Legal News & Views

The Supreme Court faced with conflicting views of the different Benches of varying strength on the issue of anticipatory bail, in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS.7281­7282/2017 Sushila Aggarwal vs State (NCT of Delhi), had referred the following questions are referred for consideration by a larger Bench: (1) Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 Cr.P.C. should be limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the Trial Court and seek regular bail. (2) Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court. A five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court the confusion. Reiterating the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Court back in 1980 in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others v. State of Punjab (Sibbia case), the Supreme Court has clarified: There is nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to indicate that the grant of pre-arrest/a

In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd v M/s J K Cement Works Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 7402/2009, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by the insurer against the order of the NCDRC allowing the claim of the respondent. The respondent had purchased a Standard Fire and Peril Insurance Coverage from the appellant, which covered, among other things, damages due to "flood and inundation". Due to heavy rains, the coal stocked by the respondent got washed away. The appellant repudiated the claim in respect of that damage by saying that the damage due to heavy rains was not covered under 'flood and inundation'. The insurer argued that ''flood' refers to overflowing of water bodies such as rivers, ponds, lakes etc. With respect to the term 'inundation', the company argued that the same refers to 'accumulation of water' and could thus not be applied to the instant case as the coal had merely been washed off due to heavy rains. Rejecting

In Civil Appeal No.4242/2019, Maharashtra Seamless Ltd v Padmanabhan Venkatesh, appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against order of NCLAT by which the Resolution Applicant (MSL) was directed to modify the resolution plan on the ground that it was below the liquidation value of the corporate debtor and that the operational creditors were not treated at par with the financial creditors. Rejecting the order of the NCLAT, the Supreme Court held that there is no provision in the Code or Regulations under which the bid of any Resolution Applicant has to match liquidation value arrived at in the manner provided in Clause 35 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. The object behind prescribing such valuation process is to assist the CoC to take decision on a resolution plan properly. Once, a resolution plan is approved by the CoC, the statutory mandate on the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31(1)

In CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 242­243 OF 2020, National Insurance Company Limited vs Birender, one of the principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the major sons of the deceased who are married and gainfully employed or earning, can claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act ? The Supreme Court referring to judgment of the court in Manjuri Bera (Smt) v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., observed that the legal representatives of the deceased could move application for compensation by virtue of clause (c) of Section 166(1). The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependant on the deceased, would be still covered by the expression “legal representative” of the deceased. Liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency of the concerned legal representative. Notably, the expression “legal representative” has not been defined in the Act. Further, the court held that while adverting to the provisions of Section 140

In CIVIL APPEAL No.79 OF 2020, MOHAMMED SIDDIQUE vs NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by parents of the deceased-accident victim against the order of the High Court reducing the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The Supreme Court observed that the victim was one of the 2 pillion riders on a motor cycle and he was thrown off the vehicle when a car hit the motor cycle from behind. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal found that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the car. This finding was confirmed by the High Court, though with a rider that the victim was also guilty of contributory negligence, in as much as there were 3 persons on the motor cycle at the time of the accident, requiring a reduction of 10% of the compensation awarded. It is seen from the material on record that the accident occurred at about 2:00 a.m. on 5.09.2008. Therefore, there was no possibility of heavy traffic on

In Civil Appeal No. 353 of 2020, M/S. PAWAN HANS LIMITED vs AVIATION KARMACHARI SANGHATANA, the issue which arises for consideration is whether the contractual employees of the Appellant­Company are entitled to provident fund benefits under the Pawan Hans Employees Provident Fund Trust Regulations or under the Employees’Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 framed thereunder. The members of the Respondent -Union had made several representations to the company to extend the benefit of the PF Trust Regulations since they were directly engaged by the Company on contractual basis, some of whom were working for almost 20 years. Being aggrieved by the inaction of the Company, the Respondent­-Trade Union approached the High Court. The High Court directed a liberal view must be taken in extending social security benefits to the contractual employees and that the benefits under the EPF Act be extended to the members of the Res

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.56 OF 2020, K. JAGADISH vs UDAYA KUMAR G.S., appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the order of the Karnataka High Court. In the complaint filed before the High Court, the appellant alleged that The crux of the complaint was that he was coerced to enter into a transaction by the accused. It was alleged that, no consideration was paid but three post-dated cheques aggregating to Rs.49.38 lakhs were handed over to the complainant and he was threatened that he must encash the cheques. Under such threat and coercion and since he was under surveillance, he deposited the first cheque amounting to Rs.15 lakhs on 12.07.2016 which was accordingly encashed and credited to his account. The first of the other two cheques was due on 15.07.2016 which the appellant never deposited and on 17.07.2017 initiated the criminal proceedings submitting that he was coerced to enter into the transaction, as stated above. The second and third cheques were thus never enca

In CIVIL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2020, SHRI UTTAM CHAND vs NATHU RAM, appeal was filed by the plaintiff before the Supreme Court against judgment and decree passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby, the defendants second appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff for possession on the basis of title was dismissed. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession on the basis of purchase of suit property from the Managing Officer, Department of Rehabilitation, Government of India in a public auction held on 21st March, 1964. The certificate of sale was issued thereafter on the January, 1965. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession on 17th February, 1979 alleging the defendants to be in an unauthorised possession of the suit property and who have refused to vacate the same. The defendants in the written statement denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the property. The defendants asserted that their house existed on the property in question for more than the last two centuries. T

In A.P. No.550 of 2008, Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. (Formerly Known as I.K. Merchants), the question before the Calcutta High Court was whether the present application under Section 34 of the Act should be kept in abeyance by reason of the provision of the IBC being invoked by operational creditors against the petitioner. The petitioner contended before the Court that the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside of the award cannot be proceeded with since Corporate Insolvency proceedings under the IBC has already been initiated against him as the ‘Corporate Debtor’. It was further submitted by the petitioner that since the management of the petitioner/corporate debtor has already been taken over by JK Paper Limited (the resolution applicant before the NCLT) and the respondents have also not made any efforts to place their claim before the Resolution Professional (“RP”), the said application under Section 34 of the Arbitra

In Crl OP(MD)No.34996 of 2019, Mr.Ajay Kumar Bishnoi, Former Managing Director M/s.Tecpro Systems Ltd., vs M/s.Tap Engineering, application was filed before the Madras High Court to quash the application under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 pending before the Fast Track Court -IV Magistrate as illegal, invalid and non est in the eyes of law and consequently direct the respondent/complainant to pursue their remedies as per the provision of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. In this matter, eight cheques were issued by the applicant which bounced and on issued with a demand notice by the defendant, only partial payment was made. The defendant then filed complaint under under Section 138 r/w 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was taken and summons were issued naming Tecpro Systems Limited was shown as the first accused and petitioner herein was shown as the second accused. During the pendency of these complaints, Tecpro Systems Limited came under

In In  CONSUMER CASE NO. 261 OF 2012, MANU SOLANKI & 8 ORS vs VINAYAKA MISSION UNIVERSITY, reference was made to the NCDRC by the appellants accusing the defendants of deficiency of service and unfair trade practice by inducing them and false assurances. The problem before the NCDRC was the conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court whence in 2010, a division bench of the Supreme Court had in Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur, 2010 (11) SCC 159, examined in detail the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora to entertain a Complaint with respect to deficiency of service by Educational Institutions and held that they are not `service providers' and a student who takes an examination is not a `consumer', under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Again in PT Koshy & Anr. v. Ellen Charitable Trust & Ors., 2012 (3) CPC 615 (SC), whereby it was held that education is not a commodity. Educational institutions are not providing any kind of service, therefore, in mat