Legal News & Views

In V. PRABHAKARA vs BASAVARAJ K. (DEAD) BY LR. & ANR, the High Court while cast suspicion on the genuiness of a document which has been found to be genuine by the Trail Court.  On appeal, the Supreme Court disagreeing with the High Court held that a testamentary court is not a court of suspicion but that of conscience. It has to consider the relevant materials instead of adopting an ethical reasoning. In Jagdish Singh vs Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, the Supreme Court has held that when the High Court is exercising power as first appellate court, it is open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. The first appellate court while exercising power under Section 96 can re-do the exercise of the trial court. However, such a power is expected to be exercised with caution. The reason being, the trial court alone has the pleasure of seeing the demeanor of the witness. Therefore, it has got its own advantage in assessing the statement of the wi

In M/s Gimpex Private Limited vs Manoj Goel, the question before the Supreme Court is whether parallel prosecutions arising from a single transaction under Section 138 of the NI Act can be sustained. In this case, a set of cheques were dishonoured, leading to filing of the first complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The parties thereafter entered into a deed of compromise to settle the matter. While the first complaint was pending, the cheques issued pursuant to the compromise deed were dishonoured leading to the second complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. Both proceedings are pending simultaneously and it is for this Court to decide whether the complainant can be allowed to pursue both the cases or whether one of them must be quashed and the consequences resulting from such quashing.  When a complainant party enters into a compromise agreement with the accused, it may be for a multitude of reasons – higher compensation, faster recovery of money, uncertainty of trial and str

In Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd, appeal was filed before  the Supreme Court against order of the Delhi High Court Division Bench setting aside an Arbitral Award. First the SC observed that the Court has in several other judgments interpreted Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on the restraint to be shown by courts while examining the validity of the arbitral awards. However, the difficulty arises in applying the well-established principles for interference to the facts of each case that come up before the courts. There is a disturbing tendency of courts setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention and thereafter, dubbing the award to be vitiated by either perversity or patent illegality, apart from the other grounds available for annulment of the award. This approach would lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the endeavou

In GARG BUILDERS vs BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED, appeal was filed against Order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, resulting in denial of pendente lite interest on the award amount to the appellant. The appellant as project contractors had a dispute with the Respondents which was placed before the Arbitrator. Learned Arbitrator after hearing the contentions of both the parties concluded that there is no prohibition in the contract about payment of interest for the pre­suit, pendente lite and future period. The Respondents appeal before the Delhi High Court that the learned Arbitrator being creature of the arbitration agreement travelled beyond the terms of the contract in awarding pendente lite interest on the award amount as the same was expressly barred in terms of the contract. The single judge concluded that As stated earlier, in terms of Section 31(7)(a) of the Act, the power of the arbitral tribunal to award pre award interest is contingent to the parties not

In Ravindranatha Bajpe vs Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. & Others, the first class magistrate had issued summons against the Chairman, MD, Directors of a company accused of offences punishable under Sections 406, 418, 420, 427, 447, 506 and 120B read with Section 34 IPC. The said order was quashed by the Session Court and on appeal High Court agreed with the Sessions court. The Supreme Court referring to judgments in GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Limited, (2013) 4 SCC 505; and Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 609 held that, in the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has to record his satisfaction about a prima facie case against the accused who are Managing Director, the Company Secretary and the Directors of the Company and the role played by them in their respective capacities which is sine qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against them. Looking to the averments and the allegations in the complain

In Chandra @ Chanda @ Chandraram & Anr. vs Mukesh Kumar Yadav & Ors., driver of a heavy commercial vehicle died in an accident while on duty. His wife claimed compensation based on a salary of Rs. 15000/- pm but as they could not produce any evidence in support, the Tribunal fixed the monthly income of the deceased by adopting minimum wage notified for the skilled labour in the year 2016. Appeal against such low compensation was rejected by the High Court. The Supreme Court however opined that in absence of salary certificate the minimum wage notification can be a yardstick but at the same time cannot be an absolute one to fix the income of the deceased. In absence of documentary evidence on record some amount of guesswork is required to be done. But at the same time the guesswork for assessing the income of the deceased should not be totally detached from reality. Merely because claimants were unable to produce documentary evidence to show the monthly income of the deceased Sh

In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs Chamundeswari & Ors., the insurer appealed against the order of the High Court. The High Court had overturned the order tribunal which had found contributory negligence, by recording a finding that accident occurred only due to the negligence of the driver of the Eicher van. The primary objection of the insurer was that the High Court had ignored the FIR which had clearly pointed towards contributory negligence. The Supreme Court however held that if any evidence before the Tribunal runs contrary to the contents in the First Information Report, the evidence which is recorded before the Tribunal has to be given weightage over the contents of the First Information Report. Whether driver of the vehicle was negligent or not, there cannot be any straitjacket formula. Each case is judged having regard to facts of the case and evidence on record.

In KORUKONDA CHALAPATHI RAO & ANR. vs KORUKONDA ANNAPURNA SAMPATH KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that a family settlement document which merely sets out the existing arrangement and past transaction will not be compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, if it doesn't by itself creates, declares, limits or extinguishes rights in the immovable properties. In Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, the SC has summed up the essentials of the family settlement in the following proposition: “10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions: “(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud,