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Consumer Commission Can Condone Delay For Filing Written Version Upto 15 Days

Cause Title : Antriksh Developers And Promoters Private Limited & Anr. Vs Kutumb Welfare Society (Regd.) & Anr., Supreme Court, Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 31629/2022

Date of Judgment/Order : 04-11-2022

Corum : M.R. Shah; J., M.M. Sundresh; J.

Citied: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 757.

Background

Appeal filed against order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission refusing to condone delays of more than 45 days in filling written version.

Judgment

Agreeing with the NCDRC and referring to the judgment in New India Assurance(supra) observed that the period of limitation to file is 30 days which can be condoned up to 15 days only and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period mentioned in the Statute.

Note:

In Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33, pari materia provision contained in Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 came up for the consideration of the Court. The provision requires the opposite party to a complaint to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum. The Court took into consideration the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the legislative intent behind providing a time frame to file reply and held : (i) that the provision as framed was not mandatory in nature as no penal consequences are prescribed if the extended time exceeds 15 days and; (ii) that the provision was directory in nature and could not be interpreted to mean that in no event whatsoever the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days.

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