Skip to main content

Posts

Showing posts from December, 2017

In review jurisdiction, Court shall interfere only when there is a glaring omission or patent mistake

In Amar Nath Vs. Jee Ram and Ors before Delhi High Court,  the Petitioner herein was the son of the Respondents. The Petitioner is 52 years of age and thus the Respondents must be more than 75 years of age. The suit of the Respondents for possession against the Petitioner in respect of their property, was decreed vide judgment. By way of the present petition, the Petitioner seeks review of the judgment.  The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very meaning implies an error which is apparent on the face of the record of the case and does not require comprehensive examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order XLVII Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (CPC). An order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in

Booking of an Under-Construction Flat is a Case of Construction and not Purchase

The Mumbai  bench of  Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in  Mr. Mustansir I Tehsildar vs  Income Tax Officer  has held that booking of an under-construction flat is a case of construction and not a purchase.  The bench comprising of Judicial Member Saktijit Dey and Accountant Member B.R.Baskaran ruled so while allowing the assesse’s appeal.  The instant appeal filed by assesse challenging the order of CIT(A), Mumbai confirming the partial rejection of claim made by the assessee for deduction under Section 54 of the Income Tax Act for assessment year 2013-14.  Assesse in the present case held a share in flat of an apartment ,sold the same for consideration  and consequent thereto, the long term capital gain was computed .The assessee had earlier booked a flat which was under construction and he had made payments to the builder much earlier to the date of transfer of old flat and the aggregate payments made by the assessee towards the new flat was more than the amount of

NCLT Approves Resolution Plan Approved By 66.67% Of Creditors In Value

The National Company Law Tribunal, Bench at Hyderabad in the matter of K. Sashidhar versus Kamineni Steel & Power India Private Limited , vide its order dated Nov. 27, 2017, has approved the resolution plan which was approved by only 66.67 percent of the committee of creditors in value. As per Section 30(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a resolution plan can be approved by the Committee of Creditors by not less than 75 percent of the total voting share. Vide an order of the Hyderabad NCLT, dated Feb. 10, 2017, a corporate insolvency resolution process under the code was initiated under Section 10 of the code and an interim resolution professional was appointed thereto, who was directed to constitute a Committee of Creditors. Pursuant to constitution of the CoC, comprising of eight financial creditors, a total of nine meetings of the CoC were held. The insolvency resolution process could not get completed in the mandatory period of 180 days, and an extension of 9

Not all arbitration proceeding barred by Section 14 of Bankruptcy Code

In POWER GRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. vs JYOTI STRUCTURES LTD, petition is under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as „the Act‟) for setting aside the arbitral award dated 20.05.2016 passed by the arbitral tribunal in favour of the respondent herein. The award is in nature of a pure money decree in favour of the respondent. During the pendency of these proceedings under section 34 of the Act, an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (hereinafter referred as „the Code‟) was filed by a financial creditor against the respondent company before the National Company Law Tribunal – Mumbai, (hereinafter referred as „the NCLT‟) seeking initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution against the respondent and by an order dated 04.07.2017 the NCLT has admitted such application and has declared a moratorium in terms of Section 14 of the Code. The question now has arisen is if the present proceedings under S

Service Law: A Mother Can’t Be Compelled To Choose Between Her Motherhood & Employment

Can the state, or its instrumentality as an employer, discriminate against a woman employee based on compelling family care giving responsibility (read giving care to her child)? The Kerala High Court has decided in the negative while recognising the fundamental right of a woman to dignity of a mother and fairness at workplace which cannot remain insensitive to the love of a mother for her child. “No service Regulations can stand in the way of a woman for claiming protection of her fundamental right of dignity as a mother,” Justice A Muhamed Mustaque said. The court also emphasised that the government should come up with a legislation to protect employees from discrimination at workplace due to their family responsibilities. The court said so while upholding the plea of a woman against her termination from service on account of her long absence from service as she needed to look after her child suffering from mild-autism. A copy of the judgment has been directed to

Husband can claim capital gains deduction from purchase of new house in wife's name

