Legal News & Views

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1263 OF 2019, Shiv Kumar Jatia vs State of NCT of Delhi,  criminal cases were filed alleging negligence on the part of hotel, against the company, its managing director and its officers who are incharge of day to day affairs of the hotel. The petition seeking to quash FIR against the managing director was turned down by the High Court. Examining the dictum laid down in earlier judgments including in Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, the bench observed that by applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal, it is clear that an individual either as a Director or a Managing Director or Chairman of the company can be made an accused, along with the company, only if there is sufficient material to prove his active role coupled with the criminal intent. Further the criminal intent alleged must have direct nexus with the accused. Further in the case of Maksud Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. , this Court ha

In Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead), the disputed signature of the first defendant was identified by his brother as those of the first defendant himself. However, another defence witness, a handwriting expert, deposed that the admitted signatures of the first defendant and the disputed signature do not tally, and that it s forged. The trial court refused to rely on expert evidence and decreed the suit of specific performance filed by the plaintiff, while the High Court did rely on it, and dismissed the suit. In appeal filed by the plaintiff, the bench comprising Justice NV Ramana, Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Justice Ajay Rastogi observed that the Court must be cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature. The weight to be accorded to such an opinion depends on the extent of familiarity shown by the witness with the disputed handwriting. This, in turn, depends on the frequency with which th

In Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 664 of 2019,  IN THE MATTER OF NUI Pulp and Paper Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Roxcel Trading GMBH, an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency Code was filed by the respondent against which the Corporate Debtor had filed a caveat. The Corporate Debtor also claimed the existence of a dispute and the Adjudicating Authority allowed time to file affidavit by the Corporate Debtor and rejoinder by the respondent. However at that stage, the respondent having expressed apprehension of the Corporate Debtor intending to sell the assets of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ to defeat the purpose of the ‘I&B Code’ and cause wrongful losses to all the creditors including the ‘Operational Creditor’, passed an interim order under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, restraining the Corporate Debtor and its Directors from alienating, encumbering or creating any third party interest on the assets of the 1st Respondent Company till further orders. Against that order t

In CIVIL APPEAL NO.20978 of 2017,  JK JUTE MILL MAZDOOR MORCHA vs JUGGILAL KAMLAPAT JUTE MILLS COMPANY LTD., the appeal was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of the NCLAT wherein the Ld. NCLAT had agreeing with NCLT had rejected the application of the appellant to be considered as an Operational Creditor under the Insolvency Code. The objection to the claim was that as no services are rendered by a trade union to the corporate debtor to claim any dues which can be termed as debts, trade unions will not come within the definition of operational creditors. That apart, each claim of each workman is a separate cause of action in law, and therefore, a separate claim for which there are separate dates of default of each debt. This being so, a collective application under the rubric of a registered trade union would not be maintainable. Referring to the definition of an Operational Creditor and debt under Section 3(23) & Section 5(c) of the Insolvency C

The Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963 not only enables a person to set up a plea of adverse possession as a shield as a defendant but also allows a plaintiff to use it as a sword to protect the possession of immovable property or to recover it in case of dispossession. In CIVIL APPEAL NO.7764 OF 2014, RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL vs MANJIT KAUR & ORS., the question before the 3 judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act only enables a person to set up a plea of adverse possession as a shield as a defendant and such a plea cannot be used as a sword by a plaintiff to protect the possession of immovable property or to recover it in case of dispossession. Whether he  is remediless in such a case? Why a person who has perfected his title by way of adverse possession cannot file a suit for obtaining an injunction protecting possession and for recovery of possession in case his dispossession is by a third person or by an owner after the extingui

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010, Rangappa vs Sri Mohan, the presumptions mandated in Sections 118, 138 & 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act were argued upon before the Supreme Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant-accused that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the same stood rebutted in this case, keeping in mind the discrepancies in the complainant’s version. It was reasoned that it is open to the accused to rely on the materials produced by the complainant for disproving the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.  The Supreme Court was in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of

