Legal News & Views

The ITAT in the case of Mr. Tushar Kothari vs. DCIT held that the provisions of deemed dividend would not attract if assessee was not a shareholder in the payer company.  Instant appeal was preferred by the assessee against the impugned order of CIT (A), New Delhi for the assessment year 2010-11, wherein upheld the addition of Rs. 10 lakh as deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. While filing the return of income AO found that M/s Beehive Systems Private Limited had advanced Rs.10 lakh to its Director Tushar Kothari (assessee) who was holding 46% of the shares in the said company. In reply, assessee told that he was not covered by the provisions of section 2(22) (e) of the Act.  However, AO added back the amount and the same was confirmed by the CIT (A). Further aggrieved assessee carried the matter before the ITAT and challenged the confirmation of addition contending that assessee is not a shareholder of M/s Beehive Technologies Private Limited from wh

The Hyderabad bench of ITAT recently declared that any loan taken from the closely held company to discharge the payment of salary is ‘commercial transaction’ for the purpose of ‘Deemed Dividend’ under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.  The bench comprising D. Manmohan, vice president and S. Rifaur Rahman, accountant member was hearing an appeal preferred by the assessee against the order of CIT (A) Hyderabad. During the assessment proceedings AO noticed that the assessee had takloanen a  from two companies, which are closely held companies and assessee holding substantial interest in that company.  The sole issue in the instant appeal was AO treated the loan amount taken by the assessee to the extent of Rs. 40,01,816/- as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/loan-closely-company-pay-salary-commercial-transaction-purpose-deemed-dividend-itat/16710/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A

The Kerala High Court, in M/S Indus Towers Limited Vs. The Assistant State Tax Officer, held that the power of detention contemplated under Section 129 of the SGST Act can be exercised only in respect of goods which are liable to be confiscated under Section 130 of the SGST Act.  While allowing the petition, Justice P.B Suresh Kumar clarified that goods cannot be detained merely for infraction of Rule 138(2) of the State SGST Rules when there is no taxable supply when goods are transported on delivery chalans so long as the authenticity of the delivery challan is not doubted and The petitioner-Company engaged in the establishment and maintenance of towers for telecom service providers, transported batteries under the strength of Tax Invoice. However, the Department officials detained the vehicle by invoking section 129 of the Act finding that the petitioner has not fulfilled the requirements of Rule 55 and 138 of the State GST Rules. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/goods

While upholding the provisions of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, a division bench of the Bombay High Court held that imposing of stamp duty on copies of the Instruments executed outside Maharashtra would not amount to Double Taxation.  While considering a bunch of petitions, the bench comprising Justice A.S Oka and Justice Vibha V. Kankanwadi rejected the argument that Section 7 read with Section 19 in so far as the same apply to the copies of the instruments are not constitutionally valid.  Before the High Court, the petitioners impugned the constitutional validity of provisions of sections 3, 7 and 19 of the said Act to the extent it levies stamp duty on the copies of the instruments executed outside the State of Maharashtra.  The petitioners submitted that the words “a copy of the instrument” was not in the Act at the time enactment and the same was subsequently added by the Maharashtra Act No. XVII of 1993.  According to them, merely because a copy of the deed or a ce

The Kolkata bench of the ITAT, while considering the case of I.T.O, Wd-12(1), Kolkata Vs. M/s Nupur Carpets Pvt. Ltd, held that the income from share transactions is taxable as “capital gain” under the Income Tax Act if the ‘initial intention’ of the assessee was to make investment.  The bench comprising Judicial Member N.V. Vasudevan & Accountant Member Dr. A.L.Saini was held so while dismissing the revenue’s appeal. Against the impugned order of CIT (A) which in turn arises out of an order passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 147/143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961 revenue preferred the matter before the tribunal bench.  During the reassessment proceedings the AO asked the assessee to explain why the income found shall not be considered business income. In reply assessee stated that assessee is a NBFC Company and such shares and mutual funds were held by the assessee as investment only and hence the gain has to be treated as capital gain. Article referred: http:

In SPT Securities Pvt. Ltd. vs DCIT,  Kolkata bench of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held  that brokerage or commission paid in connection with share transaction is not liable for Tax Deduction at source under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961.  Assessee is a private company in the present case has duly filed its return of income and declared a total income of Rs. 15,75,802. During the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) found that the assessee had paid sub brokerage of Rs.10,67,725 to its agents for doing share business in its name and he also disallowed the expenses of the said amount. He was of the view that the sub brokerage given to the agents was for doing business and not for sale of shares and securities. Therefore, it cannot be said that the sub-brokerage was against brokerage on securities, but it was for doing business on behalf of the company as its agents, which was fixed on the basis of the volume of the transactions, Hence he