In Shri Radhey Shyam Arora vs Income Tax Officer, ITAT Jaipur ruled that the benefit of Section 54F of the Income Tax Act, 1961 cannot be denied to husband for the reason that the new house was purchased in the name of wife.  Coming to the facts of the case, the assessee did not disclose the transaction of sale of house. While completing assessment, the Assessing Officer made addition for the same on account of cash deposit made by the assessee in his joint account of with his wife. Assessees’ claim for deduction under section 54F was also denied on the ground that on the ground that the new house was purchase in the name of his wife.  The Tribunal bench relied on the latest decision in Laxmi Narayan vs. CIT, held that the benefit cannot be denied to the assessee, in the instant case. Allowing the benefit of section 54F to the assessee, the bench held that “when the entire investment for the purchase of new house has gone through the assessee’s account then the benefit u/s 54

Pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence not to be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction

In Trilok Singh Chauhan Vs. Ram Lal (dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors, appeal was been filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment of High Court by which judgment High Court has allowed the Revision and set aside the order passed by trial Court directing the eviction of the Respondent-tenant with recovery of rent and damages. High Court also made observation against the landlord that the motive of landlord is to secure the possession back and profit hunting. Appellant submits that, the High Court committed error in upsetting the findings of fact regarding rate of rent which was held by the trial Court as Rs. 1500/- per month but reversed by the High Court holding it to be Rs. 250/- per month only. The landlord aggrieved by the judgment has come up in this appeal. In Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani (Smt.) and Anr., Present Court held that, jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is wider than the Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code of C

Credit co-operative society providing credit to its members cannot be treated as a ‘co-operative bank’ carrying on banking activities

The Assessee, in Income-tax Officer Vs. Somavamsha Sahasrajuna Kshatriya Credit Co-operative Society  is a credit co-operative society who provided credit/loan facilities to its members and accepted deposits from them. The Assessee had filed its return of income and declared its total income after claiming deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act). The return was processed under Section 143(1) of the Act and the case was subsequently taken up for scrutiny. The Assessing Officer (‘AO’), on examination of the Assessee’s claim for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, was of the view that the Assessee is in fact a bank as per Section 5 (ccv) of the Banking Regulation Act,1949 and therefore, as per the provisions of Section 80P(4) of the Act, it was not entitled to the deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The assessment was accordingly concluded under Section 143(3) of the Act. Being aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appea

Evidence Law: Re-examines the expression “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”

The Supreme Court in a recent judgement referring to Vijayee Singh and others vs. State of U.P. looked at Section 3 of the Evidence Act and reiterated that :- It can be argued that the concept of ‘reasonable doubt’ is vague in nature and the standard of ‘burden of proof’ contemplated under Section 105 should be somewhat specific, therefore, it is difficult to reconcile both. But the general principles of criminal jurisprudence, namely, that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt, are to be borne in mind. The ‘reasonable doubt’ is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved” lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which

Court may award compensation greater than the one demanded by claimant if it deems it fit to do so

In Ravi @ Ravichandran vs V.P.Jayapal, the Appellant had suffered 60% disability due to an accident and the MACT had fixed an amount of Rs. 5,45,000/-. The Appellant appealed against the said amount and claimed a compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/-. The High Court opined that considering the disability the multiplier method should have been applied by the Tribunal and the current as well as future medical expenses, the compensation should be Rs.11,15,000/-. On Insurance Company pointing out that the amount of compensation claimed itself is only a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-, therefore, the claimant is not entitled more than what is claimed, the court held that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nagappa vs. Gurdayal Singh, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 274, there would be no restriction that compensation could be awarded only upto the amount claimed by the claimants. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record, if the Tribunal/court considers that t

Service Law: For inflicting major penalty, the department must prove the charges by oral evidence

In Rajendra Prasad Srivastava vs State Of U.P., The brief facts of the petition are that the petitioner, while working as Manager and also Divisional Incharge of Mirzapur Division of the respondent no.2, U.P. State Employee Welfare Corporation, 742, Jawahar Bhavan, Lucknow, was suspended from service by the order dated 20.06.2013. A Charge Sheet dated 20.07.2013 was served upon him charging him of 3 charges of indiscipline, negligence and of causing loss to the Corporation, on account of collusion with the contractor and transporter. The petitioner submitted his reply to the Charge Sheet on 22.08.2013, denying the charges and asserted that whatever illegality was there has been committed by one Sushil Kumar Srivastava, the Centre Incharge. An Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner and without holding any oral enquiry, he tendered his enquiry report dated 27.01.2014. The Copy of Enquiry Report was furnished to the petitioner alongwith a

Allowing whether a pleading should amended should not depend upon the eventual fate of the suit

The Supreme Court in RAJ KUMAR BHATIA vs SUBHASH CHANDER BHATIA has held that it was not necessary to examine the merits of the averments while considering application for amendment of pleadings. The court stated  that whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case, which is proposed to be set up, will eventually succeed at the trial. A bench comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice AM Khanwilkar, Justice DY Chandrachud was deciding an appeal filed against the judgment of the high court that set aside the order of the trial court allowing amendment of the written statement. The issue arose out of a suit for recovery of possession. The parties were family members and the plaintiff sought possession on the strength of a gift deed executed by his mother. The defendant, a sibling of the plaintiff, filed a written statement stating that the property was an undivided joint family property, and they were in joint possession of the same even after the exe

Wife Working Against Husband’s Wishes Is Not ‘Cruelty’

The Allahabad High Court has observed that a wife working against the wishes of husband or his family is not a ‘cruelty’ to grant divorce to husband. The family court had granted divorce to husband on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. One of the grounds urged by the husband for seeking divorce was that wife is in  employment against his wishes. A bench of Justice Shabihul Hasnain and Justice Sheo Kumar Singh referred to Lord Denning’s “Due Process of Law” and quoted this passage: “A woman feels as keenly thinks as clearly, as a man. She in her sphere does work as useful as man does in his. She has as much right to her freedom – develop her personality to the full – as a man. When she marries, she does not become the husband’s servant but his equal partner. If his work is more important in life of the community, her’s is more important in the life of the family. Neither can do without the other. Neither is above the other or under the other. They are equals.” Article referred:

Any person having substantial interest in disputed property has to be a necessary party in the suit

In Lal Babu Sao v. State of Jharkhand, High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi  addressed a petition on a title suit wherein the petitioner had initially filed a suit for declaration of his right, title and interest over the land in question and a decree of confirmation of his possession over that land and alternatively, if he was found dispossessed during the pendency of the suit recovery, then khas possession be given to him instead. In the pending suit, an application for impleadment in the title suit was filed by a third party under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, to be considered a defendant in the suit. This application was allowed by the Court against which the petitioner filed the present petition. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the title suit was instituted against a sole defendant i.e. the State. Allowing the third party’s impleadment would lead to a situation where there would be three persons claiming right, title and interest over the property in question and thus an

Owners’ previous written consent must for sale or purchase of any vessel on which there is hypothecation/charge

In [Zatrix Ltd., v. MV Nikiforos, Gujarat High Court was hearing a suit filed for urgent interim orders, regarding the defendant vessel which was likely to sail away. The plaintiff has submitted that after entering into the agreement by the plaintiff and defendant for financing the purchase of three ships including the vessel in question, the plaintiff had advanced a sum of 800,000 USD, and that the plaintiff had a hypothecation/charge on the vessel and required a previous written consent for purchase or sale. However, the managers of the vessel including the defendant vessel, Marine Spirit Management addressed an email to the plaintiff informing about the sale of the vessel. The plaintiff further contended that, since, no written consent of the plaintiff was obtained before the sale, the sale would be bad in law and null and void and would not affect the plaintiffs’ rights. Also, after resistance from the plaintiff all the defendants had approached for settlement and executed pri

‘Prior notice’ is a necessity before impleading a person as an additional accused under S. 319 CrPC

In M. Basappa v. State, Karnataka High Court while deciding a criminal petition filed under Section 482 CrPC,  held that the order passed by the trial court whereby it allowed the petitioners to be impleaded as additional accused, was not sustainable. The petitioners challenged the above mentioned order on the grounds that they were not given an opportunity to be heard before passing of the impugned order whereby they were impleaded as additional accused on the ground that prosecution showed that the petitioners were involved in the alleged offence. The High Court perused the record and came to the conclusion that no notice was issued by the trial court on the application filed under Section 319 CrPC and no opportunity was provided to the petitioners to be heard before considering the said application, which was a legal requirement. The High Court held it to be a dictum of the Court that before considering an application under Section 319 CrPC, a criminal court must issue prior

