Legal News & Views

In Company Appeal (AT) No. 221 of 2018, IN THE MATTER OF Jindal Steel and Power Limited vs Arun Kumar Jagatramka, appeal was preferred under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013  against order passed by National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench by which the Tribunal in an application under Section 230 to 232 of the Companies Act, preferred by Promoter – Arun Kumar Jagatramka ordered for taking steps for Financial Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement between Applicant - Arun Kumar Jagatramka (Promoter) and the Company (‘Corporate Debtor’) through the ‘Liquidator’, after holding the debts of shareholders, creditors etc. in terms of Section 230 of the Companies Act. The Appellant has challenged the same on following grounds:- (i) Whether in a liquidation proceeding under IBC, the Scheme for Compromise and Arrangement can be made in terms of Sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act? (ii) If so permissible, whether the Promoter is eligible to file an application for Compromise

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 690 OF 2014, STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH vs UDHAM AND OTHERS, appeal is directed by the appellant­State against the   final   order   dated   06.11.2012,   passed   by   the   High   Court   of Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior Bench) in Criminal Appeal No. 659 of 2011, whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondents­/accused herein and reduced the sentence awarded by the Trial Court to the period already undergone for the offences under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 of IPC, and Section 452 of the IPC. The Supreme Court observed that the reasoning of the High Court, for passing the impugned order and partly allowing the appeals   of   the   respondents/­accused   herein,   is   limited   to   one sentence. The High Court states in its order that looking to the nature of the offence, the fact that this is the first offence of the respondents and the period of sentence already undergone by them.  Referring to the jud

In Sindhu S.Panicker vs. A.Balakrishnan, the transaction alleged by the complainant was on 10.04.2007. The cheque allegedly given by the accused to the complainant is dated 16.05.2007. The complaint under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused was filed only on 29.03.2011. On a petition filed by the accused before the Kerala High Court for quashing of the complaint on the ground of undue delay, the court observed that the general rule of criminal justice is that "a crime never dies". Mere delay in approaching a court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict (See Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty : AIR 2007 SC 2762). When no period of limitation is prescribed for filing the complaint, it cannot be thrown out on the sole ground of delay. The question of delay in filing a complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at the final

In CIVIL APPEAL NO.8298 OF 2019, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 22541 OF 2018), THE STATE OF MANIPUR vs KOTING LAMKANG, appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against judgment and order of the Manipur High Court whereby the High Court had refused the prayer condonation of delay of 312 days in preferring the Regular First Appeal. The Supreme Court however allowing the appeal held that while concluding as above, it was necessary for the court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a Government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be condoned. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the Government’s functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This i

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8069 OF 2019, (Arising out of SLP (C) No.11852 of 2019), M. Hariharasudhan  vs R. Karmegam and Ors., while dealing with the question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court by specially constituted tribunals in an Act, the Supreme Court concluded that such ouster was not to be readily inferred unless the conditions set out by the  Court were satisfied. For the purposes of determining the question before us, we need only refer to the following conditions laid down by this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968 (3) SCR 662 :- (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental prin

In M.A. No. 814 of 2019, in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2463 OF 2019, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) ­vs NRA Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd., the appeal was filed for re­call of the Judgment of the Supreme Court, on the ground that the Applicant – Company was not served with the Notice of the SLP at the registered office of the Company, nor was a copy of the SLP served on the Applicant – Company. Consequentially, since the Judgment was passed ex­parte, the Applicants prayed for Re­call of the Judgment and a de novo hearing. The Counsel for the Applicant – Company also argued that Mr. Sanjeev Narayan was not the “principal officer” of the Applicant – Company, and hence service could not have been effected upon him. The Department in the Counter Affidavit submitted that the dasti Notice was duly served on Mr. Sanjeev Narayan at his office address, in his capacity as the authorized representative of the Applicant – Company, who was holding a Power of Attorney of the Assessee – Compan

In CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.478-479 OF 2017, Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya Vs The State of Gujarat, an application was filed by Accused No.1 Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which was rejected by the Magistrate stating that the facts sought to be placed by the applicants were in the nature of evidence of the defence that would be taken in the trial. The question of law that therefore arises in this case is whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding. The High Court on appeal held that, as a matter of law, the Magistrate does not possess any power to order further investigation after a charge- sheet is filed and cognizance is taken. Supreme Court observed that Section 2(h) of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code defines "investigation" in the same terms as the earlier definition

In Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 601 of 2019, IN THE MATTER OF Shweta Vishwanath Shirke vs The Committee of Creditors, an application under section 7 of IBC was filed by Andhra Bank against Sterling Biotech in June 2018. Apart from defaulting loan of Rs 8,100 crore, the promoters of the debt- ridden Sterling Biotech were already facing charges of corruption and money laundering. The promoters of the Corporate Debtor absconded and government agencies like Enforcement Directorate and CBI were unable to trace them. Thereafter, a one- time settlement offer was made by on behalf of the promoters of the Corporate Debtor to the creditors. The offer stated that the entire payment under OTS shall be made by the promoters and not through the corporate debtor and its properties. The offer got a green signal by the committee of creditors. It subsequently prompted filing of withdrawal application as per section 12A of IBC. The NCLT did not accept the application and sent the corporate debto

In TONY ENTERPRISES vs RESERVE BANK OF INDIA,WP(C).No.28823 OF 2017(C) and  CHERIAN C.KARIPPAPARAMPIL and MINDSTRONG HR SOLUTIONS vs THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, WP(C).No.28824 OF 2017, appeal was filed before the Kerala High Court by Tony Enterprises and Tony Lites, a proprietary firm and a partnership firm respectively, both of which have a cash credit account at Chittoor Road branch of Oriental Bank of Commerce while in the second matter,  On 8th June, 2017, Mr.Tony Davies came to realize that a total amount of Rs.16,25,000/- had been unauthorizedly transferred from the accounts of the petitioners by way of online transactions effected through the online banking app of the Bank. The registered mobile number of Mr.Tony Davies had become dysfunctional on 6th June 2017 and he had approached the service provider, M/s. Idea Cellular on 7th June 2017 to enquire regarding the same. He was told by the representative of M/s.Idea Cellular that his number had become dysfunctional as a dupli

In Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1021 of 2019, IN THE MATTER OF Karan Goel Vs M/s Pashupati Jewellers, appeal was filed against order  of the Adjudicating Authority admiting the application under Section 7 of the I&B Code preferred by M/s Pashupati Jewellers as a Financial Creditor. The Appellant objected to the admission of the application on the ground that the ‘Corporate Guarantee and Undertaking’ Agreement provided by the Respondent while taking loan was a fraudulent document and a suit is pending on the said allegation. The NCLAT observed that ‘Corporate Guarantee and Undertaking’ Agreement was executed on 7th April, 2017 is on record, which shows that the said Agreement is on e-Stamp, Indian Non Judicial issued by Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. In the said e-Stamp, it has been clearly mentioned that the e-Stamp was purchased by Marigold Overseas Ltd. for the purpose of Loan Agreement. Merely, because the Appellant - Mr. Karan Goel has enter

In Savita vs. State of Delhi, one of the issue raised in the appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the order of High Court disposing of the criminal appeal in the absence of original record can be held sustainable in the eyes of law. The Supreme Court observed that it is not in dispute that the High Court has disposed of the appeal filed by the appellant herein without the record of the trial court, which was lost during the pendency of the appeal before it. The chronology of events also indicates that there is some effort were made by the State to re-construct the record of the trial court but the reconstruction of the record could not be completed. However, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State submits that some of the records are available. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties and perusing the material placed before us, we are of the view that disposing of the appeal filed by the appellant-accused without the record of the trial court is not susta