In OP(Crl.).No.348 OF 2019, T.K.SAJEEVAN vs FRANCIS T.CHACKO, the appeal was filed against the order of the lower court to deposit 25% of the fine before filling of appeal. The appellant argued that the deposit introduced through the Section 148 of the NI Act after amendment was directory in nature as it used the term 'may' while mentioning the issue of deposit. The Kerala High Court however disagreeing held that in view of the object of the Legislature while incorporating Section 148 into N.I. Act, the word 'may' will have to be read as 'shall'. The imposition of payment contemplated under Section 148 N.I. Act cannot be restricted to some prosecutions and evaded in other prosecutions. Since the amount directed to be deposited being compensation, undoubtedly, it is liable to be ordered to be deposited irrespective of the nature of the prosecution. Therefore, the word 'may' can only be taken to have the colour and meaning of 'shall' and there

In Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 396 of 2019, State Bank of India Vs Moser Baer Karamchari Union & Anr., appeal was filed against the order of the NCLT wherein it was decided that the ‘Provident Fund Dues’, ‘Pension Fund Dues’ and ‘Gratuity Fund Dues’ cannot be part of the Liquidation Assets as per Section 53 of the ‘I&B Code’. 'Liquidation estate' comprises of the assets over which the Corporate Debtor has ownership rights. The Liquidator of Moser Baer took a stand that according to the explanation of section 53 of IBC, "workmen's dues" shall have the same meaning as that assigned to it under section 326 of the Companies Act, 2013 and hence, gratuity is included in the "liquidation estate assets", thus making it as an asset of the Corporate Debtor. The NCLT Bench was of the view that the term 'liquidation estate' has been defined under section 36 of the IBC and specifically excludes these dues from the purview of recovery

In Damodar S.Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal, the Supreme Court had issued the following guidelines for a graded scheme of imposing costs on parties who unduly delay compounding of the offence :- That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused. If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit. Similarly, if the application for compounding is made befor

In South Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. M/s Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., the issue considered by the Apex Court was whether a civil suit is maintainable in disputes pertaining to payment of tax under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Supreme Court bench observed that intendment of the legislature while enacting the Act was to exclude jurisdiction of civil courts. It held that Civil Court's jurisdiction, in this case, was impliedly barred. The court further observed that it is settled law that jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot be completely taken away in spite of either an express or implied bar. The civil courts shall have jurisdiction to examine a matter in which there is an allegation of non-compliance of the provisions of the statute or any of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

In WRIT PETITION NO.1870 OF 2019, Mahesh Mehervan Havewalla vs The State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court observed that the appellants joined as defendants in the original suit against which this appeal is being made and the sale transactions in favour of the present appellants, purporting to transfer the suit property in part, having been effected after filing of the suit, are therefore directly hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, as embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. However, the Supreme Court held that the Transfer of property pending suit as defined under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act no way lead to the proposition that any transaction on being hit by Section 52 ibid., is illegal or void ab initio. The effect of doctrine of lis pendens or   is not to annul all the transfers effected by the parties to a suit but only to render them subservient to the rights of the parties under the decree or order which may be made in that  suit. In othe

In Shri Rupesh Rashmikant Shah Vs Union of India & Ors., compensation was paid to the victim of an accident after a long legal battle but the insurance company paid the same after deducting TDS. The contention of the petitioner was interest component on the motor accident claim compensation paid to the petitioner is not taxable as it is a capital receipt. The other contention is that the interest is compensatory in nature. It is meant to offset the erosion of the principal compensation because of passage of time and the reduction of purchasing power of rupee due to inflation. According to the petitioner since the compensation itself is not taxable, the interest pendente lite which also forms part of the compensation, would not be taxable. When the receipt itself is not taxable, the question of deducting tax at source while making payment thereof would not arise. It was lastly contended that in any case, such interest should be spread over the entire period for which it is paid

Person, who claims title over property on strength of adverse possession is required to prove his case only against true owner of property In Dagadabai (dead) by L.Rs. v. Abbas, the First and Second Appellant Court concurring with the trial court had allowed the appeal but the High Court wed the appeal and while setting aside judgment/decree of two Courts below and the matter came to the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in admitting second appeal in first instance and then further erred in allowing it by answering question framed in Defendant's favour. When trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently decreed Plaintiff's suit by recording all findings of facts against Defendant, then, such findings of facts were binding on High Court. Second appeal did not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law within meaning of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(CPC) to enable High Court to admit appe