Legal News & Views

In an important pronouncement which would have serious impact in states having significant tribal population, the Apex Court has held that Banks can sell tribal land to non-tribal even if prohibited by state law. The Supreme Court in UCO Bank vs. Dipak Debbarma, has held that the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, which do not contain any embargo on the category of persons to whom mortgaged property can be sold by the bank for realisation of its dues that will prevail over the provisions contained in Section 187 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/banks-can-sell-tribal-land-non-tribal-even-prohibited-state-law-sc/

The Supreme Court in Anjan Dasgupta vs. The State of West Bengal, has held that the receipt and recording of First Information Report is not a condition precedent for setting in motion a criminal investigation and the police are duty bound to start investigation when it gets information with regard to commission of crime. A trial court had acquitted an accused observing that the FIR was ante-timed as the prosecution witness, who gave the written complaint for lodging an FIR, deposed that that he went to the police station after 7.30 pm. The court observed that the FIR could not have been lodged before 7.30­8 pm and the mention of time of receiving the information in the FIR as 17.35 hours clearly proves that it was ante-timed. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/recording-fir-not-condition-precedent-starting-criminal-investigation-sc/

In State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dhirendra Pal Singh and Ors., Respondent was Assistant Store Superintendent with Irrigation Department of State of Uttar Pradesh. He stood retired on 30th June, 2009 on attaining age of superannuation. At time of his retirement GPF, leave encashment and 70% of gratuity and pension were cleared, but rest of 30% of gratuity and computation of pension were held up. Stand of Appellants is that there were some discrepancies in the stock in the store of Department and some enquiries were going on as to loss caused to public exchequer. After making representations, when remaining amount of gratuity and pension was not cleared, Respondent filed Civil Suit No. 338 of 2012. However, same was dismissed as withdrawn as Appellants/State authorities, vide order finally, on basis of alleged discrepancies withheld the remaining part of gratuity and pension of the Respondent and, vide order, directed recovery of Rs. 7,26,589/-, from retiral dues payable to Responde

In The New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Hussain Babulal Shaikh, Petitioner-New India Assurance Company Limited filed instant petition challenging order passed by learned member of Maharashtra Accident Claims Tribunal, whereby an application of Respondent No.1 for issuance of warrant of attachment against Petitioner in execution of an award, for not depositing part of award amount, on ground that, same has been deducted as “tax deducted at source” (TDS), stands allowed. Issue which falls for consideration of the Court is 'whether the Petitioner would be justified in deducting tax at source (TDS) in respect of interest payment made under the award of the Tribunal. As per Section 194A of Income Tax Act, 1961, when any person not being an individual or Hindu undivided family who becomes responsible for paying to a resident any income by way of interest other than income by way of interest on securities, shall at time of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time o

In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Singh, Accused was charged with commission of offence under Section 20(b) (ii)(C) of Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, wherein he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Present appeal is preferred by Appellant/State assailing judgment of acquittal, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, whereby accused has been acquitted of charge framed against him under Section 20 of NDPS Act. Prosecution has been able to prove recovery of Charas weighing 4.5 kgs from exclusive and conscious possession of accused. Therefore, it was for accused person to have explained his innocence, as envisaged under Sections 35 and 54 of Act. The present, as such, is a case where presumption, as envisaged under Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, has to be drawn against accused, as the accused failed to explain his innocence. Present is not a case where it can be said that, prosecution has failed to prove its case against accused beyond all reasonable doubt

In Paradeep Port Trust v. Chunilata Mohanty and Ors., 21-year old educated son of complainant, lost his life by drowning at Boat Club, owned by Appellant, Paradeep Port Trust. Appellant has tried to shift the blame on their lessee, the TIDC, saying that the entire responsibility for running the Boat Club had been entrusted upon OP-2. Vide impugned order, State Commission, after taking into account averments of parties, allowed consumer complaint and directed OPs to pay a sum of 5 lakh as compensation to complainant for gross deficiency in service alongwith 5,000/- as litigation cost. It is against this order that present appeal has been made before this Commission. Since, TIDC was only bidder, as stated by Appellant, they handed over operation of Boat Club alongwith Open Air Restaurant to them for a period of 6 years. It was evident that, while making such arrangements, Appellant should have ensured that, all terms and conditions, and more so, those mentioned in technical bid were st