Customers in a brothel house are not offenders under the Immoral Traffic Act

In Chandru S v. State, a criminal petition was filed under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings in a criminal case filed under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, where a Single Judge Bench of the Karnataka High Court comprising of K.N. Phaneendra, J. held that the offences under ITP Act or under Section 370  IPC are not attracted as far as the customers in a brothel house are concerned. The petitioners in the instant petition were customers in a brothel house found by the police during a raid. The petitioners were charged as accused in a criminal case for offences punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the ITP Act. The High Court perused the entire charge-sheet papers and also referred to a few of the earlier decisions pronounced by it on the same or similar matter. On perusal of the earlier decisions as well as various provisions of the ITP Act, the High Court was of the view that offences under the said sections were not attracted to the customers in a brot

No ‘medical negligence’ if diagnosed as per standard of medical practice

In DR. M. KOCHAR vs ISPITA SEAL, while holding no cure/ no success is not negligence and fastening the liability on the treating doctor is not justified, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) has held as it took judicial notice of the fact that increasing number of people are opting for in- vitro fertilization due to growing problem of infertility while acknowledging that its failure cannot be attributed to the treating doctor given the complexity of procedure and medically recorded evidence of low success rate in women above 35 years of age. The NCDRC bench of presiding officer Ajit Bharihoke and member Dr SM Kantikar said so while setting aside the order of the State Commission by which a doctor was asked to pay Rs 15 lakh compensation to her client after the IVF in her case failed. “In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a complex series of procedures used to treat fertility or genetic problems and assist with the conception of a child. IVF involves several s

No Superior Court Can Command Subordinate Court To Pass A Particular Order

In Madan Mohan vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., no superior court in hierarchical jurisdiction can issue direction/mandamus to any subordinate court commanding them to pass a particular order on any application filed by any party, the Supreme Court said Thursday while reiterating that the judicial independence of a court cannot be interfered with by any court, including the superior court. Justice R K Agrawal and Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre said so while setting aside the order of the Rajasthan High Court wherein a single judge had directed two revisionists in a case of alleged kidnapping and rape of a minor to appear before the sessions court for regular bail and went to the extent of directing the sessions court to grant them bail on the same day. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/no-superior-court-can-command-subordinate-court-pass-particular-order-sc-read-judgment/

F&O Transaction Made through Stock Exchange is not Speculative, can be set off against ordinary business Income

In Shri Dron Sureshkumar Rao vs ITO, Baroda, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal recently ruled that the future and option transaction carried out through recognized stock exchange cannot be treated as speculative transaction, can be set off against ordinary business income. Judicial member Shri. Rajpal Yadav held so while allowing the appeal of assesse. The assesse raised the ground of appeal that CIT(A) has erred in not allowing set off of loss of Rs.3,19,071/- being loss on trading of shares/securities against other business income. The assesse in the instant case has started trading activities in shares, filed a copy of bank statement and ledger account of M/s.Marfatia Stock Brokings P.Ltd wherein AO held that the loss shown by the assessee as speculative loss and observed that since the assessee has no speculative profit, therefore, he has neither entitled to claim set off nor to claim carry forward. Article referred: http://www.taxscan.in/fo-transaction-carried-recognized-stock-e

Giving Criminal Colour To A Civil Dispute Is Abuse Of Process Of Law

In Ramesh Dahyalal Shah vs The State of Maharashtra and other matters, the Bombay High Court recently allowed a batch of applications seeking quashing of an FIR registered for offences under sections 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477(a), 506(2) read with 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code. The division bench of Justice Ranjit More and Justice Shalini Phansalkar Joshi held that when dispute is of civil nature, giving the proceedings a criminal colour is abuse of the process of law. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/dispute-civil-nature-giving-proceedings-criminal-colour-abuse-process-law-bombay-hc-read-judgment/

Jurisdiction Of A Court Under A Statute Can’t Be Allowed To Shift

The constitution bench of the Supreme Court in The State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.,  has observed that the jurisdiction of a court conferred under a statute cannot be allowed to shift or become flexible because of a superior court’s interference in the matter in a different manner. The bench, headed by Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra, overruled the decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd and Guru Nanak Foundation vs Rattan Singh and Sons, wherein it has been held that when an arbitrator is appointed by the Supreme Court and further directions are issued, it retains seisin over the arbitration proceedings and in such circumstances, the Supreme Court is the only court for the purposes of Section 2(c) of the Act. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/jurisdiction-court-statute-cant-allowed-shift-superior-courts-interference-different-manner-sc-constitution-bench-read-judgment/

