Legal News & Views

In Apollo Zipper India Limited vs W. Newman And Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court reiterated the settled  principal that in an eviction suit filed by the landlord against the tenant under the Rent Laws, when the issue of title over the tenanted premises is raised, the landlord is not expected to prove his title like what he is required to prove in a title suit. In other words, the burden of proving the ownership in an eviction suit is not the same like a title suit. (See Sheela & Ors. vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, 2002 (3) SCC 375, Para 10 at page 383 and also Boorugu Mahadev & Sons & Anr. vs. Sirigiri Narasing Rao & Ors. 2016 (3) SCC 343, Para 18 at page 349 ). Similarly, the law relating to derivative title to the landlord and when the tenant challenges it during subsistence of his tenancy in relation to the demised property is also fairly well settled. Though by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of hi

In Canara Bank vs NG Subbaraya Setty, the Supreme Court has observed that an issue of law which arises between the same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding is not res judicata if, by an erroneous decision given on a statutory prohibition in the former suit or proceeding, the statutory prohibition is not given effect to. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, who authored the judgment, has elaborately explained the concept of res judicata and its exceptions when it comes to issues of law. Referring to various case laws on the subject, the bench summarized these principles: Where an issue of law decided between the same parties in a former suit or proceeding relates to the jurisdiction of the Court, an erroneous decision in the former suit or proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties, even where the issue raised in the second suit or proceeding is directly and substantially the same as that raised in the former suit or proceedi

The Supreme Court, in Delhi Administration vs. Vidya Gupta, has held that storing of adulterated food, even for the purpose of making some other food which is sold, is an offence. A bench of Justice SA Bobde and Justice L Nageswara Rao also held that the court, while trying an offence under the Food Adulteration Act, needs to consider the contents of the certificate of the director only and it need not refer to the variation between the report of the public analyst and the director. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/storing-adulterated-food-purpose-making-food-sold-offence-sc-read-judgment/

The Supreme Court in THESIMA BEGAM vs  THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU, set aside a Madras High Court order that refused to entertain a plea seeking quashing of charge sheet on the ground that the trial has already begun and prosecution witness has been examined. A lady, in a complaint against husband and relatives alleging demand of dowry, had implicated her sister-in-law and her husband. The charge sheet against her sister-in-law and her husband was sought to be quashed on the ground that that the de-facto complainant herself stated in her statement that she had implicated the appellants herein out of anger and as far as they are concerned, they had no role in the family dispute and they were not party in making any demand of dowry. The Madurai bench of the high court dismissed the plea observing that it ‘will not interfere, when the trial in the case has commenced.’ Article referred:http://www.livelaw.in/hc-cant-refuse-quashing-proceedings-merely-ground-trial-already-begun-sc-rea

In The Commissioner of Income Tax­ vs M/s. Shree Rama Multi Tech Ltd, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, interest accrued on account of deposit of share application money is taxable income at the hands of the Respondent? The Supreme Court held that the common rationale that is followed in all these judgment is that if there is any surplus money which is lying idle and it has been deposited in the bank for the purpose of earning interest then it is liable to be taxed as income from other sources but if the income accrued is merely incidental and not the prime purpose of doing the act in question which resulted into accrual of some additional income then the income is not liable to be assessed and is eligible to be claimed as deduction. Putting the above rationale in terms of the present case, if the share application money that is received is deposited in the bank in light of the statutory mandatory requirement then th

Bangalore bench of ITAT in the case of M/s. Cornerstone Property Investments Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, ruled that Share premium received can be assessed as undisclosed income if the high premium is not justified by a valuation report and the high premium is not supported by the financials.  In instant case Assessee engaged in the business of Real Estate filed its revised return declaring a loss. Following the consequential proceedings notice under section 147 issued, later dropped by the AO and finally, assessment was completed with the income of Rs.49.50 Crores shown as “Share Premium” as ‘Income from other sources’.  On appeal, the CIT (A) upheld the action of the AO and the Assessee carried the matter to this tribunal. It was observed by the Assessing Officer that a company by name, M/s. Walden Properties Pvt. Ltd., had invested an amount of Rs.50 Crores and in lieu, thereof the assessee had issued 5 lakh shares of face value of Rs.10 per share. Accordingly, AO held

