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Showing posts from December, 2020

Any creditor of a company can seek transfer of winding up proceeding pending before a High Court to a National Company Law Tribunal

In Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Respondent: Axis Nirman and Industries Ltd. and Ors., Girdhar Trading Co., the 2nd Respondent herein, filed a petition in Company Petition before the High Court of Allahabad under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956, for the winding up of the first Respondent Company, on the ground that the Company was unable to pay its debts. The Company Court ordered notice to the 1st Respondent herein, but the 1st Respondent failed to appear before the Company Court. Therefore, by an order, the Company Court ordered the admission of the Company Petition and also directed publication of the advertisement of the petition in accordance with Rule 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.  The Company Court passed an order on 22nd August, 2016 keeping the winding up order dated 10th March, 2016 in abeyance. However, the Company Court directed the Official Liquidator to continue to be in custody of the assets of the Company. While things stood thus, the Appella

Standard of proof in Motor Accident Claim Cases is one of preponderance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt

In Anita Sharma & Ors. vs The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr, appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur whereby the first appeal preferred by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. against the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's  award was allowed and the Claim Petition was rejected, whereas the appeal filed by the Appellant-claimants for enhancement of compensation was consequently dismissed. The issue was that road accident and eventual death had occurred while travelling in a car which had a head-on collusion with a truck which could not be traced. Since all the occupants of the car were injured, nobody noted the registration number of the truck. The insurance company in its separate written statement took the preliminary objection that as per the police investigation and first information report, the accident was caused by an unknown truck which hit the car and, therefore, the claim pe

Burden on the person who seeks amendment after commencement of the trial to show that the amendment could not have been sought earlier

In T.V. Sasikala and Ors. Vs. C.P. Joseph, after commencement of the examination of witnesses in the suit, the Plaintiff filed an application (Exhibit P5) under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for amendment of the plaint. The Defendants filed objection to application raising various contentions. The trial Court allowed application. The Defendants filed this appeal before the High Court of Kerala challenging the legality and propriety of the trial court order. The High Court observed that the Trial Court has allowed the amendment desired by the Defendant in the appeal with a cryptic order where there is a need for speaking order with reasons and is liable to be set aside for that reason alone. The High Court further observed that Order VI Rule 17 of the Code provides that, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as ma

Bank can sell vehicle seized due to default through public auction with prior written notice to the debtor

In ICICI BANK vs AMIT KURI, appeal was filed before the Delhi High Court by the Petitioner aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court in simplicitor adjourning the proceedings and not granting permission under Order XXXIX Rule 6 CPC for sale of the vehicle which has been taken into custody by the receiver appointed by the Court. The Petitioner contended that the respondent defaulted in making the payment of the instalments and accordingly the subject suit for recovery was filed against the respondent and application was moved to the concerned Trial Court for appointment of a receiver to take over possession of the subject vehicle. The possession of the vehicle was taken over on 02.04.2018. Application under Order XXXIX Rule 6 CPC was filed on 14.08.2018 seeking permission to sell the vehicle. The application is stated to be pending and no order on the application has been passed despite passage of substantial period. Order XXXIX Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with interim s

If an earlier application was rejected by a lower Court, the upper Court can always entertain the successive bail application

In Usman Ahmed vs Union Territory Of J&K And Another, FIR for offences under Sections 8/20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) came to be registered by the Police on the basis of an information received from the reliable sources to the effect that, Petitioner herein was in possession of charas for its illicit trade. During investigation of the case, 183 gms of charas was recovered from the possession of the Petitioner. Its sample was taken and sent to the FSL for chemical examination. Upon receipt of the report of FSL and completion of investigation, offences under Sections 8/20 of NDPS Act were found established against the Petitioner and challan was filed against him.  The Petitioner's application for grant of bail before the Court of Principal Sessions Judge was rejected by the Court. Being aggrieved of the said order, the Petitioner has filed the instant petition before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir for grant of bail in his favour on