Police Machinery Can’t Be Utilised To Hold Husband At Ransom

In AMRITPALSINGH MAHENDRASINGH KALER vs DALJITKAUR W/O. AMRITPALSINGH MAHENDRASINGH KALER, the respondent No.1 got married with the applicant No.1 herein on 27th November 2013. The marriage was solemnized at Delhi. The first informant left the matrimonial home on 5th December 2013, as according to her, she was being harassed and there was a demand of Rupees Ten lac. After leaving the matrimonial home on 5th December 2013, an F.I.R. was lodged at the concerned police station on 5th February 2014. Within two months thereafter, the police filed chargesheet for the offence enumerated above. The first informant has alleged that soon after marriage, the applicant No.1 – husband told her that he was not interested in the marriage and had married with the first informant only for the purpose of money. The allegations against the applicants Nos.2 and 3 i.e. the father­in­law and mother­in­law are that of instigating the husband. The husband had approached the high court seeking to quash F

Contributory negligence cannot be assumed from mere non production of driving license

In Sri Dinesh Kumar J. @ Dinesh J. Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors, the appellant while driving a motor cycle met with an accident and was severely injured. However, the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal put his disability at 10% and also held him guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 40%. On appeal, the High Court enhanced the compensation but agreed with the tribunal so to the contributory negligence. So the appellant took the matter to high court arguing that the tribunal as well as the High Court proceeded on the erroneous premise that since the appellant had failed to produce the driving licence, an adverse inference on the aspect of contributory negligence would have to be drawn. Moreover, it was submitted that the entire discussion on contributory negligence is conjectural and is not worthy of acceptance. The Supreme Court found itself in agreement with the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant that plea of contributory negligence

Lawyer Can Issue Demand Notice Of Unpaid Operational Debt On Behalf Of Operational Creditor

In MACQUARIE BANK LIMITED vs SHILPI CABLE TECHNOLOGIES LTD., answering two important issues of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court, in Macquarie Bank Limited vs Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd, has held that a lawyer on behalf of the operational creditor can issue a demand notice of an unpaid operational debt. The court also held that the provision contained in Section 9(3)(c) of the Code is mandatory for initiating insolvency proceedings. A bench of Justice RF Nariman and Justice Navin Sinha set aside the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal order which had dismissed an application seeking to initiate insolvency proceedings for non-compliance of the provision contained in Section 9(3)(c) of the Code, which, it held, is ‘mandatory’. The NCLAT also held that an advocate/lawyer cannot issue a notice under Section 8 on behalf of the operational creditor. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/breaking-ibc-lawyer-can-issue-demand-notice-unpaid-operational-debt-

Whole statements cannot be thrown out because of some contradiction in statement

In Raghunath Singh Vs. State of M.P. , the Madhya Pradesh High Court referring to the judgement if the supreme court in Kalegura Padma Rao and another v. The State of A.P., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1299,  held itt is settled principle of law that in India theory of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” is not applicable and the Court is duty bound to extract the truth from the statements of the eye-witnesses. Only on the basis of some contradiction in the statements, with regard to some accused, the whole statements cannot be thrown out. Article referred: https://www.lawkam.org/gwalior/high-court-raghunath-singh/17833/

Summoning Order for an Offence u/s. 420 IPC in a Cheque Complaint is not Sustainable

In ALOK RAJGARDIA VS. STATE OF U.P., ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT, the objection of the appellant was that against a complaint under the Negotiable Instrument Act, the  learned Magistrate by means of the impugned order has proceeded to summon the Drawer for offences punishable under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act as well as Section 420 IPC. As the Drawer did not respond to the summons, warrants of arrest were issued by the Magistrate by an order dated 04.10.2004.  The High court opined that a contextual analysis of the provisions of Section 145 of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the special procedure enabling the complainant to give evidence on affidavit notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure is a procedure available only in relation to a complaint for an offence punishable under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act. In the opinion of the Court, the said special procedure cannot be utilized or invoked by a complaint, the Drawer, in this case,