The Supreme Court in ITO vs M/s TechSpan India Private Ltd.  has held that Section 147 of the Income Tax Act does not allow re-assessment of an income merely because of the fact that the assessing officer has change of opinion on the same facts and circumstances which were already in his knowledge even during the original assessment proceedings. A bench of Justice RK Agrawal and Justice Mohan M Shantanagoudar were considering an appeal filed by the Revenue against Delhi High Court order that had quashed the show cause notice as well as reassessment order. The court said that the use of the words ‘reason to believe’ in Section 147 has to be interpreted schematically as the liberal interpretation of the word would have the consequence of conferring arbitrary powers on the assessing officer who may even initiate such re-assessment proceedings merely on his change of opinion on the basis of same facts and circumstances which has already been considered by him during the original a

In Cheran Propertiees Limited vs Kasturi And Sons Limited, A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court  has upheld proceedings for rectification of records before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) by a claimant company whose claim was upheld by the arbitral tribunal directing transmission of shares. The court dismissed an appeal wherein the main contention was that an arbitral award has to be enforced as a decree of a civil court in view of the provisions of Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and it could not have been enforced by pursuing proceedings before the NCLT.

The Ahmedabad bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) has held that if cash was received from brother and father of the assessee to meet business exigencies, such transactions cannot be treated as the violation of section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961.  The bench comprising Rajpal Yadav (JM) and N K Billaiya (AM) clarified that in such cases, the penalty under sections 271D and 271E of the Income Tax Act cannot be levied. In the instant case, the assessee, Girishkumar Popatlal Patel received Rs. 1.55 lacs from brother and father in cash and repaid the same in cash. The assessee contended that he is in the business of retailed trade and therefore whenever there is an urgent need for money, the same is taken from the brother and the father.  The counsel appeared on behalf of the assessee contended that the legislative intent in prohibiting the acceptance and repayment of money in cash over and above Rs. 20,000/- is to check the unaccounted money and not to hit the

A division bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax Central Excise vs. Bhoorathanam Construction Co. (P) Ltd. held that mere technical mistake on the part of the assessee cannot be a ground for denying the exemption. The assessee-respondent had taken up a project for supplying water pipes for a particular project. They had availed exemption of central excise duty via exemption Notification in respect of supplies of pipes to the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) Government of Rajasthan. As per the Notification exemption can be availed only upon fulfilling certain conditions. The Revenue decided that the assessee-respondent had failed to satisfy the conditions. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CITA(A) also affirmed the findings of the lower authority. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/exemption-denied-mere-technical-mistake-rajasthan-hc/21565/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%

In Rabindra Nath Kundu & Anr vs Sudhir Hira, Bijoy Krishna Hira being the owner in the suit plot, gifted to Santosh Kumar Hira demarcated 11 decimals of land vide deed of gift dated 27.4.2004 and the latter sold 9 decimals out of 11 decimals of land to Sudhir Hira the preemptor/opposite party no. 1 and well demarcated 1.65 decimals of land in the said plot along with several other plots were sold, transferred and conveyed to the preemptees/petitioners herein by a registered deed of sale dated 10.8.2010, the subject matter of preemption. It is argued on behalf of the preemptees that  the present opposite party no. 1/preemptor Sudhir Hira has no relationship of co-sharership with Santosh Kumar Hira opposite party no. 2 as the demarcated portion of land has been purchased. It is settled principle of law that partial preemption is not permissible and this was what the view adopted by this Hon'ble High Court is Surendra Vs. Abhimannu reported in (1980) 1 Cal LJ 135 wherein

The Supreme Court, in Competition Commission of India vs. Thomas Cook (India) Ltd., has observed that the imposition of penalty under section 43A of the Competition Act is on account of breach of a civil obligation, and the proceedings being neither criminal nor quasi-criminal, there is no requirement of mens rea or intentional breach as an essential element for levy of penalty. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1970 SC 253, with respect to imposition of penalty on failure to comply with the civil obligation this Court has laid down thus:  "In our opinion, mens rea is not an essential ingredient for contravention of the provision of a civil act. In our view, the penalty is attracted as soon as the contravention of the statutory obligations as contemplated by the Act is established and, therefore, the intention of the parties committing such violation becomes immaterial. In other words, the breach of a civil obligation which attracts penalty under the provisions