In ISSAC Vs. Ronald Cheriyan and Ors, the trial court had convicted one of the accused of murder while releasing the other stating lack of sufficient ground for conviction. The High Court ordered retrial on appeal by the son of the deceased (murdered person). The accused then appealed before the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that Section 386 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC) defines the powers of the Appellate Court in dealing with the appeals. The powers enumerated thereon are vested in all Courts, whether the High Court or subordinate Courts, except that Clause (a) of the Section is restricted to the powers of the High Court only, since an appeal against an order of acquittal lies only to that Court, while Clause (b) of the Section is not so restricted and embraces all Courts.  Under Section 386(a) and (b)(i) of Cr. PC, the power to direct retrial has been conferred upon the Appellate Court when it deals either with an a

In The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Devansh Real Estate Pvt. Ltd., High Court of Delhi,  the Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) was filed by the Appellant/tenant/Oriental Insurance Company Limited impugning the judgment of the trial Court whereby the trial Court has decreed the suit filed by the Respondent/plaintiff/landlord for mesne profits. On account of a decree passed earlier being passed under Appellant/Defendant, the Appellant/Defendant vacated the suit premises on 25th March, 2014. However, the mesne profits have been granted by the trial Court not later till 25th March, 2014 but earlier only till 31st December, 2013 as there was an offer made by the Appellant/Defendant to vacate the suit premises by 31st December, 2013, but the Respondent/Plaintiff did not take possession of the suit premises and ultimately took possession only in Court on 25th March, 2014 pursuant to an application filed by the Appellant/Defendant for handing

In Honshu Buildcon Private Limited and Ors. Vs. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, High Court of Delhi, Petitioner received a Show Cause Notice from the NDMC, alleging that Petitioner had a direct connection with certain defaulter companies which violated the terms and conditions of the tender notice (NIT) and asked Honshu to explain why its application submitted for participation in the e-auction should not be cancelled along with further actions. On receipt of the Show Cause Notice Honshu confirmed that its directors, as well as its shareholders had no direct relation with the defaulter companies as alleged, and requested the NDMC to withdraw the said Show Cause Notice on this ground alone. It, requested the NDMC to withdraw the Show Cause Notice being without any merit. On NDMC cancelling the Letter of Intent (LoI) and forfeiting EMD deposited by the Petitioner, Honshu preferred the writ petition alleging that, the cancellation is arbitrary and mala fide.  NDMC alleges to h

In OTA KANDLA PVT. LTD. Versus THE O/P INT. IN THE VESSEL M.V. NEPENTHE & ORS., the plaintiff's case in the suit is that its maritime claim against the said ship is on account of supply of necessaries made to another ship M.V. ARYBBAS registered in the name of the defendant no.3, which is also a company incorporated under the appropriate laws of Republic of Liberia. According to the plaintiff, although the ships, namely, M.V. NEPENTHE and M.V. ARYBBAS and the said vessel are registered in the names of the defendant nos.2 and 3 companies respectively but, the same are beneficially owned by the defendant no.4, another company also incorporated under the appropriate laws of the Republic of Liberia and all the three companies have their office in Greece at 25, Poseidonos Avenue, Moschato, 183 44 Piraeus, Greece. The plaintiff has alleged although the defendant no.4 is the common Ship Manager/Commercial Manager of the said vessel and M.V. ARYBBAS, but it is the defendant no.4 compa

In BATRA HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION vs BATRA HOSPITAL & MEDICAL RESEARCH., the Delhi High Court held that Section 32(v)(c) of the Act, which excludes from the purview of the Act employees working with hospitals “established not for purposes of profit”. It opined that the provision must be interpreted expansively rather than restrictively, observing, “In the case of an institution which is making profits, therefore, the judicial effort, clearly, has to aim at ensuring bonus, to its workers, rather than denying the same by resorting to any hyper-technical interpretation of the statute. Of course, if the statute unambiguously excludes an institution, then, needless to say, it is no part of the duty of the court to bend backwards to encompass the institution within the ambit thereof.” It then went on to reject the reliance placed by the Hospital on the exemption granted to it under Section 80-G (5) of the I-T Act, noting that under the I-T Act, providing medical relief, ipso facto,