A nominee is only a Trustee holding the amount on behalf of the actual beneficiaries and does not have any vested right or interest in the same

In R.Saranya vs. The Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, during the life time of the deceased Ramakrishnan, he had taken two insurance policies with the first Respondent. He had been paying the premium till his death. As the first Petitioner is inexperienced and was not well-educated, her husband had appointed the second Respondent, who is his paternal uncle's son, as nominee in the said policies. However, after the death of the first Petitioner's husband, the second Respondent is trying to appropriate the entire insurance amount taking advantage of the nomination made in his favour. Though a legal notice was issued to the first Respondent, the first respondent has not yet settled the amount in favour of the Petitioners. Petitioner has sought this writ of mandamus before the Madras High Court, to direct the first Respondent to release the insured amount under two Policy proportionately in favour of the Petitioners.  The prayer of the Petitioners was resisted by the fi

Share Application Money as transferred by the assessee is ‘Capital Asset’ for the purpose of Income Tax Act, 1961

In DCIT Circle, Mumbai vs. Morarjee Realities Ltd (Now known as Peninsula Land Ltd.) ,  as a part of corporate restructuring undertaken by the assessee group, it was decided that, shares of certain group entities held by the assessee would be transferred to other group entities, with the assessee-company focusing on real estate business. Accordingly, the assessee transferred its investments held in the shape of equity shares, preference shares and rights to apply for shares i.e. share application money held in MBL, to an entity MGM Shareholders Benefit Trust. The assessee similarly transferred equity shares in certain entities as well as share application money held in Morarjee Legler Limited to MBL. While doing so, the assessee suffered Long Term Capital Losses as well as short terms capital losses, the set-off of which was denied by Learned Assessing Officer (AO). However, upon further appeal, learned first appellate authority allows the same against which the revenue was in appeal.

Explained - Arbitration, meaning of non-arbitrability, Who Decides the Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction?, Who Decides Non-arbitrability ?

In VIDYA DROLIA AND OTHERS vs DURGA TRADING CORPORATION, the judgment decided the reference to three Judges made vide order dated 28th February, 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 2402 of 2019 titled Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation,1 as it doubted the legal ratio expressed in Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia that landlord-tenant disputes governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are not arbitrable as this would be contrary to public policy. However, in this judgment the Supreme Court held that a deeper consideration of the order of reference reveals that the issues required to be answered relate to two aspects that are distinct and yet interconnected, namely: (i) meaning of non-arbitrability and when the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being resolved through arbitration; and (ii) the conundrum – “who decides” – whether the court at the reference stage or the arbitral tribunal in the arbitration proceedings would decide

Landlord-Tenant Disputes Under Transfer Of Property Act Arbitrable Except When Covered By Rent Control Laws

In VIDYA DROLIA AND OTHERS vs DURGA TRADING CORPORATION, the judgment decided the reference to three Judges made vide order dated 28th February, 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 2402 of 2019 titled Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation,1 as it doubted the legal ratio expressed in Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia that landlord-tenant disputes governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are not arbitrable as this would be contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court decided that Landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable as they are not actions in rem but pertain to subordinate rights in personam that arise from rights in rem. Such actions normally would not affect third-party rights or have erga omnes affect or require centralized adjudication. An award passed deciding landlord-tenant disputes can be executed and enforced like a decree of the civil court. Landlord-tenant disputes do not relate to inalien

Prosecution can be launched before Income Tax Assessment completion

 In Rohit Kumar Nemchand Piparia vs  The Deputy Director of Income Tax (Inv), petition was filed before the High Court to quash the preceding initiated against the Appellants before the  Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences-II, Egmore, Chennai, taking cognizance for the offence under Section 276C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Dept. alleged that the petitioner had entered into 165 share transaction during the financial year 2007-08 and filed his return of income for the assessment year 2008-09. Though the tax has been deducted, it was not fully deducted and the petitioner did not disclose in his return of income under the head Capital Gain and paid the tax. Thus, the petitioner failed to show the same in his return of income and attempted to evade payment of tax. Only after deduction by the income tax department, the petitioner had share transactions during the relevant financial year and accepted the same. Therefore, the petitioner committed th