Supreme court in Dinesh Singh Thakur vs Sonal Thakur Anti-Suit Injunctions are meant to restrain a party to a suit/proceeding from instituting or prosecuting a case in another court, including a foreign court. Simply put, an anti-suit injunction is a judicial order restraining one party from prosecuting a case in another court outside its jurisdiction. Held:- The principles governing grant of injunction are common to that of granting anti-suit injunction. The cases of injunction are basically governed by the doctrine of equity. It is a well-settled law that the courts in India have power to issue anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction, in an appropriate case. However, before passing the order of anti-suit injunction, courts should be very cautious and careful, and it should be granted sparingly and not as a matter of routine as such orders involve a court impinging on the jurisdiction of another court, which is not entertained very easily specia

Whenever there is a breach of contract then earnest money which is forfeited because of the breach, whether by a plaintiff or a defendant in a contract, the forfeiture is of that amount which are in fact liquidated damages specified under a contract and that for claiming damages under a contract, whether liquidated under Section 74 of the Contract Act or unliquidated under Section 73 of the Contract Act, existence of loss is a sine qua non. In other words, if no loss is caused to a seller who has in his pocket monies of buyer, then the seller can only forfeit a nominal amount unless the seller has pleaded and proved that losses have been caused to him on account of the breach of contract by the buyer. Once there is no pleading of loss suffered by a seller under an agreement to sell, then large amounts cannot be forfeited though so entitled to a seller under a clause of an agreement to sell/contract entitling forfeiture of 'earnest money' because what is forfeited is towards lo

In SURESHCHANDRA BAGMAL DOSHI vs THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, the 25 year old daughter of the applicant had died in a car accident. The deceased was a B.E. (Civil) and at the time of her death working as an International Internal Sales Engineer at a monthly salary of Rs.6,273. It was claimed by the father of the deceased that The deceased had a quick successful progression in her career from the initial post of a Secretary, and the claim was based on the prospective earning of the deceased of more than Rs.25,000 per month. The Tribunal, added approximately 100 per cent towards future rise in income and allowed a claim of Rs.15,71,000. Both sides being aggrieved appeal before the High Court declined to accept the future income rise as 100 per cent and took the same as 50 per cent in view of the judgment of this Court in Sarla Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. The question before the Supreme Court thus was whether the Tribunal was right in increa

In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre versus State of Maharashtra and others, (2011), the Supreme Court held :- The following factors and parameters can be taken into consideration while dealing with the anticipatory bail: (i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made; (ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; (iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; (iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or the other offences. (v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her. (vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people. (vii) The courts must evaluate the entire av

The question under consideration before the Guwahati High Court in Shri Kartik Chakraborty vs State of Assam was whether the expression Magistrate appearing in Section 26 of the Evidence Act would mean Judicial Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate?   Section 26 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him.—No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate1, shall be proved as against such person.—No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate2, shall be proved as against such person." 2[Explanation.—In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George 3[***] or elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a M

In RANCH MANAGER, PCA & RD BANK LTD. vs SURESH DAS,  the respondent had issued a blank cheque as security while availing loan from the Bank. It was filled on a later date by a clerk of the Bank.  Subsequently when the Bank presented for collection, that the same was returned with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’ in the account. Since the cheque issued by the accused was dishonoured, the complainant – Bank had issued a notice on 20.12.2004. However, in spite of service of notice, the accused failed to pay the cheque amount nor had replied to the said notice. Subsequently, the complainant – Bank initiated proceedings under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act for dishonour of cheque.  The said complain was rejected by the trial court. On appeal, the High Court referring to Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited which was actually quoted by the Bank in support of their claim held that as clearly stated in