Defamation: A newspaper is in no different position from an individual

In The Publisher and Editor of Divya Himachal and anr. Versus Parkash Chand and ors., the HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT has held that a newspaper is in no different position from an individual and it cannot give currency to a defamatory statement and escape upon the ground itself that, it showed that it did not believe that which it had published. That may have some bearing on the question of damages but not upon the question of liability. The responsibility in either case is the same. The degree of care and attention is in no way less in the case of newspaper publications other than that required from ordinary men. In India, since we have a written constitution, it is recognized that freedom of speech is not an absolute unlimited right. Article 19(2) provides reasonable restrictions on what is guaranteed by article 19(1)(a). Therefore, the mass media must maintain high professional standards and are obliged to verify the correctness of the news disseminated. Publication of false ne

Laboratory Report Can Be Counter Signed Only By A Registered Medical Practitioner With A Post Graduate Qualification

In NORTH GUJARAT UNIT OF ASSOCIATION OF SELF EMPLOYED OWNERS (PARAMEDICAL) OF PRIVATE PATHOLOGY LABORATORIES OF GUJARAT vs NORTH GUJARAT PATHOLOGISTS ASSOCIATION & ORS., the Supreme Court upheld the stand taken by the Medical Council of India (MCI) that “Laboratory Report can be counter signed only by a registered medical practitioner with a post graduate qualification in pathology”. The Bench comprising Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justice R. Banumathi was hearing a bunch of Special Leave Petitions challenging an order passed in September, 2010 by the Gujarat High Court, wherein it was held that Laboratory Technicians, not being Pathologists, cannot run any laboratory independently. The High Court had noted that Laboratory Technicians (Pathology) are not registered with the Medical Council of India, whereas Doctors in Pathology, who have obtained MBBS qualification, are. Only the latter are permitted to sign or counter sign a lab report, it had ruled. http://www.livelaw.in/

Arbitration : Difference between choice of venue and seat where exclusive jurisdiction specified

In CVS INSURANCE AND INVESTMENTS vs VIPUL IT INFRASOFT PVT. LTD, the agreement between the parties had specified that venue of arbitration would be Noida/Delhi under the exclusive jurisdiction of courts at Noida. The parties landed up before the Delhi High Court with the question as to where shall be the seat of the arbitration viz. at Delhi or Noida when the agreement between the parties give exclusive jurisdiction to courts at Noida and there being no high court in Noida? The court held that :- (a) there shall be only one seat of arbitration though venues may be different;  (b) where the arbitration seat is fixed (may be neutral), only such court shall have an exclusive jurisdiction; (c) where a seat/place of arbitration is fixed it is section 20(1) and section 20(2) of the Act we are referring to; and  (d) venue relates to convenience of parties, per section 20(3) of the Act. The facts herein show barring the registered office of the respondent company at Delh

Exemption From Tax To Encourage Industrialization Cannot Be Equated With Refund Of Tax

The Delhi High Court in M/S. ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED vs STATE OF GUJARAT, refusing to allow refund of tax which was paid despite there being an exemption sanctioned for the payee, the Delhi High Court, on Thursday, observed that such exemption to encourage industrialization cannot be equated with refund of tax. The Court was hearing a Petition filed by M/s. Ultratech Cement Limited, challenging an order passed in January last year by the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR), whereby its claim for refund of Value Added Tax and Sales Tax as well as Electricity duty from the Governments of Maharashtra and Gujarat was dismissed. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/exemption-tax-encourage-industrialization-cannot-equated-refund-tax-delhi-hc-read-judgment/

Giving Lift To Strangers Who Later Stole The Vehicle Cannot Be Fundamental Breach Of Insurance Policy

In MANJEET SINGH vs NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR., the Supreme Court,  ruled that giving lift to strangers who later stole the vehicle is not a breach that would nullify the insurance policy. The Court was hearing an Appeal filed by one Mr. Manjeet Singh, who was the owner of a truck that had been stolen. At the time of the incident, the truck was being driven by someone else, who gave a lift to a few people. These hitchhikers later beat up the driver and fled away with the vehicle. The insurance company had then denied Mr. Singh’s claim, asserting that by giving a lift to the passengers, he had violated the terms of the policy and that hence, it was not liable to pay. Mr. Singh had then approached the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, but to no avail. His appeals before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission were also rejected.  The Supreme Court, however, opined that carrying passeng

Benefit Of Deduction Can’t Be Given To An Industry If It Ceases To Be A Small Scale Industry

The Supreme Court, in Deputy Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs M/S Ace Multi Axes Systems Ltd, has held that an assessee is not entitled to benefit of exemption if it loses its eligibility as a small scale industrial undertaking in a particular assessment year, even if in the initial year, eligibility was satisfied. Before the apex court, the revenue had questioned the Karnataka High Court view that when once the eligible business of an assessee is given the benefit of deduction under Section 80 IB on the assessee satisfying the conditions mentioned in sub-section. (2) of Section 80 IB, cannot the assessee be denied the benefit of the said deduction on the ground that during the said 10 consecutive years, it ceases to be a small scale industry. A three-judge bench of Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice AK Goel and Justice Navin Sinha observed that the assessee, having not retained the character of ‘small scale industrial undertaking’, is not eligible to the incentive meant for that cate

Mere Fact That A Person Is Made Accused In An FIR Is Not A Disqualification For Appointment To Public Posts

In K. Harindran Nair vs State of Kerala, while dealing with a challenge made to the appointment of Part Time Official Receivers under the Insolvency Act, 1955, Kerala High Court has held that the mere fact that a person is made an accused in a crime is not a disqualification by itself. The challenge to the appointment of a person was made primarily on the ground that he was an accused in a crime. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/mere-fact-person-made-accused-fir-not-disqualification-appointment-public-posts-kerala-hc-read-judgment/

Plaintiff Is Entitled To Specific Performance Of Contract Only If He Sticks To Original Terms Of Contract

The High Court of Kerala has held that a plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of contract only if he sticks to the original terms of the contract. Any variance from the original terms, even if such variance is to the benefit of the defendant, will disentitle him from seeking the discretionary relief of specific performance. This was made clear by the division bench comprising Justice V Chitambaresh and Justice Satish Ninan, while deciding an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of the trial court which declined to order specific performance of agreement of sale. As per the original agreement, the offer price of the land was Rs 1 lakh per cent. Later, the plaintiff offered a higher price of Rs 1.75 lakh per cent. The court found that the subsequent offer resulted in variation of the original contract and that the plaintiff could not seek specific performance of original contract in such circumstances. It was observed as follows: “The plaintiff by floating a fresh off

Nothing Illegal In Drawing Voice Sample Of Accused For Test

In Shri Rabindra Kumar Bhalotia Vs State rep.,by Inspector of Police, CBI, Chennai, the Madras High Court,  has upheld trial court orders allowing prosecution to draw voice sample of the accused persons for comparison with that of the questionable voice recorded in the course of intercepted telephonic conversion between the accused. Justice G Jayachandran held that requesting the to give their voice sample for comparison with that of the questionable voice recorded in the course of intercepted telephonic conversion between them by no stretch of imagination falls within the mischief of testimonial compulsion. The contention put forth by the counsel for the accused was that Section 311-A includes only ‘handwriting’, but ‘no voice samples’. Rejecting the said contention, the court observed: “Drawing of voice sample is only a measurement of waves emanating through vocal cord. It is only a measurement and fall within the meaning of physical examination and not testimonial compulsio

Investigation Officer Can’t Prove Contents Of FIR In Case Of Death Of Informant

The Gujarat High Court, in Bhavanbhai Premjibhai Vaghela vs State of Gujarat, has held that an investigating officer cannot depose the contents of the FIR in the absence of the informant, who died a natural death, or whose death has no nexus with the complaint lodged. In the instant case, the informant, during the pendency of the trial, died a natural death. The Investigation Officer, during his examination, deposed exact contents of the entire FIR. The objection by the defence counsel that it is not permissible in law for the investigating officer to prove the contents of the FIR if the first informant is dead was over-ruled by the trial court. This was challenged before the high court. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/investigation-officer-cant-prove-contents-fir-case-death-informant-unless-death-nexus-fir-lodged-gujarat-hc-read-judgment/