In Board of Trustee for the Port of Calcutta & Anr. Vs. Samir Patra, The proceeding before the learned Judge arose in the following way. On 5th June, 1987 an order of suspension was passed by the appellant authority against the respondent on the charge of dishonesty and financial irregularities causing huge loss to it. He was suspended from 6th June, 1987 till 10th September, 1991. On 7th October, 1987 a charge-sheet was issued against him. The memorandum of charges was amended on 15th February, 1988. On 15th January, 1991 the enquiry proceeding was completed. From 1991, it took the appellant authority five years to pronounce the final order in the disciplinary proceedings. This final order was pronounced on 18th September, 1996. The respondent was held guilty. One increment of the respondent was withheld for four years having the effect of postponing future increments. The period of suspension was treated as having been spent on duty by the respondent. The respondent appe

The Supreme Court in SURESH GANPATI HALVANKAR vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., setting aside a judgment dated March 30, 2017 of the Bombay High Court, held that the offence of ‘interference with meters or works of licensee’ under section 138 of the Electricity Act of 2003 also relates to the theft of electricity and hence, is compoundable under section 152 of the Act. In the impugned judgment, The High Court compounded the offence of theft of electricity under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, dealing with tapping of electricity lines, tampering/damage/destruction of an electric meter or related equipment, usage of electricity through a tampered meter and use for an unauthorised purpose, but refused to do so qua Section 138 of the Electricity Act, stating that though the said section deals with maliciously injuring electric meters, since it does not directly relate to the offence of theft it would not be covered by Section 152 of the Electricity Act. The bench stating

In Pushap Raj v. State of H.P., order dated March 16, 2017,   High Court of Himachal Pradesh allowed a criminal revision petition holding that an appeal against an acquittal, where offences are bailable and non-cognizable, lies in the High Court and not in the Court of Sessions Judge. Article referred: http://blog.scconline.com/post/2018/01/02/appeal-acquittal-bailable-non-cognizable-offences-not-maintainable-sessions-court/

In AMBIKA D/O.ARAVINDAKSHAN vs K.ARAVINDAKSHAN, the Kerala High Court has held that an unmarried Hindu daughter has the legal right to claim from her father reasonable expenses for marriage. This is based on Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, as per which a father has the legal obligation to maintain his unmarried daughter, whether legitimate or illegitimate. ‘Maintenance’, as defined in Section 3(b)(ii) of the Act, includes reasonable expense of and incidental to marriage. Hence, the legal obligation of father extends to meeting reasonable marriage expenses. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/hindu-daughter-can-claim-marriage-expenses-father-kerala-hc-read-judgment/

In Lt. Col. (Retd.) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Union of India, decided on 7-12-2017,  Applicant has stated that there has been erratic felling of the tree and construction of kaccha road in a large part of the forest area which is important wildlife corridor and frequented by wild animals including leopards from Asola Sanctuary. The above stated information is well known to the Forest Department but no timely action has been taken on their part. National Green Tribunal held that the material defence noted in this whole scenario is that  Respondent 5 did not deny any of the stated allegations but contended that some unknown offenders were involved in the felling of trees for which a criminal complaint had also been filed and further the Forest Department was restraining him from entering his own land as they considered him to be one of the accused too. The Court observed that by examining the legal position and the various FIR’s in the name of respondent alleging him to be one of

In Bhakra-Beas Management Board (BBMB) v. Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (PSERC),  order dated 6.09.2017, while deciding an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity  inter alia held that the State Commission overstepped its jurisdiction while limiting the liability of PSPCL towards the appellant and exceeded the scope of the order of this Tribunal by going into the issue of apportionment of costs between the power and irrigation wings of BBMB. The appellant, BBMB is a Generating Company involved in the inter-state transmission of electricity. Respondent 2, PSPCL is the successor entity of the erstwhile Punjab State Electricity Board. The appeal was filed under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 against the order passed by the State Commission wherein the State Commission determined the ARR and tariff of PSPCL for FY 2016-17, including the cost of generation and inter-state transmission of electricity from projects operated and maintained by the appellan