In D. SARAVANAN vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER TANGEDCO TNEB DISTRIBUTION CIRCLE, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in request an application for agricultural service connection as defective for non-payment of Registration Fee as per procedure only because the applicant was an advocate and therefore ought to have known about the rules and regulations. The Supreme Court held that the case of the appellant that he was not aware that Rs.50/was required to be deposited has been disbelieved only because he is an Advocate. A presumption that an Advocate is supposed to know the law can be raised but there can be no presumption that an Advocate is well aware of all procedural requirements regarding making of an application for agricultural service connection. We are of the view that the Division Bench without any basis refused to accept the stand of the appellant that he is not aware that Rs.50/was to be submitted

In The State of Uttar Pradesh vs Tribhuwan, the High Court had set aside the entire jail sentence of respondent No.1 while upholding his conviction under Section 325 IPC.   The Supreme Court on appeal by the State held that so far as Section 325 IPC is concerned, its reading would show that once the accused is held guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 325 IPC, then imposition of jail sentence and fine on the accused is mandatory. In other words, the award of punishment would include both, i.e., jail sentence and fine. So far as jail sentence is concerned, it may extend upto 7 years as per Court’s discretion whereas so far as fine amount is concerned, its quantum would also depend upon the Court’s discretion.

The Delhi High Court in S Vs. J held that the Family Court is empowered to formulate its own procedure for disposal of the petitioner’s application under D.V. Act. In that view of the matter, it is not mandatory for the Family Court to follow Cr.P.C. In the present case, the Family Court is dealing with the petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the petitioner under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and therefore, Justice J.R. Midha observed that the petitioner’s application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act seeking reliefs under Section 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the D.V. Act is maintainable before the Family Court.

In K.N. Raju v. Manjunath T.V., the petitioner was prosecuted for offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complainant alleged that the accused took a hand loan from him and issued cheques in lieu thereof. However, when the said cheques were presented in the bank, they were dishonoured and returned with a memo marked ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a demand letter to the accused as required by the Act. However, the accused did not repay the loan even after the demand letter was issued to him. Consequently, the accused was prosecuted under the Act. The trial court, inter alia, found that the time gap between the giving of loan by the complainant to the accused and presenting of cheques for recovery thereof, was more than three years. Trial court held the case to be hit by limitation and acquitted the accused. On appeal the Karnataka High Court observed that the limitation period for recovery of a hand loan is three years from the da

In INS Finance & Investment P Ltd vs ITO,  the assessee company, engaged in the business of finance and investment, originally acquired the right for purchase of property because of auction carried out by the Punjab National Bank where the assessee was the highest bidder. It paid the purchase price in entirety. Later the auction was disputed and cancelled leading to restoration of the property to the bank. The assessee was hence refunded this purchase price and damages.  It was found by the AO at the very first instance that the amount shall be liable to be added since the sum received by the assessee on cancellation of auction holding is in the nature of a revenue receipt. The CIT (A) on an appeal confirmed the addition and hence the present appeal. The issue before the Tribunal was that whether the CIT (A) has properly appreciated and adjudicated the nature of receipt. According to the submissions of the revenue, the damages recovered from the bank were in the nature of

The Hyderabad Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ( ITAT ) in the case of Tanvi Financial Services Private Limited v. Income Tax Officer ruling in favor of the assessee held that a loss on forfeiture of shares of a trader in shares is to be treated as revenue expenditure.  The assessee is a non-banking financial company and is engaged in the business of granting of loans and advances. The assessee purchased a number of preferential warrants of M/s. Sankhya Infotech Ltd to be converted into shares against which 25% of the amount was paid by the assessee. After the share price of the company came down, the assessee company forfeited the amount already paid to M/s Sankhya in spite of converting the warrants into shares. The assessee claimed this amount as revenue expenditure. ITAT held that if the assessee has subscribed to the preferential warrants as an investor, then the share application money assumes the character of capital expenditure and the loss incurred by the as

In in Madhu Sarda vs. Income Tax Officer, the Assesse sold 900 of her shares to her son at fair market value. On such sale, the assessee suffered considerable long-term capital loss. In the same year, she sold his property and earned a capital gain. The assessee filed the return of her income and claimed set off of the loss on account of long-term capital loss suffered by the assessee on sale of shares against the profit of long-term capital gain earned on the sale of the immovable asset. The Assessing Officer and on appeal the CIT (A) both disallowed such set-off and treated the sale of shares by the assessee to his son as a ‘sham transaction’. The two-member bench of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai relied on the case of Union of India vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan in which the Supreme Court had held that an act which is otherwise valid in law cannot be treated as non-est merely on the basis of some underlying motive supposedly resulting in some economic detriment or prejudice

The division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Pr.Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs. Raghu Hari Dalmia held that a valuation report made by a registered valuer once adopted shall be in effect for four assessment years unless an event has occurred whereby the value is increased or decreased. The High Court made it clear that the event of “search” under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 cannot compel the assessee to undertake a fresh valuation.