In State Bank of India v. Pushpakala R. Jimulia and Ors.,  matter is relating to deficiency in service on part of Bank in denying payment of cheque and resultantly, financial loss had been caused to complainant. District Forum ordered the dismissal of the consumer complaint on the ground that the complainants were not consumers. Being aggrieved against the said order of the District Forum, the complainants challenged the same by way of an appeal before the State Commission, which partly allowed the same vide impugned order, and found the Bank deficient in rendering service to the respondent and directed them to pay an amount of Rs. 7 lakhs as compensation for mental agony and negligence on their part. Being aggrieved against said order, OP Bank is before this Commission by way of present revision petition. In present case, complainants are maintaining a regular savings bank account with OP Bank since 2005. It is clear, therefore, that they have been availing themselves of services pr

Attributing ‘culture of compromise’ as one of the reasons for witnesses turning hostile during trial, the Supreme Court in Ramesh vs. State of Haryana, has upheld a High Court judgment that reversed an acquittal recorded by the trial court in a murder case. The high court, while convicting one Ramesh and others for murder of his wife, had observed that certain prosecution witnesses, which includes father and brother of the deceased, had turn hostile and have been won over by the accused. The high court held that a dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence and can be made the basis of conviction once the court is convinced that dying declaration is made voluntarily and is not influenced by any extraneous circumstances. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/culture-compromise-makes-witnesses-turn-hostile-trials-sc/

A division bench of High Court of Kerala recently reversed a single bench’s ruling that allowed individual flat owners to seek separate water connections. This writ appeal (W.A. No. 1556 of 2016) filed by Kerala Water Authority had come up for admission on 27-10-2016 against the judgment dated 28.3.2016. The division bench of Chief Justice Mohan M Shantanagoudar and Justice Sathish Ninan held that only a common connection could be obtained for the entire apartment complex. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/individual-flat-owners-no-right-separate-water-connections-kerala-hc/

The Supreme Court in Amarsang Nathaji vs. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel, has said the mere fact that a person made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding was not by itself always sufficient to justify prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code. The apex court said it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. It also explained the procedure contemplated under Section 340(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article referred : http://www.livelaw.in/defendant-making-contradictory-statements-trial-isnt-offence-sc/

The Supreme Court in Golla Rajanna vs. The Divisional Manager, has held that the high court cannot reassess the percentage of disability recorded by a Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner as it is a pure question of fact and the scope of the appeal before the high court under Section 30 of the workmen’s compensation Act is only to substantial questions of law. Re-appreciating the evidence recorded by the Commissioner, the high court held that the disability would only be to the extent of 5% of the whole body, resulting in 5% of the loss of earning capacity. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/hc-cant-reassess-disability-percentage-recorded-workmens-compensation-commissioner-sc/

In JINDAL STAINLESS LTD.& ANR VS STATE OF HARYANA & ORS,  the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the vexed questions touching the interpretation of Articles 301 to 307 comprising Part XIII of the Constitution which have been the subject matter of several Constitution Bench decisions of this Court, all but one, decided by majority. The questions assume in a great measure considerable public importance not only because the same deal with the powers of the State legislatures to levy taxes but also because any pronouncement of this Court is bound to impact the federal character of our polity and the Centre-State relationship in legislative and fiscal matters. ORDER By majority the Court answers the reference in the following terms: 1. Taxes simpliciter are not within the contemplation of Part XIII of the Constitution of India. The word ‘Free’ used in Article 301 does not mean “free from taxation”. 2. Only such taxes as are discriminatory in nature are prohibited by Article

In Sonoma Management Partners Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bank of Maharashtra, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court found that the amount of sales tax was not disclosed to the final auction buyer till after the sale of the asset has been completed. Further the amount due from the defaulting company cannot be claimed from the auction purchaser can by no stretch of the imagination be termed as a successor of the business of the Defaulter Company. The Hon'ble court said that in State of Karnataka & Anr Vs. Shreyas Papers Pvt. Ltd., (2006) it has been held that  a charge may not be enforced against a transferee if she/he has had no notice of the same, unless by law, the requirement of such notice has been waived. The Hon'ble court also mentioned the newly amended Sections 26D & E of the SARFAESI Act which states :- " 26D. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, from the date of commencement of the provisions of this Chapter, no secured credi