In YN Prasad v. PIO, Alhmad Evening Court, decided on 16.10.2017, the Central Information Commission held that judicial proceedings and records thereof are public records and the appellant has a right to secure desired information. The appellant had sought information of some proceedings to which he himself was not a party, seeking copy of response filed in a complaint against the management of Redeemed Christian Church of God, Janakpuri, before the MM, Karkardooma Court. Article referred: http://blog.scconline.com/post/2017/11/03/judicial-proceedings-records-public-records-can-accessed-rti/

In Kleenage Products (India) Private Limited vs The Registrar of Trade Marks, the petitioner had applied for registration of trademark ‘KLITOLIN’ which was accepted and from 1988 to 2009, the said trademark was renewed multiple times. The trademark was due for renewal on August 21, 2009, but the petitioner failed to tender application for renewal.  It was, thereafter, revealed that the trademark is likely to be removed from the register. The petitioner contended that the Registrar of Trademarks (respondent No.1) also failed to issue the requisite mandatory notice in Form O-3 to him (the registered proprietor) under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition holding that any such removal can only be possible if prior notice, mandatory under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1999, has been given Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/removal-registered-trademarks-cant-done-without-giving-prior-notice-registered-proprietor-bombay-hc-

In Canara Bank v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited, decided on 14.9.2017, Canara Bank, the appellant-financial creditor, challenged an order of moratorium thereby prohibiting the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings except before the High Courts and Supreme Court of India, against the Corporate Debtor. The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the Adjudicating Authority cannot exclude any court from the purview of moratorium for the purpose of recovery of amount or execution of any judgment or decree, including the proceeding, if any, pending before the High Courts and Supreme Court of India against a ‘corporate debtor’. The NCLAT, dismissing the appeal, and further clarifying the impugned order passed by Tribunal relating to ‘moratorium’ held in clear terms that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court has power under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India which po

In Anant Kajare v. Eknath Aher, decided on 30-11-2017, the appellant has challenged the order dated 14th July, 2017 passed by National Company Law, Tribunal, Chennai Bench wherein the Tribunal granted ‘waiver’ under the proviso to Section 244(1) of the Companies Act, 2013. According to the Tribunal, the petitioner had made out the case for grant of waiver under Section 244. The NCLAT, New Delhi, while adjudicating the grant of waiver by the Tribunal, opined that the impugned order had been passed in a mechanical manner by the Tribunal without considering any exceptional circumstances to allow the application for ‘waiver’ under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 244, the Tribunal has not applied its mind as to whether (proposed) application under Section 241 merits consideration and whether it relates to ‘oppression and mismanagement’. NCLAT also explicitly held in Cyrus Investments case that The Tribunal is required to take into consideration the relevant facts and evid

In Yashwant Rama Jadhav v. Shaukat Hussain Shaikh, First Appeal No. 1229 of 2017, decided on 18.11.2017,  the grievance of the petitioner before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was that appellants/complainants had entered into agreements with the respondents for purchase of residential flats, which the respondents were to construct and despite paying the substantial amount to the respondents, the construction of the flats had not been completed. The State Commission dismissed the complaints and ruled in favor of respondents against which the appellants approached the National Commission. The NCDRC held that Section ‘3’ of the Consumer Protection Act, to the extent it is relevant provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Thus the remedy available under the Consumer Protection Act is an additional remedy, which Parliament has made available to a consumer. Even

In Shah Virchand Govanji Jwellers Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, Valsad Circle, Valsad, decided on 26-10-2017, the Income Tax Apellate Tribunal, Surat, passed an order for a case related to difference in the amount of income and furthermore, in the return, due to adoption of different methods by each party. The brief facts of the case are that there was difference in the amount of income as two different methods were used by the parties respectively. Also there was an accusation of disallowance of computer expenses which was voluntarily agreed to by the assessee. The appeal for the same was filed before the CIT (A). However, the CIT (A) upheld the levity of penalty. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal observed that the difference in the valuation method alone does not amount to the conscious concealment of income. The Tribunal also said that issuing of notice without striking off the irrelevant clauses and without mentioning the speci

In Rajendra Mahadev Todkar v. M/s Paranjape Schemes (Construction) Company Limited, order dated 05-01-2018, the Bombay High Court heard a petition challenging the order of the trial court that had allowed admission of letters by the respondent as secondary evidence. The petitioner contended that there was nothing on record to show that those letters had been issued by the respondent and the respondent’s contention that they were in the possession of the petitioner was also not true. Therefore, the petitioner requested that the application seeking request to produce letters in the form of secondary evidence be rejected. The Court upheld the decision of the trial court allowing the respondent to produce secondary evidence stating that the necessary foundation for production of the secondary evidence had been established but merely because the respondent was allowed to lead secondary evidence does not imply that they will be exhibited or admitted in evidence. Therefore, the issue