The Madras High Court in Firm Foundations & Housing Pvt. Ltd. vs. Principal Commissioner of Service Tax, held that profit and Loss Accounts cannot be relied upon for determination of the point of rendition and accrual of services for the purpose of imposition of service tax. The Petitioner, Firm Foundations & Housing Pvt. Ltd is engaged in promotion and construction of residential apartments and complexes.  The projects are undertaken on a joint venture basis. The petitioner builds on the property of other landowners. A Show Cause Notice (SCN) was served to the petitioner to explain why differential service tax should not be demanded from the petitioner in terms of Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/profit-loss-accounts-determination-service-tax-liability-madras-hc/20891/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Taxscan+%28Top+Stories+%E2%80%93+Taxscan+%7C+Simplifying+Tax+Laws%29

In  MINOR BASID vs National Insurance Co., the victim, a minor aged 6 years, was struck down by a motor vehicle driven by the party respondent on 24/10/2006. Barely alive and struggling, the victim was reduced to a vegetative state and is continuing as such. The father of the victim, who was suffering from diabetes, could not withstand the suffering of his son. The continuous stress faced by the father exacerbated his diabetic disease leading to amputation of both his legs and eventually his untimely death. The mother of the victim thus had a life which was further aggravated by these misfortunes for the past 11 years. The tribunal granted a compensation of Rs 31,05,765 as against a claim of Rs 38,01,000. Seeking enhancement of compensation, the victim through his mother approached the high court. Challenging the compensation awarded, the insurance company too came in appeal before the Kerala High Court. Invoking the concept of ‘Lost Life Principle’, High Court of Kerala ordered t

In M/S Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. vs M/S Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. , the Supreme Court while hearing an appeal filed by the Appellant-Company against the rejection of an application seeking commencement of de novo proceedings. The Supreme Court held that it is an undeniable fact that on reference of the matter to the Umpire, the Arbitrators become functus officio. The Umpire takes upon himself the exclusive authority of determining the disputes. He takes the place of Arbitrators, as the expression “in lieu of the Arbitrators” conveys. Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, defining or demarcating the powers of the Umpire, he is expected to discharge the same functions as Arbitrators with all the attendant powers, duties and obligations.  It is trite to say that an Arbitrator is bound to observe the principles of natural justice and conform to the fundamentals of judicial procedure. It is his duty to afford a reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned. However, it would

In Prashant Dattarya Patre vs Sbi Life Insurance Company Ltd, the insurer had denied claim becauseon the ground of concealment of material facts. NCDRC clarified that rely upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PC Chacko & Anr. Vs. Chairman, LIC of India - (2008) 1 SCC 321.  Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paras 15 and 16 of its judgment on fraudulent suppression, as below: "The insured furthermore was aware of the consequence of making a misstatement of fact. If a person makes a wrong statement with knowledge of consequence therefor, he would ordinarily be estopped from pleading that even if such a fact had been disclosed, it would not have made any material change".

In D.S. Senthilvel  v. Tax Recovery Officer, the Petitioner had purchased an immovable property after service of a recovery notice by the TRO for recovery of arrears due under the ITL on the seller, but before the date of the attachment of the immovable property by the TRO. The Petitioner had objected to the attachment of the immovable property by the TRO by filing a writ petition to the HC on the ground of his being a bona fide purchaser of the immovable property for adequate consideration. The HC held that the ITL contains a separate and distinct scheme of provisions for transfer of immovable property before and after the service of the recovery notice by the TRO. The ITL protects a buyer who purchases an immovable property for adequate consideration and without having knowledge of the seller’s default under the ITL, only if the purchase happens before the service of the recovery notice by the TRO. In the present case, because the purchase of the immovable property happened afte

