Legal News & Views

In Smt. Mangala Wd/O Vijay Khandar ... vs National Insurance Co. Ltd., the issue involved in this appeal before the Bombay High Court was about liability of insurance company to pay as per clause of ' personal accident cover' in the insurance policy. The issue is about extent of liability of insurance company when the insured/owner of the Jeep was himself the driver-cum-deceased and when no other vehicle is involved. The issue is whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (M.A.C.T) has got jurisdiction to decide such claim petition. The heirs of the deceased had claimed compensation from the insurer through th MACT under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV) which was rejected by the MACT. The insurer denied liability as the policy covered third party while the accident was a single vehicle one, and no other vehicle was involved or any other person injured. The insurer claimed that the insurer who was also the owner of the vehicle was driving and had died in the accident

In Mala Sahni Seth vs New India Assurance Co. Ltd., the insured died while trying to ride a high end bike. It was found on enquiring that the company owning the bike had specifically asked riders to get oriented with the bike before riding which the insured had not done. The claim of the legal heirs of the insured was however repudiated by the insurer as per Exception No. 5(a) of the policy which says that the company shall not be liable under this policy for Payment of compensation in respect of Death, Injury or Disablement of the Insured from Intentional self-injury. The matter reached the NCDRC which observed that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Galada Power and Telecommunication Limited Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. (2016) 14 SCC 161,  the insurer cannot be allowed to contest the consumer complaint beyond the ground on which the claim has been repudiated. A perusal of the repudiation letter would show that the claim was repudiated so

In M/S. INOX RENEWABLES LTD. vs JAYESH ELECTRICALS LTD., an appeal was filed against the order passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad was dismissed, holding that the courts at Jaipur, Rajasthan would be the courts in which the Section 34 petition could be filed. In this matter originally, a purchase order was was entered into between M/s Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd. [“GFL”] and the respondent herein, Jayesh Electricals Ltd. [“Respondent”]. The said order contained an arbitration clause which clearly stated that the venue of the arbitration shall be Jaipur and in the event of arbitrators’ award being not acceptable to either party, the parties shall be free to seek lawful remedies under the law of India and the jurisdiction for the same shall be courts in the State of Rajasthan. Therefore as per this agreement both the venue and seat of arbitration was Rajasthan and therefore jurisdiction was under the courts in Rajasthan. Subsequently, the Appellant took over the business of GFL by

Dhulabhai etc. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1969 SC 78 1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the lat

In BOOTA SINGH & OTHERS vs STATE OF HARYANA, the police had acting on secret information, arrested the accused with contraband while they were sitting in their car on a public road and they were convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) by the trial court which rejected the question of applicability of Section 42 of the NDPS Act raised by the accused. According to the trial court, the said question could help the accused if recovery had been effected from the house, building etc. of the accused. Admittedly, recovery in question was effected from the accused while they were sitting on road in a jeep at a public place. Therefore, case of accused would be covered by Section 43 of N.D.P.S. Act and not by Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act. On appeal the High Court agreed with the trail court stating that the accused were present in a jeep on a public path and in such circumstance, the provisions of Section 43 and not of 42 of the Act come int

In M/S FUMO CHEM PVT. LTD. vs M/S RAJ PROCESS EQUIPMENTS AND SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. & ORS., the petitioners asked for transfer of a subsequent suit  instituted by the respondents against them in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune to the Commerical Court, Ahmedabad where the petitioners had already filed a suit for there common issues involved in both the suits, which are between the same parties. The Supreme Court rejecting the petition held that the factor which needs consideration while examining a plea for transfer in a petition under Section 25 of the code is whether allowing such petition would be expedient in the ends of justice or not. This Court has to consider the prayer for transfer with an element of equity. The petitioners’ case is largely founded on the claim of having approached a judicial forum before the respondents did and both the suits emanate from the same set of facts with the same set of parties. These factors, by themselves cannot be the groun

In SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.2 OF 2020, In Re: EXPEDITIOUS TRIAL OF CASES UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I. ACT 1881, the Supreme Court decided to appoint an Amicus Curiae to suggest changes so that trials under Section 138 of NI Act could be decided. The other participants in this exercise were Union of India, Registrar Generals of the High Courts, Director Generals of Police of the States and Union Territories, Member Secretary of the National Legal Services Authority, Reserve Bank of India and Indian Banks’ Association, Mumbai as the representative of banking institutions. The learned Amici Curiae identified seven major issues from the responses filed by the State Governments and Union Territories which are as under: a) Service of summons b) Statutory amendment to Section 219 of the Code c) Summary trials d) Attachment of bank accounts e) Applicability of Section 202 of the Code f) Mediation g) Inherent jurisdiction of the Magistrate The Supreme Courts conclusions :- 1) The High Cour

In SANJIV PRAKASH vs SEEMA KUKREJA AND ORS., the dispute was whether a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been superseded and novated by a Share Holder Agreement (SHA) and therefore the arbitration agreement and the Respondents denied that there was any arbitration clause between the parties as the MoU itself had been superseded and did not exist after signing of the SHA. On appeal the Supreme Court referring to Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1, Pravin Electricals Pvt. Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 190, decided to examine whether the word “existence” in Section 11 merely refers to contract formation (whether there is an arbitration agreement) and excludes the question of enforcement (validity) and therefore the latter falls outside the jurisdiction of the court at the referral stage. On jurisprudentially and textualism it is possible to differentiate between existence of an arbitration agreement and validity of an arbitra

In ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY (INDIA) LIMITED vs BISHAL JAISWAL & ANR., the NCLAT relying on the Full Bench judgment of the NCLAT in V. Padmakumar v. Stressed Assets Stabilisation Fund, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 57 of 2020 (decided on 12.03.2020), rejected the NCLT order of admitting an application by Financial Creditor under Section 7 of IBC based on enteries made in the balance sheet. The NCLAT in the V. Padmakumar order had held that entries in balance sheets would not amount to acknowledgement of debt for the purpose of extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court referred to a plethora of judgments Mahabir Cold Storage v. CIT, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 402, A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna, (2002) 2 SCC 642, S. Natarajan vs. Sama Dharman, Crl. A. No. 1524 of 2014, Bengal Silk Mills Co. v. Ismail Golam Hossain Ariff, 1961 SCC OnLine Cal 128 : AIR 1962 Cal 115 where it has been held that that an entry made in the books of accoun

In IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs PEARL BEVERAGES LTD., the question which arises in this Appeal is, whether the NCDRC is correct in holding that the appellant is not entitled to invoke the shield of Clause (2c) of the Contract of Insurance, under which, it was not liable, if the person driving the vehicle, was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or drugs. The State Commission rejected the complaint of the respondent finding that there was evidence to show that the person who drove the vehicle, had consumed liquor and was under the influence of liquor. The NCDRC, by the impugned Order, on the other hand, found that there was no material to establish that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of the Exclusion Clause, as aforesaid. In this matter, the driver of the vehicle was observed travelling at high speed during early hours of the morning, hit the road divider then the wall of a park, overturn and burn so m

In GHANASHYAM MISHRA AND SONS PRIVATE LIMITED vs EDELWEISS ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED, the questions, that arose for consideration were:­ (i) As to whether any creditor including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority is bound by the Resolution Plan once it is approved by an adjudicating authority under sub­section (1) of Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘I&B Code’)? (ii) As to whether the amendment to Section 31 by Section 7 of Act 26 of 2019 is clarificatory/declaratory or substantive in nature? (iii) As to whether after approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority a creditor including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority is entitled to initiate any proceedings for recovery of any of the dues from the Corporate Debtor, which are not a part of the Resolution Plan approved by the adjudicating authority? The SC observed that after the amendment to Section 31 b

In NAVAYUGA ENGINEERING COMPANY vs BANGALORE METRO RAIL CORPORATION LIMITED, writ filed by the Respondent before the High Court against order of the arbitrator was allowed by the HC which changed the order. On appeal the Supreme Court categorically stated that despite this Court repeatedly referring to Section 5 of the Arbitration Act in particular and the Arbitration Act in general and despite this Court having laid down in Deep Industries Ltd. Vs. ONGC & Anr. (2020) 15 SCC 706 that the High Court under Article 226 and 227 should be extremely circumspect in interfering with orders passed under the Arbitration Act, such interference being only in cases of exceptional rarity or cases which are stated to be patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction, we find that High Courts are interfering with deposit orders that have been made. This is not a case of exceptional rarity or of any patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.

In A.R. MADANA GOPAL  vs M/S RAMNATH PUBLICATIONS PVT. LTD., appeals are filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court by which a decree for specific performance passed by the learned Single Judge was reversed. While reversing the decision of the Division Bench, the Apex court held that :- 1) A suit for specific performance cannot be dismissed on the sole ground of delay or laches. However, an exception to this rule is where an immovable property is to be sold within a certain period, time being of the essence, and it is not found that owing to some default on the part of the plaintiff, the sale could not take place within the stipulated time. Once a suit for specific performance has been filed, any delay as a result of the Court process cannot be put against the plaintiff as a matter of law in decreeing specific performance. However, it is within the discretion of the Court, regard being had to the facts of each case, as to whether some additional amount ou

In Ramakrishna B.K. vs Narayana Bhat.P., appeal was filed before the Kerala High Court by the Appellant against the order of the magistrate rejecting the complaint filed by the appellant. The High Court observed that the appellants alleged to have loaned money to the accused against which a cheque was issued by the accused which bounced. Lawyer notice was served upon the accused demanding money which was never replied to. However, before the court the accused challenged the financial capacity of the Appellants and his capability of lending the amount claimed. The accused claimed that the cheque in question was a signed blank cheque. No evidence was tendered by the 1st respondent.   Sections 20, 87 and 139 of the Act make it clear that unless the presumption is rebutted, it can be taken that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable liability. Referring to the decision in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [AIR 2019 SC 2446], it must be stated that even if a signed blank cheque

In Km. Anshu Jain And Others vs Suresh Prakash Garg And Others, a compromise was reached between the landlord/respondents and the father of the appellant wherein he was allowed to occupy a portion of a property during his lifetime for a fixed rent. On his death, his heirs challenged the eviction claiming the requirement of the landlord not being bonafide and sought to nullify the compromise settlement. The appeal was filed before the Allahabad High Court after the contention of the tenants have been rejected by the small causes court. The HC observed that there is no quarrel with the law that in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise and that the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution. However, as mentioned in the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Raghunath Prasad Pande vs. State of Karnataka and others 2018 (5

In Priti Saraf v. State of NCT of Delhi, the Supreme Court in reply to the question in what circumstances can a criminal proceeding be quashed, has reiterated that in the matter of exercise of inherent power by the High Court, the only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the process of the Court. The Apex  court held that in order to exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. The offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and other documentary evidence, if any, on record. The Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of putting a halt to the k