The Rajasthan High Court has dismissed a criminal complaint u/s 498A, 323, 406 & 504 of the IPC and 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC, against the parents of the deceased husband due to want of specific instances of domestic violence. Speaking through Justice PK Vohra, the court was seized of a petition filed in 2011 against a complaint filed by a woman in 2010 seeking protection under the DV Act and punishment under IPC. The complainant had entered into a marital set-up with her husband in 1994 and had been living separate from the in-laws since 1995 Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/complaint-domestic-violence-not-sustainable-no-specific-allegations-rajasthan-hc/

The Rajasthan High Court in Geeta Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr dismissed the DV application of Geeta Singh, filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 claiming interim monetary relief to her daughter Geetanjali. One of the reliefs sought is that respondent may be directed to pay 700 pounds per month as living expenditure as she was pursuing higher studies at Cardiff University, England. Geetanjali’s father contended he had borne all the school and college education expenses for his daughter and even took care of educational and all other expenses for her higher studies at Nottingham, England. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/well-educated-woman-capable-earning-income-cant-seek-monitory-relief-dv-act-rajasthan-hc/

The Supreme Court in Harpal Singh @ Chhota Vs. State Of Punjab, has reiterated that any electronic record in the form of secondary evidence cannot be admitted in evidence unless a certificate under Section 65B (4) of the Evidence Act is produced. In the instant case, the prosecution had produced printed copy of the computer generated call details kept in usual ordinary course of business and stored in a hard disc of the company server, to co-relate the calls made from and to the cell phones involved, including those, amongst others, recovered from the accused persons. However, a certificate relatable thereto as required under Section 65B (4) of the Evidence Act was not adduced. The high court held that the evidence is admissible. Section 65(B) states that electronic records will be admissible as evidence is the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by computer during the period over which computer was used regularly to s

The High Court of Orissa on Tuesday held that for maintaining proceedings under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, it is not necessary for the woman to have lived in a shared household with the accused at the time of making an application to the Magistrate. Justice S.K. Sahoo observed, “For subjecting a woman to any act of domestic violence as defined under section 3 of the P.W.D.V. Act and maintaining an application under section 12 of the P.W.D.V. Act, it is not necessary that the woman concerned must be living with the respondent under one roof or in a shared household at the time of presenting the application to the Magistrate.” Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/not-necessary-for-woman-to-share-household-with-accused-at-the-time-of-making-an-application-under-dv-act-orissa-hc/

In Sheela O.K. Vs. New India Insurance Company, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court decided that When an insurer is impleaded as a party-respondent to the claim petition, as contrasted from merely being a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act, its rights are significantly different. If the insurer is only a noticee, it can only raise such of those grounds as are permissible in law under Section 149(2). But if he is a party-respondent, it can raise, not only those grounds which are available under Section 149(2), but also all other grounds that are available to a person against whom a claim is made. If the insurer is already a respondent, having been impleaded as a party-respondent, it need not seek the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act to raise grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act.

The Calcutta High Court, while allowing the appeal of a rape accused in Belal @ Radheshyam Mondal vs. The State of West Bengal, has held that mere error in mentioning the date of occurrence at the time of framing charge cannot vitiate the trial under Section 464 of CrPC and, thus, cannot be a ground to invalidate the trial.  Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/error-date-occurrence-court-charge-cant-vitiate-trial-calcutta-hc/

The Supreme Court in President J.K. Synthetics Mazdoor Union, Kota vs. Arfat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd., has reiterated that the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) has no competence to issue directions under Section 22A of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, to a company that is not a sick industrial company. Certain directions like not to dispose of the assets were issued by the BIFR against M/s Arafat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. (APPL), which was affirmed by Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial (AAIFR). The said order was set aside by the Rajasthan High Court holding that the BIFR and the AAIFR do not have jurisdiction to issue directions to a company, which is not a sick industrial company under Section 22 A of the Act. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/bifr-aaifr-not-competent-issue-directions-non-sick-industrial-company-sc/

The Supreme Court in HP State Electricity Board Ltd vs Mahesh Dahiya, has observed that in disciplinary proceedings, before making opinion with regard to punishment which is to be imposed on a delinquent, the delinquent has to be given an opportunity to submit representation/reply on the inquiry report which finds a charge proved against the delinquent. A bench comprising Justice SA Bobde and Justice Ashok Bhushan made this observation while upholding a high court judgment setting aside the punishment order on a delinquent employee charged with willful absentation from official duty and disobeying the directions of the superiors. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/forming-opinion-punishment-giving-chance-delinquent-reply-inquiry-report-violates-natural-justice-sc/

In State of Bihar Vs. Maharana Pratap Singh, the Hon'ble Patna High Court while setting aside the decision of a single judge bench held that the learned Single Bench appears to have exercised appellate jurisdiction over findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, which is impermissible in law, since, while exercising the power of judicial review, only the decision-making process has to be examined and not the merit and demerit of the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. The Court cannot re-appreciate the merits of allegation levelled against the charged officer and return a finding that the same is not made out.

A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court has reiterated that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304B of the Penal Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. A bench comprising Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Amitava Roy acquitted accused in-laws in a dowry death case, holding that the prosecution failed to prove this indispensable component of Sections 304B and 498A of the Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/dowry-death-ingredients-shall-proved-prosecution-beyond-reasonable-doubt-invoke-presumption-sc/

The Kerala High Court in Mavila Sathi vs. State of Kerala and Ors has held that the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (the ‘Act’), cannot be allowed to be used as a tool in property disputes. Petitioner Mavila Sathi had filed the writ petition against the direction issued by the Maintenance Tribunal, according to which she had to reconvey 10 cents of property given to her by her mother Devaki Amma after having assigned 23 cents previously, along with the direction of paying a monthly maintenance of Rs 500 per month. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/maintenance-parents-senior-citizens-act-cant-used-tool-property-disputes-siblings-kerala-hc/

In Utpal Dasgupta Vs. Mrinal Kanti Sinha, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court held that ;- From the above decisions, the following principles emerge: (a) An Award, which is (i) Contrary to substantive provisions of law; or (ii) The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; or (iii) Against the terms of the respective contract; or (iv) Patently illegal, or (v) Prejudicial to the rights of the parties, is open to interference by the Court under S.34(2) of the Act. (b) Award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (i) Fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (ii) The interest of India; or (iii) Justice or morality; (iv) The Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court; (v) It is open to the Court to consider whether the Award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India.” There

In Manakkal Nadakumar Vs. M. Subramanyan, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court held that it is clear from the above dictums that in order to attract the bar of res judicata for a subsequent suit, it must be decided on merits and dismissal on technical grounds or it was dismissed as not pressed will not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit as the issues have not been heard and decided finally on merit. Further it is also clear from the above dictums that in respect of suit for partition as well redemption of mortgage, the dismissal of an earlier suit as not pressed or dismissed on technical grounds will not amount to res judicata for filing a subsequent suit as it will be having recurring cause of action till the right to claim partition or redemption is totally extinguished. Article referred: http://www.lawkam.org/caselaw/res-judicata-nadakumar-subramanyan/11100/

The Patna High Court in Param Pal Gandhi vs. State of Bihar, through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Govt. of Bihar, through a bench of Chief Justice Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, dismissed the writ petition of accused Param Pal Gandhi, who sought quashing of an order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Gaya, whereby his prayer for discharge in relation to a case of obtaining a degree from Magadh University fraudulently was rejected. The court said: “The order, deciding to frame a charge, must be a speaking order and such speaking order shall not only record the submissions made by the prosecution as well as the defence, but also the reasons as to why the submissions, which may have been made by the accused or the prosecution, cannot be accepted. On this aspect, the impugned order is wholly silent.” Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/order-framing-charge-must-speaking-order-patna-hc/

In Sirangai Shoba @ Shoba Munnuri rep.by her General Power of Attorney, M.Narayana   Rao  Vs Sirangi Muralidhar Rao, rep. by his Power of Attorney Smt. Sirangi Vijayalakshmi. the Hon'ble Andhra HC Upholding a trial court order allowing witness examination on Skype for recording evidence in a divorce petition, the High Court of Hyderabad has held that examination of witnesses and recording of evidence by commissioner contemplated by Order XVIII Rule 4 C.P.C from the words ‘witness in attendance’ are to be understood as person being present and it need not be physical presence. The court held that recording of evidence through audio, video link or through internet by Skype or similar technological device is permissible and complying with the words ‘in attendance’. Justice Dr B Siva Sankara Rao observed that there was a need to avail of technological innovations with necessary safeguards and precautions in the justice delivery system for speedy and effective disposal of cases. The

