Legal News & Views

In  SUKHJINDER SINGH SAINI vs  HARVINDER KAUR, the  Delhi High Court reiterated that  It is a settled principle of law that both the parents have a legal, moral and social duty to provide to their child the best education and standard of living within their means. The mere fact that the spouse with whom the child is living is having a source of income, even if sufficient, would in no way absolve the other spouse of his obligation to make his contribution towards the maintenance and welfare of the child. Article referred:  http://www.livelaw.in/cannot-exempted-maintaining-child-even-spouse-earns-sufficiently-well-delhi-hc-read-judgment/

In Om Prakash v. Reliance General Insurance, the said vehicle was stolen on 23.03.2010 at about 9:00 p.m. Consequently, an FIR was lodged, on 24.03.2010. Thereafter, the appellant visited the office of the first respondent but the office was found to be closed. On 29.03.2010, the appellant along with the truck driver, went with the police officials for their assistance to search the vehicle. The appellant reached his village on 30.03.2010. On 31.10.2010, the appellant lodged the insurance claim with the respondent-company at Hissar and provided the necessary documents which were demanded by the respondent-company. However, the respondent-company repudiated the insurance claim of the appellant citing breach of Condition No. 1, i.e. immediate information about the loss/theft of the vehicle. The Supreme Court allowed  the appeal and the claim petition filed by the appellant and set aside the orders of the National Commission, State Commission and the District Forum. The court hel

In Sabarkantha Annuity Pvt. Ltd. Vs. NHAI and Ors, the Petitioner filed before the Delhi High Court  petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 with a prayer that, Respondents be restrained from acting upon the letter dated 15th September, 2017 or from invoking the Bid securities of the Petitioner to the tune of Rs. 10.93 Crores and also restraining the banks from honouring the invocation of said bank guarantees on behalf of Respondent No. 1 acting in terms of letter dated 3rd November, 2007. Petitioner has relied upon Clauses Nos. 9.1.1, 9.1.2 and 4.3 of the agreement dated 28th April, 2017 entered into between the parties to say the claim for damages since is not a claim for a sum presently due and payable and the respondent would be entitled to damages only on proof of loss, per Clause 4.3 of the agreement and hence is not entitle to the entire sum of bid security.  The Court found that Clause No. 9.1.2 speaks of an exclusive right of the

In PRAFULLA KUMAR MAHESHWARI VS. AUTHORIZED OFFICER & CHIEF MANAGER, MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT the powers exercise under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 by the District Magistrate is only an administrative power and not adjudicatory in nature and, thus, authorizing Additional District Magistrate or Executive Magistrate will not amount to any delegation of power and, there exists no illegality in exercise of powers under the said section by an Additional District Magistrate – there is no error of jurisdiction in entertaining the application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 by Additional District Magistrate and the order passed by him cannot be said illegal or without jurisdiction.

In DAYAWATI VS. YOGESH KUMAR GOSAIN [DELHI HIGH COURT], the legal permissibility of referring a complaint cases under Section 138 of the NI Act for amicable settlement through mediation; procedure to be followed upon settlement and the legal implications of breach of the mediation settlement is the subject matter of this judgment. Can be imported and applied in criminal cases? Held, Rules applies to mediation arising out of civil as well as criminal cases. In the context of reference of the parties, in a case arising under Section 138 of the NI Act, to mediation is concerned, the following procedure is required to be followed : 1. When the respondent first enters appearance in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, before proceeding further with the case, the Magistrate may proceed to record admission and denial of documents in accordance with Section 294 of the Cr.P.C., and if satisfied, at any stage before the complaint is taken up for hearing, there exist elements

In Sahara India Commercial Corporation Ltd. vs DCIT, the assessee filed the return of wealth on 23/11/2009 and subsequently having realized that inadvertently they have omitted to add the taxable assets of the partnership firms in which the assessee company was a partner, filed a revised computation of wealth on 20/12/2010 showing the net wealth at Rs.36,90,03,980/-. Assessment was complete on the total net wealth of Rs. Rs.36,90,03,980/-. However the AO proceeded to levy penalty under section 18 (1) (c) of the Act for concealment of income, The Appellate Tribunal found that no doubt the assessment order reads that the penalty proceedings were initiated for furnishing inaccurate particulars of wealth and also the penalty order states that the penalty was imposed for furnishing inaccurate particulars. However, the notice issued under section 18 (1) (c) of the Act on 29/12/2010 shows that the said notice was issued for concealment of the particulars as well as furnishing  inaccurate