In Sidhi Industries v. M/s Religare Finvest Ltd.,  decided on 11.12.2017, a Division Bench of Delhi High Court, dismissed an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “Arbitration Act”) read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 against the order of a Single Judge wherein the appellants had raised objections against the award of the arbitrator under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Court noticed that the arbitrator had issued a notice to the parties, wherein the following relevant sentence was quoted, “….currently adjudicating on multiple claims filed by the claimant company.” The order-sheet reflected that the hearing was attended by counsel for both parties. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interfering with the order passed by the Single Judge for two reasons. The first being that the argument urged before the Court was not raised in front of the Single Judge,

In Ram Kishor Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors, the High Court of Rajasthan held that the law of Contempt of Courts is for keeping the administration of justice pure and undefined. While dignity of the court has to be maintained at all costs. The contempt jurisdiction which is of a special nature should be sparingly used. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction conferred on the law courts power to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. The contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the Courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither fair nor reasonable for the law Courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. This has also been settled that, the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt.  The Explanation to Section 12 of the Act, m

In Seema Agency Vs. Union of India and Ors., High Court of Chhattisgarh, held that "Salus populi est suprema lex: regard for the public welfare is the highest law". This principle is based on the implied agreement of every member of society that his own individual welfare shall in cases of necessity yield to that of community. His property, liberty and life shall under certain circumstances be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good. This legal maxim has been followed by Supreme Court in the matter of Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others and it has been held that, in public law in certain situations, relief to the parties aggrieved by action or promises of public authorities can be granted on the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" but when grant of such relief is likely to harm larger public interest, the doctrine cannot be allowed to be pressed into service.  In the matter of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.,

In State of H.P. v. Chet Ram,  2018, order dated 10.01.2018,  a Single Judge Bench of High Court of Himachal Pradesh decided a criminal appeal filed by the State against the order of acquittal of the accused-respondent passed by the trial court, wherein it was held that when two views are possible, appellate court should not reverse the judgment of acquittal merely because the other view was possible. The respondent was the accused in a criminal case filed under Sections 325 and 504 IPC. He was acquitted by the trail court on appreciation of evidence and witness statements. Learned counsel for the appellant State contended that the trial court has not correctly appreciated the evidence, the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and as such the order under challenge should be reversed. Article referred: http://blog.scconline.com/post/2018/01/18/appellate-court-not-reverse-judgment-acquittal-merely-two-views-possible/

In Sonoma Management Partners Pvt. Ltd. v. Bank of Maharashtra, decided on 22nd November, 2016, while relying upon the Supreme Court decision in State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers Pvt. Ltd., 2006 (1) SCC 615 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that no charge can be enforced against a property legitimately purchased for consideration by the transferee if he has had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the charge. In the instant case, when a defaulter company could not repay the loan taken from the respondent bank, the bank took physical possession of a property belonging to the defaulter company under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act and invited offers for sale of the said property. On 1st September, 2010 the petitioners placed their bid for purchasing the property at Rs. 11,00,29,000. Thereafter, a Deed of Conveyance was registered in favour of the petitioners with the Registrar of Assurances on 10th March, 2011. At the time of registration, the petitioners

In Rohita Bhuniya Vs. Respondent: State of Orissa, the Appellant faced trial and convicted for offences punishable under Sections 498-A/302 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) on the accusation that he being the husband of deceased subjected her to cruelty by demanding dowry since the date of their marriage till her death and committed murder of the deceased.  While acquitting the Appellant, the court held that though a young lady has lost her valuable life within a few months of her marriage while she was pregnant and that to while she was staying in her in-laws' house but that itself cannot be a factor to convict the Appellant. Emotions have no role to play in a criminal trial in adjudicating the guilt or otherwise of the accused which is to be established by credible evidence. The crime committed may be cruel or ruthless but the evidence has to be evaluated dispassionately and objectively to see whether the accused is responsible for the said crime or he is innocent.  L