In Pragti Devi Vs. State of U.P. the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, it is a fact that at the time of passing order on point of cognizance and summoning, the Magistrate is expected to consider as to whether prima facie evidence for summoning the accused are available or not. But this consideration has to be after application of judicial mind, and not blindly. Magistrate is not expected only to read the words uttered by witnesses under sections 200 or 202 CrPC, but he also is required to use its judicial mind before passing any order and not to act like a silent spectators of the words uttered by the witnesses, who were not going to be cross-examined at the stage of evidences under Chapter XV CrPC. Even in the aforesaid judgment of Km. Nisha case (supra), this court had cited certain verdicts of Hon’ble Apex Court, which are again reiterated.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a woman cannot claim as a matter of right to occupy any part of a self-acquired property of her husband’s parents against their wishes. The court relied on a number of judgments and dismissed an appeal by a woman claiming residential rights on her matrimonial house, owned by her father-in-law. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/woman-cant-claim-right-father-laws-property-punjab-haryana-hc/

In State of Kerala v. Babu, (1999) 4 SCC 621 the Apex Court was confronted with the question as to whether the statement of a witness recorded under S.161 of Cr.P.C. in one particular crime could be used against that witness in any other trial enquiry or proceedings by the accused. Statement recorded by an investigating officer in any case which was under investigation being a statement made under S. 161 of the Code, the same can be used for the limited purpose provided under S.162 of the Code read with S.145 of the Evidence Act. There can be no quarrel with this approach in regard to the use of the previous statements of a witness made in the course of another investigation being used in the course of another criminal trial. Article referred: http://www.lawkam.org/criminal/statement-witness-used-trial/11302/

A full bench of Patna High Court in District Bar Association vs. State of Bihar, has deliberated on the difference between a Sessions Judge and Court of Session, a Sessions judge and an Additional/Assistant Sessions Judge. The bench comprising Chief Justice of Patna High Court IA Ansari, Justice Navaniti Prasad Singh and Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh, made this discussion while dealing with a public interest litigation by the district Bar Association which had challenged a circular issued by High Court wherein it had directed that the applications, seeking pre-arrest/ anticipatory bail, shall be filed before the Sessions Judge, who, shall, in turn, distribute such applications amongst the senior Additional Sessions Judges. According to the Bar Association, under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, every Court of Session has been empowered to issue directions for pre-arrest/anticipatory bail and, hence, the circular is illegal. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/court

In Metsil Exports Private Ltd. & anr. v. Punjab National Bank & anr., the question before the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court was what is the legal position regarding publication of a demand notice under section 13(2) of the Act in two newspapers having wide circulation with the photograph of a director/guarantor? Held, If a demand notice under section 13(2) of the Act is served on the borrower/guarantor in the manner statutorily provided for and there is no reason at all to believe that service has not been effected, question of publication thereof in the newspapers does not and cannot arise. It is only when an opinion could reasonably be formed that the borrower is evading service of the demand notice and that alternative modes of service have been exhausted without seemingly positive result in view thereby making it imperative to proceed for the last option i.e. publication in newspapers, that recourse thereto could be taken. The requirement of formation of opini

The Madras High Court has pulled up litigants for negligence in follow-up of their case and said they cannot blame their lawyers for not keeping them abreast with case developments as they themselves need to adopt a more vigilant attitude. Justice MV Muralidaran took to the above stance while dismissing a civil revision petition by litigants that challenged a sub-court order that dismissed their plea for condoning the delay of 1,600 days in filing an application to set aside an ex-parte decree as they were not informed earlier of the court order. Article referred: at: http://www.livelaw.in/litigants-must-stay-updated-case-status-cant-blame-lawyers-madras-hc/ The Madras High Court has pulled up litigants for negligence in follow-up of their case and said they cannot blame their lawyers for not keeping them abreast with case developments as they themselves need to adopt a more vigilant attitude. Justice MV Muralidaran took to the above stance while dismissing a civil revision

The Supreme Court in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. Vs. Hubtown Ltd, has restated the principles governing the grant of leave to defend a Summary suit as per amended Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Bench comprising Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice RF Nariman said the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation will now stand superseded, post amendment of Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in view of a four-judge bench decision in Milkhiram (India) (P) Ltd. v. Chamanlal Bros. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court-elucidates-principles-governing-grant-leave-defend-summary-suit/ The court observed as follows: If the defendant satisfies the court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit;