M/s. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. vs JCIT(OSD),Circle-3(1), the assessee is a Cooperative Society and claimed exemption of Rs.1.45 crores under section 80P of the I.T. Act, 1961. During the assessment proceedings,  it was noticed that assessee had received interest of Rs.17,67,059 which is also claimed exempt. It was claimed by the assessee that interest of  Rs.11,92,784 was paid and therefore, net interest was only at Rs.5,74,275. Finally, after discussion, assessment was completed at net taxable income of Rs.5,74,275. However, the proceedings under section 263 were initiated and it was noticed that interest of Cooperative Society and claimed exemption of Rs.1.45 crores under section 80P of the I.T. Act, 1961. During the assessment proceedings, it was noticed that assessee had received interest of Rs.17,67,059 which Is also claimed exempt. It was claimed by the assessee that interest of Rs.11,92,784 was paid and therefore, net interest was only at Rs.5,74,275. Finally, after discussion

In The Income Tax Officer vs. Shri Ajay Sharma,, the assessee has declared short term capital gain of Rs.19,59,668. The assessee has declared the sale consideration at Rs.1,27,50,000 vide sale deed executed dated 11th March, 2010. The document shows that stamp duty was paid at Rs.1,83,02,910 as reflected in the AIR information as against sale consideration of Rs.1,27,50,000 and there is a difference of Rs.55,52,910. Thus the provisions of Section 50C of the I.T. Act were found attracted in this case. The A.O. accordingly made addition of Rs.55,52,910 on account of difference and taken as additional short term capital gain and added to the income of the assessee. The Appellate Tribunal rejecting the claim of the department held that The valuation of the Stamp Valuation Authority is not a conclusive evidence of receipt of the money by assessee over and above what is recorded in the sale deed. The A.O. has not brought any concrete evidence of concealment of income in the order. The

In UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs SUNIL KUMAR & ANR, unable to agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of a two judge bench of this Court in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Sinitha and others, a coordinate bench of the Supreme Court by order dated 29th October, 2013 has referred the instant matter for a resolution of what appears to be the following question of law. "Whether in a claim proceeding under Section 163 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 it is open for the Insurer to raise the defence/plea of negligence?” In Sinitha's case (supra), a two judge bench of this Court understood the scope of Section 163A of the Act to be enabling an Insurer to raise the defence of negligence to counter a claim for compensation. The principal basis on which the conclusion in Sinitha's case (supra) was reached and recorded is the absence of a provision similar to sub-section (4) of Section 140 of the Act in Section 163A of the Act. Such absence has been understo

The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty case on Court In Maharaja Amrinder Singh vs The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, the Supreme Court held that Section 27-A of the Act, which provides a remedy of appeal to the High Court against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, is modeled on existing Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). Indeed, as would be clear, the language of Section 27-A of the Act and Section 100 of the Code is identical. Both the Sections are, therefore, in pari materia. It is a case where Section 100 of the Code is bodily lifted from the Code and incorporated in Section 27-A of the Act with minor additions and alterations by following the principle of “legislation by incorporation". The Supreme Court while quoting A three Judge Benc

In ATMA SINGH vs GURMEJ KAUR (D) & ORS., the respondent is the widow who had remarried after the death of her first husband in 1952. Subsequently when one of her son by the said first marriage died in 1972 unmarried and intestate, the estate of the said son was mutated in her favour against which one of her surviving sons of the first marriage filed suit which being rejected by the lower courts including high court finally came before the Supreme Court. The High Court agreeing with the trial court held that although after death of Narain Singh, Gurmej Kaur have every right to inherit the estate of her son, Pal Singh in terms of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, but on account of her re­marriage will loose right in estate of Narain Singh. The Supreme Court held that as Narain Singh has died before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, the widow is disentitled from the property her first husband after remarriage but after 1956 Act, the widow being a Class 1 relat

In Chand Devi Daga and Ors. Vs. Manju K. Humatani and Ors, appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court allowing an application filed by the legal representatives of Petitioner. Chandra Narayan Das whose legal representatives are the Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 had filed a complaint against the Appellants alleging offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 201 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The original complainant died during the pendency of the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition before the High Court. High Court permitted the legal representatives of Chandra Narayan Das to come on record for prosecuting the criminal miscellaneous petition. Section 256 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is contained in Chapter XX with the heading "Trial of summons-cases by Magistrates". Analogous provision to Section 256 of CrPC was contained in Section 247 of CrPC, 1898. In Section 247, the proviso was added in 1955 saying that "where the Magistrate is o