Land owner can claim Section 80-IB(10) despite no expense on Housing Project

 In the Commissioner of Income Tax, Business Ward III(1), Chennai. vs M/s.Astoria Leathers, appeal was filed by the Revenue Dept. against the order of the Tribunal. The substantial question of law before the High Court was whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct and justified in directing the Assessing Officer to allow deduction under Section 80IB(10) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to assessee land owner when it had not incurred any expenses towards development or construction of the housing project ? The High Court o answer the substantial question of law, we need not labour much, as an identical question was considered and decided by a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (TSSJ) was a party, in TCA.No.177 of 2018 vide judgment dated 30.1.2019 [M/s.Bashyam Constructions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. DCIT]. In fact, the nature of transaction is also the same. After taking into consideration the decisions of this Court in the cases of (i) CIT Vs. Sanghvi & Doshi Enterprise [r

Section 54F deduction cannot be denied for subsequent letting of property for commercial use

In CIT Vs Ramesh Shroff, the appeal was filed before the Madras High Court filed by the revenue under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is directed against the order passed by the ITAT, 'A' Bench in I.T.A.No.2710/Chny/2017 dated 13.12.2018 for the assessment year 2011-2012. The respondent / assessee, who is an individual has filed his return of income on 30.07.2011 admitting a total income of Rs.4,44,610/-. The case was selected for scrutiny and notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was issued on 01.08.2012 accepting the return filed by the assessee. Thereafter, the assessee had sold properties at Uthandi by a registered sale deeds. The assessee contended that the properties, which were sold were agricultural lands and did not offer any capital gain on such transfer. This was a ground on which assessment was re-opened by stating that income chargeable to capital gain has escaped assessment. In the re-assessment proceedings, the assessee contended that lands were agricu

No TDS u/s 194I on Payment for Acquisition of Leasehold Rights over Immovable Property

In M/s.Nagarjuna Oil Corporation Ltd., vs The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS Circle II,  the issue before the Madras High Court involved before the learned Tribunal was whether one time lump sum paid by the Assessee for getting 99 years lease of land from the Government Undertaking viz., SIPCOT was a payment in the nature of rental and therefore, the Assessee was required to deduct tax at sources under Section 194 I of the Act and having failed to do so, the said payment was liable to be added back to the declared income of the Assessee? The learned Tribunal followed the earlier view of its own in the case of M/s.TRIL Infopark Ltd., (ITA No.699/Mds/2014, Order dated 19.06.2015) and Foxconn India Developers (P) Ltd. vs. ITO reported in 2012(53) SOT 0213. The High Court agreeing with the Coordinate Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Foxconn India Developer (P.) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer, TDS Ward- II (3), Chennai, [2016] 68 taxmann.com 95 (Madras) held that such l

If the delay is properly explained and no third party rights are being affected, the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution may condone the delay

In Vetindia Pharmaceuticals vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, the appellant was served with an order of blacklisting dated 08.09.2009 by the Office of Director, Animal Husbandry Department of the respondent referring to the State Analyst report dated 10.10.2008, declaring the batch supplied by the appellant to be of substandard quality (misbranded/not in accordance with Oxytetracycline injection), thus violating clauses 8.12 and 8.23 of the Tender of 2006­07. The appellant informed the respondents that it had never made any supplies to them under the Tender in question. The misbranding referred to was an inadvertent error. The brand name of the medicine was correctly mentioned as “OXY­125”. The composition of the medicine was also correctly mentioned as “Oxytetracycline HCL IP Vet 125 mg”. The generic term “Hcl” was only missing on the label, and it was written as “OXYTETRACYCLINE INJ. I.P. VET” in place of “OXYTETRACYCLINE HCL INJ. I.P. VET”. It was therefore a case of bonafide inadvert