The Supreme Court in Madhuri Ghosh vs. Debobroto Dutta, has reiterated the legal position that where an absolute bequest has been made in respect of certain property to certain persons in a Will, then a subsequent bequest made qua the same property later in the same Will to other persons will be of no effect. In his Will, the testator had bequeathed the property in favour of the widow and the elder daughter. Before the court, it was contended that the said bequeath is only a limited interest and that the............. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/subsequent-bequest-will-void-absolute-bequest-made-will-sc/

In The trial of a suit commences with the framing of issues. The trial of the suit commences at the stage of the first witness of the plaintiff adducing evidence and concludes with the argument of the parties. In the case of Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1926 the Supreme Court held that Order VII Rule 11 of the Code does not ,either expressly or by necessary implication, provide that the power under the said provision should be exercised at a particular stage only and in the absence of any restriction placed by the statutory provision, it is open to the Court to exercise that power at any stage. Even in the subsequent decision in the case of Saleem Bhai and Ors. (supra) relied upon by the defendant petitioner the Supreme Court held that the trial Court can exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, at any stage of the suit and at any time before the conclusion of the trial.

The Supreme Court in Robin Ramjibhai Patel vs. Anandibai Rama @ Rajaram Pawar And Ors, has reiterated that when the plaintiff wants to implead certain persons as defendants in a suit for specific performance on the ground that they may be adversely affected by the outcome of the suit, then interest of justice also requires allowing such a prayer for impleadment so that the persons likely to be affected are aware of the proceedings and may take appropriate defence as suited to their vendors. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/plaintiff-can-implead-proposed-purchasers-property-suit-specific-performance-sc/

The Supreme Court in Kuldeep Kapoor & Ors vs. Court on its Motion, has observed that a litigant refusing to answer a question put to him by the Court does not constitute criminal contempt of Court. A three-judge bench comprising Justice Anil R Dave, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman and Justice AM Khanwilkar opined so while setting aside a Delhi High Court order in suo motu contempt proceedings against Kuldeep Kapoor and Ashok Kumar. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/refusal-answer-court-queries-isnt-criminal-contempt-sc/

In ANANTHESH BHAKTA REPRESENTED BY MOTHER USHA A.BHAKTA & ORS. VERSUS NAYANA S. BHAKTA & ORS., the Hon'ble Supreme Court had following three issues arises for consideration: (1) Whether nonfiling of either original or certified copy of retirement deed and partnership deed along with application I.A.No. IV dated 09.05.2014 entailed dismissal of the application as per section 8(2) of 1996 Act. (2) Whether the fact that all the parties to the suit being not parties to the retirement deed/partnership deed, the Court was not entitled to make the reference relying on arbitration agreement. (3) Whether dispute pertaining to unregistered partnership deed cannot be referred to an arbitration despite there being arbitration agreement in the deed of retirement/partnership deed. For Issue no. 1, the Hon'ble court held that Section 8(2) has to be interpreted to mean that the court shall not consider any application filed by the party under Section 8(1) unless it is accompani

The Kerala High Court in Chandran Vs. Amruthavally viewed that there is no reason to restrict the scope of Section 152 of the Code of CPC to ‘ accidental slip or omission’ of the Court and its ministerial staff alone. In cases where it is clear that the case is one of “ accidental slip or omission”, it is the duty of the court to correct the decree in tune with the actual intend of the Court and the parties.

In Hindustan Cables Vs. Tapan Kumar Sarkar, the Calcutta High Court held that a company may be under the control of the Central Government. However, in law, it is a separate legal entity. The age old principle of law laid down in Saloman v. Saloman, (1897) still holds fort. A limited company has an independent personality in the eye of law and has an identity separate from its shareholders or Board of Directors. Even a wholly held subsidiary of a company has an independent entity separate from that of the holding company. The Central Government may be the only or single largest shareholder of a limited company, but still the company has a distinct entity and its rights and liabilities cannot be attributed to the Central Government. Government companies do not become agents of the Government so as to bind the Government for their acts, liabilities and obligations as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Water Front Workers, (supra)

In Asraf Biswas Vs. State of West Bengal, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court held that place of occurrence is of paramount importance and once it is held that the place of occurrence has not been established beyond all reasonable doubts, then the other circumstances are hardly sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

In Tej Bahadur Thapa Vs. Branch Manager of District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., the Calcutta High Court held that under Article 227 of the constitution, the High Court has Power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals. Thus even though the Consumer Protection Act mentions appeal against order of the State Forum to be done before the National Forum, the the revisional application is very much maintainable before High Court, particularly, when the Court is, prima facie, satisfied on the merit of the case that the finding arrived at by the State Commission is perverse.

