresh; J., Sudhanshu Dhulia; J.

Citied:

  1. Shanti Fragrances v. Union of India and others
  2. Kothari Products Ltd. v. State of A.P.
  3. Central Sales Tax vs. Agra Belting Work
  4. Ningappa Ramappa Kurbar v. Emperor
  5. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v Union of India
  6. Harper v. National Coal Board
  7. Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P.
  8. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of U.P
  9. State of Orrisa vs. Radhey Shyam Gudakhu Factory
  10. Gulabchand Harekchand v. State of West Bengal
  11. Reliance Trading Company, Kerala v. State of Kerala
  12. Sales Tax Officer, Sector-IX, Kanpur vs. Dealing Dairy Products and Anr.
  13. State of Bihar and Others v. Krishna Kumar Kabra and Another
  14. Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister and Others

Background

The question before the Supreme Court was on the superiority one bench of the court over another.

Judgment


Stare decisis means “to stand by things decided” in Latin. When a court faces a legal argument, if a previous court has ruled on the same or a closely related issue, then the court will make their decision in alignment with the previous court's decision.

The court said that unanimity in a given Bench (termed as a “super majority”) — denoting for instance a  5 : 0 unanimous decision in a Constitution Bench cannot be construed as per se a strong or compelling reason to doubt the legitimacy of a larger Bench ruling that might contain a narrow majority (say, for instance with a 4 : 3 vote, resulting in overruling of a previous unanimous precedent). The principle of stare decisis operates both vertically — in the sense that decisions of appellate courts in the superior in vertical hierarchy, bind tribunals and courts lower in the hierarchy, and horizontally — in the sense that a larger Bench formation ruling, would be binding and prevail upon the ruling of a smaller Bench formation. The logic in this stems from the raison d'être for the doctrine of precedents i.e. stability in the law. If this rule were to be departed from and the legitimacy of a subsequent larger Bench ruling were to be doubted on the ground that it comprises of either plurality of opinions or a narrow majority as compared with a previous Bench ruling (which might be either unanimous or of a larger majority, but of lower Bench strength), there would be uncertainty and lack of clarity in the realm of precedential certainty. 

In view of the above reasoning, it is held that the existence of a plurality of opinions or discordant or dissident judgments in the past — which might even have led to a majority (on an overall headcount) supporting a particular rule in a particular case cannot detract from the legitimacy of a rule enunciated by a later, larger Bench. In view of Article 145(5) of the Constitution of India concurrence of a majority of the judges at the hearing will be considered as a judgment or opinion of the Court. It is settled that the majority decision of a Bench of larger strength would prevail over the decision of a Bench of lesser strength, irrespective of the number of Judges constituting the majority.

The conclusion (1) is that a decision delivered by a Bench of largest strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. It is the strength of the Bench and not number of Judges who have taken a particular view which is said to be relevant. However, conclusion (2) makes it absolutely clear that a Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. Quorum means the bench strength which was hearing the matter. Thus, it has been rightly concluded that the numerical strength of the Judges taking a particular view is not relevant, but the Bench strength is determinative of the binding nature of the Judgment.

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