Skip to main content

Ordinarily, there shall be no direction to “pay and recover” when Insurance company not liable

Cause Title : Balu Krishna Chavan vs The Reliance General Insurance, Civil Appeal No. Of 2022, Supreme Court Of India

Date of Judgment/Order : 03rd November, 2022

Corum : A.s. Bopanna & Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J

Citied: Manuara Khatun & Ors. Vs. Rajesh Kr. Singh & Ors

Background

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Respondent-Insurance Company should be directed to “pay and recover” in the facts arising in the case.

Judgment

The Supreme Court observed that in Civil Appeal No(s).3047 of 2017 titled as “Manuara Khatun & Ors. Vs. Rajesh Kr. Singh & Ors”, the Supreme Court has concluded that normally, there would be no order to “pay and recover”. However, in the said facts, this Court, to meet the ends of justice, had taken into consideration the fact situation though, the claimant therein, was a ‘gratuitous passenger’ and had kept in view that the benevolent object of the Act and had directed the payment by the Insurance Company and to recover the amount.

Therefore, on the legal aspect, it is clear that in all cases such order of “pay and recover” would not arise when the Insurance Company is not liable but would, in the facts and circumstances, be considered by this Court to meet the ends of justice.

Comments

Post a Comment

Most viewed this month

One Sided Clauses In Builder-Buyer Agreements Is An Unfair Trade Practice

In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12238 OF 2018, Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. vs Govindan Raghavan, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court  by the builder against the order of the National Consumer Forum. The builder had relied upon various clauses of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement to refute the claim of the respondent but was rejected by the commission which found the said clauses as wholly one-sided, unfair and unreasonable, and could not be relied upon. The Supreme Court on perusal of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement found stark incongruities between the remedies available to both the parties. For example, Clause 6.4 (ii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to charge Interest @18% p.a. on account of any delay in payment of installments from the Respondent – Flat Purchaser. Clause 6.4 (iii) of the Agreement entitles the Appellant – Builder to cancel the allotment and terminate the Agreement, if any installment remains in arrears for more than 30 da...
Post a Comment
Read more

Inherited property of childless hindu woman devolve onto heirs of her parents

In Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware vs Narayan Keru Nitanware, quashing an order passed by a joint civil judge junior division, Pune, the Bombay High Court has held that under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, will devolve upon the heirs of her father/mother, if she dies without any children of her own, and not upon her husband. Justice Shalini Phansalkar Joshi was hearing a writ petition filed by relatives of one Sundarabai, who died issueless more than 45 years ago on June 18, 1962. Article referred:http://www.livelaw.in/property-inherited-female-hindu-parents-shall-devolve-upon-heirs-father-not-husband-dies-childless-bombay-hc-read-judgment/
Post a Comment
Read more

Court approached in the early stages of arbitration will prevail in all other subsequent proceedings

In National Highway Authority of India v. Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court opined that once the parties have approached a certain court for relief under Act at earlier stages of disputes then it is same court that, parties must return to for all other subsequent proceedings. Language of Section 42 of Act is categorical and brooks no exception. In fact, the language used has the effect of jurisdiction of all courts since it states that once an application has been made in Part I of the Act then ―that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. Court holds that NHAI in present case cannot take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for explaining inordinate delay in filing present petition under Section 34 of this Act in this Court.
Post a Comment
Read more