In Atanu Chattopadhyay Vs. Justice Debangsu Basak and Ors., Petitioner alleged that, because of the inaction on the part of the Respondents, the Petitioner has been denied justice and the Ministry of Law and Justice must take care and responsibility before nominating the advocates as the Hon'ble Judges of the Court, who are not fit for such posts. The Petitioner consistently harped upon denial of access to justice and injustice perpetrated upon him in not acceding to his prayer either listing as per his desire before the particular Judge and refusal to release the matter as he has inculcated a sense of bias against a particular Judge.  Issue involved in present is whether any cause of action is pleaded leading to denial of access to justice and such allegations and/or aspersions have any legal or factual basis.  While dismissing the Writ Petition, the court held tt is not open to any person to make scandalous, disparaging and intemperate remarks directly on the Judges or t

In Okechuku Mathew v. State of H.P., 2017, order dated December 29, 2017, High Court of Himachal Pradesh decided a criminal miscellaneous petition filed under Section 439 of CrPC, wherein it declined to grant the relief of bail as prayed for by the petitioner-accused. The petitioner was accused in a criminal case filed under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. The facts of the case were that 15 gms of heroin was recovered from the possession of the co-accused in this case. He told that he purchased the heroin from the petitioner herein. The incident took place in Kasol, H.P. Police searched the petitioner’s house in Delhi and recovered 1.5 kg of heroin. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire process initiated against the petitioner by the State was illegal and without jurisdiction by the police of the State from a place beyond its jurisdiction and for this reason alone, the petitioner was entitled to be grant

In Anthony H. Silva Vs. Hermonie Mary Salazar, the Respondent/complainant, filed the consumer complaint before the State Commission, saying that, she alongwith her siblings were absolute owners of agricultural land measuring 4972.9 sq. mtr. alongwith structures standing thereon, at village Kondivata, Taluka Andheri East at Bombay suburban.  The Opposite Party (OP) builder/Appellant, approached them with a proposal to take over the said land on "as is where is" basis and develop the same, by settling with the persons in occupation of the structure on the said land at his own cost and expenses and after obtaining necessary permissions and sanctions from the concerned authorities. On 7th November, 87, an agreement was entered between the complainant and four others on one side and the OP Builder on the other side, according to which, the developer was supposed to provide flats to the 5 owners, including the complainant for a total area of 8500 sq. ft. and sell the rest of t

Aero Club Vs. Ravinder Singh Dhanju The Petitioner is engaged in the business of selling Woodland Brand of shoes and apparels. The complainant/respondent went to a store of the Petitioner which had allegedly offered a discount of 35% on purchase of T shirt having maximum retail price of Rs. 2195 (inclusive of taxes). According to the Complainant, though the Petitioner had offered a flat 35% discount on the maximum retail price (inclusive of taxes), it charged a sum of Rs. 1498/- from him whereas, the price after deducting 35% discount comes to Rs. 1426.75. The Petitioner, according to the complainant had charged double VAT amount from him. It is also alleged that despite the request made by the complainant, the Petitioner refused to cancel the transaction, taking a plea that the invoice had already been generated. It was alleged that the petitioner had indulged into unfair trade practice, by charging double VAT amount. The complainant therefore, approached the concerned District For

In Rajendra Yadav V. Arati Plastic, order dated 04-01-2018, a Single Judge Bench comprising of Sanjib Banerjee, J., decided a petition wherein it was held that a stranger claiming to be a co-sharer in the suit property was not entitled to be impleaded as a co-plaintiff when the original plaintiff opposes such inclusion. The petitioner was the original plaintiff in a suit for eviction of a licensee. By the impugned order, the trial court allowed a stranger to be impleaded as a co-plaintiff upon such stranger claiming to be a co-sharer of the property with the original plaintiff. The present petitioner-original plaintiff, aggrieved by the said order, filed the instant petition. The High Court, after going through the records and considering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, was of the view that it was always open to the petitioner to oppose or embrace the said stranger as a co-sharer. Once the petitioner opposed the alleged co-sharer, the alleged co-sharer was no

The Delhi High Court has ruled that mere hosting of a webpage on Facebook would not confer jurisdiction in the State where such page is viewed. “...it is clear that merely hosting a web page on Facebook would not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a Court where the defendant does not carry on business. Merely because Facebook is an interactive site and permits the users to offer comments or indicate whether they “like what they see” on the site, would not be sufficient to provide a cause of action for passing off in a jurisdiction where the defendant does not enter into any commercial transaction,” Justice Vibhu Bakhru explained. The Court was hearing an Application filed by ‘News Nation Gujarat’, praying that the passing off suit filed against it by ‘News Nation Networks Private Limited’ be dismissed as it does not disclose a “clear right to sue”. It had further contended that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. While the mark ‘News Nation’ is