Consumer Courts Not Meant For Enriching Consumers

In G M Gupta vs  Colston Bath and SPA Pvt. Ltd, the  Delhi State Commission  while dismissing the appeal of a west Delhi resident seeking  enhancement of compensation of Rs 10,000 awarded by a District Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum to Rs 50,000 held that i t will not be justified to award Rs. 50,000 as compensation as appellant/complainant has not provided any documentary proof or any evidence to show as how he had suffered the loss of Rs. 50,000. Consumer courts are not meant for enriching the consumers.courts are not meant for enriching the consumers. Article referred:  http://www.livelaw.in/consumer-courts-not-meant-enriching-consumers-delhi-state-commission-read-order/

Defendant Can’t Object To Mere Withdrawal Of Suit By Plaintiff

The Supreme Court, in Anil Kumar Singh vs Vijay Pal Singh, has held that defendant has no right to compel the plaintiff to prosecute the suit by opposing the withdrawal of suit sought by the plaintiff except to claim the cost for filing a suit against him. The court observed that mere withdrawal of the suit without asking for anything more can be always permitted since while making a prayer to withdraw the suit under Rule 1(1), the plaintiff does not ask for any leave to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter. The Court however, clarified that if the  plaintiff applies for withdrawal of the suit along with a prayer to grant him permission to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter, then in such event, the defendant can object to such prayer made by the plaintiff.

Forfeiting Deposit Made By Auction Purchaser Can Be Challenged Before DRT

The Supreme Court, in Agarwal Tracom Pvt Ltd Vs Punjab National Bank, has held that an action of secured creditor in forfeiting the deposit made by the auction purchaser is a part of the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The bench comprising of Justice RK Agrawal and Justice AM Sapre upheld a Delhi High Court judgment which had dismissed the Writ petition filed by an auction purchaser on the ground of alternate remedy. The Bench held that the Auction purchaser is entitled to challenge the action of the secured creditor before the DRT by filing an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act.

Insurer Has No Liability Once There Is Breach Of Condition Of Insurance Policy

The Supreme Court, in MS Middle High School Vs HDFC Ergo General Insurance Co Ltd, has upheld a high court judgment which held that once there is breach of condition of insurance policy, the liability cannot be fastened on the insurer. The Punjab and Haryana High Court relying on the judgement of theSupreme court in National Insurance Company Limited vs Challa Bharathamma and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 517, New India Assurance Company Limited vs Asha Rani & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 223 and National Insurance Company Limited vs Nicolleta Rohtagi & Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 456. had affirmed the findings of the tribunal that the  offending vehicle did not possess a permit and that constituted breach of condition in insurance policy. The said judgment was assailed through a special leave petition. Dismissing the SLP, the Supreme Court also observed that the contrary view in a judgment of full bench of Kerala High Court, in the case titled Augustine VM vs Ayyappankutty and Ors, is disapprove

Merely Playing Rummy With Small Stakes In A Club Would Not Amount To Gambling

The Delhi High Court, in SURESH KUMAR vs CENTRAL SECRETARIAT CLUB, agreed with a lower Court’s observations that merely playing rummy with small stakes in a club would not amount to gambling. “Trial court in my opinion also has rightly held that merely because a card game of  rummy was played in the club premises with small stakes from a few annas to some rupees would not make it gambling as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 825,” Justice Valmiki J. Mehta observed. The Court was hearing a Petition filed by one Mr. Suresh Kumar, who had challenged a Trial Court order, wherein he had been directed to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the Central Secretariat Club as damages for filing a false police complaint. Mr. Kumar had complained that a mafia operated in the Club and that the Club allows gambling within its premises. The Trial Court had, however, opined that Mr. Kumar had failed to discharge the burde

Debatable/bonafide claim cannot be treated as concealment of income merely because it was disallowed

In The D.C.I.T., Vs. Sh.Vipan Guppta Prop., the Assessing Officer had restricted the assessees claim of deduction u/s 80 IC of the Act to 25% of the eligible profits as against 100% claimed by the assessee on account of substantial expansion undertaken by it, for the reason that it was the 8th year since commencement of production by the assessee in the area specified by the section, while as per the section deduction @100% of the eligible profits was allowable only for the first five years from the date of commencement of production and thereafter @ 25% of the profits for the next five years. The said disallowance was upheld in further appeals, both by the CIT(A) and the ITAT. On appeal the Ld.CIT(Appeals) deleted the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act relying upon the order of the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s Hycron Electronics Vs. ITO for assessment year 2009-10 in ITA No.326/Chd/2005.  Aggrieved by the action of the Ld.CIT(Appeals), the Revenue