In Pramod Jain Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India,  the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was :- (i) To what extent is the timeline laid down under the Takeover Regulations required to be adhered to and effect of delay by SEBI in the present case? (ii) To what extent unilateral action of the target company in dealing with the property of the company after a hostile public offer is made furnish cause of action to the acquirers to withdraw the public offer and whether in the present case, decision not permitting withdrawal of public offer is justified? The Hon'ble court held that :- i) The withdrawal has to be dealt with under Regulation 27, as held by this Court. The general principle is that public offer once made cannot be withdrawn. Exception to the rule is the specified situations under the Regulation as laid down by this Court in above decisions particularly in Nirma Industries Limited (Supra). In the present case, though SEBI was not justif

In Shaik Riayazun Bee Vs. State of A.P., the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the phrase relative of the husband employed in Section 498A IPC should be understood as relatives of the husbands side with whom he obtained relationship by way of blood, marriage or adoption. That being so A6 during the relevant period being the sister-in-law of complainant, she cannot be said to be the relative of the husband.

The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in The National Insurance Comp Ltd. Nawal Kishore Road Lko vs. Pushpa Devi, has held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) has the discretion to permit examination-in-chief, but cross-examination and re-examination were not permissible on affidavit. The Bench headed by Chief Justice Dilip B Bhosale held that defendants can raise objection to examination-in-chief in affidavit and in the absence of any objection before the tribunal in this regard, no challenge to its award would be permissible in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the high court. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/mact-can-permit-chief-examination-on-affidavit-allahabad-hc-fb/

The Calcutta High Court in Jishu Sengupta & Others Vs State of West Bengal & Anr, has held that “sexually coloured remarks” will come within the ambit of “sexual harassment” enumerated in section 354A of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Ranjit Kumar Bag was considering revision petitions filed by Rudranil Ghosh, Parambrata Chattopadhyay, Srijit Mukherjee and Jishu Sengupta against the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, issuing summons to them. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/sexually-coloured-remarks-come-within-ambit-sexual-harassment-calcutta-hc/

The Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala vs. Mukesh Jain, has held that the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal as per Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, even if the amount involved is less than Rs 10 lakh. A bench comprising Justice Anil R Dave and Justice L Nageswara Rao, however, clarified that appellate jurisdiction need not be misunderstood with the original jurisdiction of the tribunal. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/appeal-drt-maintainable-even-amount-involved-less-rs-10-lakh-sc/

A division bench of the Kerala High Court has held that a gift deed made by a senior citizen can be revoked for not providing the basic amenities even if there is no specific clause in the transfer deed to provide for the senior citizen’s welfare. The bench comprising Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Justice Antony Dominic was hearing a writ appeal wherein according to the petitioner, in the absence of a specific reservation made in the settlement deed, providing for the conditions subject to which the transfer was made, an application invoking the power under Section 23 was not maintainable. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/gift-deed-senior-citizen-revocable-even-doesnt-bear-dedicated-welfare-clause-kerala-hc/

The Delhi High Court has quashed an order passed by the Central Information Commissioner and stated that while reversing orders of lower authorities, the CIC must record appropriate reasons for the decision. Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva allowed the writ petition against CIC order dated 04.06.2015, and observed, ‘In the present case, there is no finding returned by the Central Information Commission that there is a larger public interest which justices the disclosure of the information, in fact, there is no reasoning or rationing accorded in the impugned order except to direct the petitioner to furnish the information.’ Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/cic-must-record-reason-reversing-orders-lower-authorities-delhi-hc/

Suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot substitute proof, said the Supreme Court while setting aside a high court and trial court judgment that had found a duo guilty for murder. The high court, in this case, had affirmed the trial court findings that one Gurunathan was murdered by his wife and her alleged paramour. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/grave-suspicion-cant-substitute-proof-criminal-trials-sc/

The Supreme Court in Bhupinder Singh Bawa vs. Asha Devi, has upheld an order of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of tenanted premises for the business requirement of the son of the landlady. The High Court , while dismissing the revision petition, had held that there is no law which suggests that if a landlord/landlady requires the premises for running business of his/her young son who is an MBA graduate and is already engaged in some other business, he is acting malafidely and thus, no relief should be granted to him/her. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/landlord-can-evict-tenants-bona-fide-need-premises-business-purpose-sc/