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Trial Courts competent to decide on question of law having no prior judicial precedent

Cause Title : Om Prakash vs The Delhi Pinjrapole Society (Rego.), CM(M) 864/2022 & CM APPL.37131/2022, CM APPL.37132/2022, High Court Of Delhi At New Delhi

Date of Judgment/Order : 26.08.2022

Corum : Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

Citied: 

State of Maharashtra v. Sarva Shramik Sangh, Sangli
M/s. Suvinys Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Verma Beauty Parlor and Hair Dressers
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213
State of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu

Background

The appeal was filed by the Petitioner challenging the decision of the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge (the learned Pr. DSJ) rejecting the appeal of the Petitioner adjourn RCT 77/2018 (Om Prakash v. The Delhi Pinjrapole Society), till the Division Bench of this Court adjudicated on the questions of law referred to it by a learned Single Judge in a batch of Rent Control Revision Petitions headed by K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd.

The Single judge bench of the Delhi High Court had referred the question of whether a public charitable trust carrying on public activities qualifies as a ―public institution for the purposes of Section 222 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, to the Division Bench.

The Petitioner was of the view that District Courts are competent only to decide questions of law for which prior authoritative precedents in the form of decisions of High Courts or the Supreme Court exist. 

Judgment

The Hon'ble Court held that the submission is completely misconceived in law.

There is no proscription whatsoever on a Trial Court taking a decision on any question that arises before it whether of fact or of law, irrespective of whether there exists, or does not exist, a prior precedent on the issue or there does not exist a precedent on the issue. Trial Courts are wholly competent to decide all questions of fact and law which may arise before them. Many such questions may be res integra, previously undecided by any superior court. The ld. Trial Court is well within its authority to decide all such issues and, possibly, even be the first judicial authority to take a view on the subject.

There is no principle of law which requires the existence of a prior judicial precedent on a question of law before a ld. Trial Court takes a view on the said issue. If there is any binding judicial precedent, of course, the ld. Trial Court would be bound to follow it unless the ld. Trial Court deems the precedent to be distinguishable for reasons which it would be required to elucidate. As such, even if the precise question of law that arises before the ld. Trial Court stands referred to the Division Bench of this Court, there is no embargo whatsoever on the learned Pr. DSJ taking a view on the issue. Qua the present case, there is no embargo whatsoever on the learned Pr. DSJ taking a view on whether a public charitable trust carrying on public activities qualifies as a ―public institution under Section 222 of the DRC Act, even while that question stands referred to a Division Bench in K.S. Bhandari.

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