In Capital First Ltd. vs The State of Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court has held that for the purposes of Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is not a persona designata and the Additional District Magistrate or Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has the same judicial powers. Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act requires the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist a secured creditor in taking possession of secured asset. It has been stated in the petition that in view of amended provisions of Section 14 of the Act, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate is required to pass suitable orders within 30 days from the date of application, which period could be extended not exceeding in aggregate 60 days. However, when the high court directed the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to ‘endeavour to

In UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH vs PRADEEP KUMAR AND ANOTHER, The Supreme Court, on Monday, upheld rejection of candidature of Police aspirants on the ground that they had criminal antecedents, despite the fact that they had been acquitted. The Bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice U.U. LalitLalit observed, “While deciding whether a person involved in a criminal case has been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in a police force, nature of offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honorable acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt because of witnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be considered by the Screening Committee for taking the decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post.... … object of such screening is to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enters police force. While so, the court cannot substitute its views for the decision of the Screening Committee.” Art

In ROOPESH @ PRAVEEN vs UNION OF INDIA, the Kerala High Court has held that there is no express or implied power conferred by the statute to the magistrate to direct the accused to give voice samples for the purposes of investigation.  The ruling was rendered by a division bench comprising Justice AM Shaffique and Justice P Somarajan. While rendering the ruling, the division bench overruled an earlier decision of a single bench in Pratap v CBI (2017) (3) KLT 458, which had held that the magistrate has power under Section 311A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to direct the accused to give voice samples. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/magistrate-no-express-implied-power-direct-accused-give-voice-samples-investigation-purposes-kerala-hc-read-judgment/

In M/s. Essel Propack Ltd. vs DCIT, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal said Business Advances made without interest to Indian and subsidiaries can’t be disallowed under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961.  The Revenue, in the instant case, was aggrieved by the order of the first appellate authority who deleted the disallowance of interest under Section 36 (1) (iii) of the Income Tax Act on the plea that assessee was having sufficient own funds for investment in subsidiary company. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/business-advances-made-without-interest-indian-foreign-subsidiaries-disallowed-itat/16289/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Taxscan+%28Top+Stories+%E2%80%93+Taxscan+%7C+Simplifying+Tax+Laws%29

In the case of DCIT vs. Smt. Sriram Satyavathi, Visakhapatnam bench of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITA) recently held that amount given as security for purchase of flat cannot be treated as ‘deemed dividend’ for the purpose of Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.  Assessee in the present case is an individual duly filed his return of income for the relevant assessment year.  During the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) has conducted a search under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act 1961.  It was found during the course of search that a promissory note executed in favour of the assessee which representing Vijetha Foundation and Constructions Pvt. Ltd.for a sum of Rs.35 lakhs. However the assessee was called for explanation as to why the loan given to M/s. Vijetha Constructions should not be brought to tax under section 2(22)(e) of the Act in the hands of the assessee. In response the assessee explained that M/s. First Tek Pvt. Ltd. had advan

In The ACIT vs M/s. TRN Energy Pvt. Ltd., while dismissing the appeal filed by the revenue Delhi bench of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) has held that the share application money received cannot be treated as unexplained for the purpose of Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 if the Assessing Officer (AO) doesn’t made any investigation on the documentary evidences at the period of assessment.  In the instant case the assessee company has filed its return of income for the relevant assessment year declared a loss of Rs.2,75,807.  During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that during the year under consideration, the assessee-company has received fresh share application money of Rs.10,63,50,000 from M/s. Jaisri Properties Exports Pvt. Ltd and the assessee was asked to furnish evidence in support of the genuineness of the share application money. In response, the assessee submitted all the supporting documents of the genuineness of the share application

In Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware vs Narayan Keru Nitanware, quashing an order passed by a joint civil judge junior division, Pune, the Bombay High Court has held that under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, will devolve upon the heirs of her father/mother, if she dies without any children of her own, and not upon her husband. Justice Shalini Phansalkar Joshi was hearing a writ petition filed by relatives of one Sundarabai, who died issueless more than 45 years ago on June 18, 1962. Article referred:http://www.livelaw.in/property-inherited-female-hindu-parents-shall-devolve-upon-heirs-father-not-husband-dies-childless-bombay-hc-read-judgment/