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Possessory title holder has all the possessory rights of an owner

Cause Title : Ghanshyam vs Yogendra Rathi, Civil Appeal Nos.7527-7528 Of 2012, Supreme Court Of India

Date of Judgment/Order : 2/6/2023

Corum : Dipankar Datta, J. & Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citied: 

  1. Veer Bala Gulati Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr., (2003) 104 DLT 787
  2. Asha M. Jain Vs. Canara Bank and Ors., (2001) 94 DLT 841
  3. Imtiaz Ali Vs. Nasim Ahmed, AIR 1987 DELHI 36
  4. G. Ram Vs. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 2003 DELHI 120
  5. Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (2009) 7 SCC 363

Background

The plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the suit premises on the averment that he is the owner of the said property by virtue of an agreement to sell, power of attorney, a memo of possession and a receipt of payment of sale consideration as well as a “will” of the defendant- appellant bequeathing the said property in his favour; the possession of the suit premises was handed over to the plaintiff-respondent pursuant to the agreement to sell subsequently on the request of the defendant-appellant the plaintiff-respondent allowed the defendant-appellant to occupy the ground floor and one room on the first floor of it for a period of 3 months as a licencee; the defendant- appellant failed to vacate the suit premises despite expiry of the licence period and termination notice.

The defendant-appellant contested the suit on the ground that the aforesaid documents have been manipulated on blank papers but did not dispute the execution of any of them or that the possession memo was not executed or that the sale consideration as per the agreement was not paid.

The defendant-appellant having lost his cases in the trial, first appellate as well as the High Courts finally approached the Supreme Court.

Judgment

The Supreme Court agreeing with the lower courts observed that one thing is clear that the plaintiff-respondent is in a settled possession of the suit property at least in part performance of the agreement which cannot be disturbed or disputed by the transferer, i.e., the defendant-appellant. No doubt, agreement to sell is not a document of title or a deed of transfer of property by sale and as such, may not confer absolute title upon the plaintiff-respondent over the suit property in view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, nonetheless, the agreement to sell, the payment of entire sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement itself and corroborated by the receipt of its payment and the fact that the plaintiff-respondent was put in possession of the suit property in accordance with law as is also established by the possession memo on record, goes to prove that the plaintiff-respondent is de-facto having possessory rights over the suit property in part performance of the agreement to sell. This possessory right of the plaintiff-respondent is not liable to be disturbed by the transferer, i.e., the defendant-appellant. The entry of the defendant-appellant over part of the suit property subsequently is simply as a licencee of the plaintiff- respondent. He does not continue to occupy it in capacity of the owner.

Legally an agreement to sell may not be regarded as a transaction of sale or a document transferring the proprietary rights in an immovable property but the prospective purchaser having performed his part of the contract and lawfully in possession acquires possessory title which is liable to be protected in view of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The said possessory rights of the prospective purchaser cannot be invaded by the transferer or any person claiming under him.


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