The Bombay High Court in Builders Association of Navi Mumbai vs Commissioner of Goods and Service Tax has upheld the Goods and Services Tax (GST) levied by the Central Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (CIDCO) on one-time lease premium charged for letting out plots of land on lease basis. The bench of Justice SC Dharmadhikari and Justice PD Naik were hearing a writ petition filed by the Builders Association of Navi Mumbai and another realtor based out of Navi Mumbai. They challenged the levy of 18% GST on one-time lease premium charged and sought directions to refrain CIDCO from levying GST on members of the petitioner association as well as the second petitioner for such transaction. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/bombay-hc-upholds-levy-gst-one-time-premium-charged-letting-land-lease-basis-read-judgment/

In  MANAGING DIRECTOR, BIHAR STATE HOUSING BOARD DISTRICT PATNA BIHAR Vs "SANRAKSHAN" & YOGENDER PRASAD, the NCDRC while deciding on a revision petition filed by the Board directed against the order of the State Commission held that complaint instituted by ‘Sanrakshan’ which is registered under Indian Trust Act, 1882 is infructuous as on a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a Trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer.  Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act. The Commission also referred to a Supreme Court judgment Pratibha Pratisthan & Ors. Vs. Manager, Canara Bank & Ors.

In Agnes Lily Irudaya vs Irudaya Kani Arsan, the Bombay High Court has held that the unmarried daughter though the attained majority is entitled to claim maintenance from the father. In this case, the mother had approached the family court claiming maintenance from her husband for daughter who had turned major but IS unmarried, for meeting her educational expenses. The family court dismissed her application on the ground that maintenance can be granted to minor children only and the major daughter cannot claim maintenance through her mother. This order was assailed before the high court. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/unmarried-adult-daughter-entitled-claim-maintenance-father-rules-bombay-hc-read-judgment/

In K.M.TOMAR vs STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS., the Delhi High Court, rapped litigants for making it a habit of filing review petitions without understanding whether the case was fit for it. “Some litigants, it appears, are never satisfied. This is being stated by this Court because filing of review petition has now become almost a habit with respect to certain litigants,” Justice Valmiki J. Mehta observed. The Court also scorned at the practice of lawyers routinely giving out certificates affirming that such review petitions should be filed, observing, “Not only filing of the review petition becoming a habit for certain litigants, the same is also not filed in terms of the rules of this Court, because a review petition must be accompanied by a certificate of the lawyer that the review petition is justified, however, lawyers are routinely giving certificate that the review petition should be filed. Giving of certificates by lawyers in a routine manner defeats the whole purpose

In SATPAL SINGH vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB, the Supreme Court held that the protection under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is available to the accused only till the court summons the accused based on the charge sheet (report under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C.). On such appearance, the accused has to seek regular bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and that application has to be considered by the court on its own merits. Merely because an accused was under the protection of anticipatory bail granted under Section 438 Cr.P.C. that does not mean that he is automatically entitled to regular bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. The satisfaction of the court for granting protection under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is different from the one under Section 439 Cr.P.C. while considering regular bail. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/no-automatic-entitlement-regular-bail-merely-accused-granted-anticipatory-bail-sc-read-judgment/

The Supreme Court, in Mangla Ram vs. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., while enhancing compensation in a motor accident claim case, observed that the spot marked in the sitemap where the motor vehicle was found lying after the accident cannot be the basis to assume that it was driven in or around that spot at the relevant time. The Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, in this case, had attributed contributory negligence to the claimant referring to the sitemap of the accident to conclude that he was riding his motorcycle one foot on the wrong side from the middle of the road. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/cant-assume-vehicle-wrong-side-merely-basis-site-map-showing-position-accident-sc-read-judgment/

In Shama Parveen Beg vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, while discharging the principal and headmaster of a school accused of abetment of suicide of a peon belonging to Scheduled Caste community, the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that if a higher officer compels his subordinate to do extra work, which is unbearable, he cannot be held to have abetted his suicide because the latter had ‘other several options and it cannot be said that he had no other option except to commit suicide’ Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/compelling-subordinate-unbearable-extra-work-not-amount-abetment-suicide-mp-hc-read-judgment/