In A. Elangovan Vs. The Inspector of Police, Palaviduthi Police Station and Ors, the Petitioner has preferred the instant Contempt Petition praying for passing of an order by this Court to punish the Respondents for the act of Contempt in not obeying the orders passed by this Court. The High Court of Madras held that it cannot be gainsaid that, the Contempt jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court not only to preserve or maintain the Majesty of Law by taking necessary action against persons, who violates the Court's order, but to see that the 'Court of Justice' is pure. Furthermore, even an 'Abuse of Process of Court' would amount to Contempt of Court. As a matter of fact, a Civil Contempt pertains to an order of 'Court of Law' affecting the rights of other parties to that order.  It is to be noted that, the disobedience of orders of Court in order to be a 'Civil Contempt' must be a willful one, a proof of sheer/mere disobedience is not e

In  VIPIN GROVER & ANR. Vs NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD., the insurance company rejected a claim as the claimant had suffered the same illness 17 years back. The NCDRC decided that the main controversy in this case is ‘whether the repudiation under clause 4.1 of the policy excludes all diseases/injuries which are from pre-existing disease when the cover incepts for the first time?  It is an admitted fact that the complainant underwent CABG in 1990 and it was brought to the notice of the OP at the time of filling of proposal form.  Thereafter, for more than 16 years, the insured had no cardiac complaints.  In our view, the disease was treated completely and the patient was under medication. The patient remained active for more than 16 years.  It appears that the OP had relied upon preponderance of probability that the persons who underwent CABG are prone for the recurrence.   Even as per clause 15, already four years waiting period was over from commencement of policy.  In 2007, h

In RUKSANA SAYED Vs AMIT C. PRABHU, PROPERIETOR M/S. PRABHU REAL ESTATE, the NCDRC while agreeing to the decision of the State Forum which had earlier dismissed the order of the District Forum on the grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction, referred to the judgment in the Larger Bench of this Commission in the matter of Ambrish Kumar Shukla & Ors. Vs. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) where it was observed as under: “It is evident from a bare perusal of Sections 21, 17 and 11 of the Consumer Protection Act that it’s the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed which determines the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum.  The Act does not envisage determination of the pecuniary jurisdiction based upon the cost of removing the deficiencies in the goods purchased or the services to be rendered to the consumer.  Therefore, the cost of removing the defects or deficiencies in the goods or the services would have no bearing on the determination of the

In M/S. Silver Line Villas vs V.V. Nair & Anr., the appellant had raised the objection before NCDRC that the transaction under consideration is a commercial one and therefore the complainant is not a consumer. The NCRDC held that the contention raised by the complainant has not been controverted by any evidence to the contrary.  In a case already decided by this commission in "Kavita Ahuja vs. Shipra Estate Ltd .& ors. and allied matters" [CC No. 137/2010 decided on 12.02.2015], it has been stated as follows:- "Going by the Dictionary meaning of the expression 'Commerce' as far as hiring or availing services are concerned, a person can be said to have hired or availed services only if they are connected or related to the business or commerce in which he is engaged.  In other words, the services in order to exclude the hirer from the ambit of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act should be availed for the purpose of promoting, advancing or augmenting an activity,

In Maruti Suzuki India Ltd vs Dr. Koneru Satya Kishre & Ors, the NCDRC held that whether the defects pointed out in the vehicle come under the category of manufacturing defect or not, the matter has been considered by this Commission in a number of cases, and it has been held that a 'defect' in a vehicle may come under the category of 'manufacturing defect' or otherwise, a vehicle is said to be suffering from 'defect', if there is any fault, imperfection or shortcoming in the quality, quantity, potency, purity or standard, which was required to be maintained under any law in force.  We are supported in this view in an earlier judgment of this Commission, delivered in, Revision Petition No. 7/2013, Malwa Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sunanda Sangwan, decided on 20.09.2013. Although the petitioner/manufacturer has taken the plea that the vehicle did not suffer from any manufacturing defect and hence, they had no liability in the matter, but considering the view ta

When one unit of a group of com pa nies sep a rates it self to form an in de pen dent firm, the trade union of the orig i nal group can   not keep the em ploy ees of the new firm on its rolls. The bye-laws of the union can   not be amended to al low erst while em ploy ees of the group to con tinue as mem bers, even if they pay sub scrip tion fees, the Supreme Court stated in its judg ment, All Es corts Em ploy ees’ Union vs State of Haryana. The Es corts group orig i nally in cluded Es corts Ltd, Es corts Yamaha Ltd (a joint ven ture), Es corts JCB Ltd, Es corts Class Ltd and Es corts Hospi tal. In 2001, the two-wheeler man u fac turer Yamaha seg re gated and formed a sep a rate com pany, which was an In dian sub sidiary of the Ja panese par ent. Es corts stopped mak ing twowheel ers. The trade union tried to at tract the erst while em ploy ees of the Yamaha unit by chang ing the bye-laws. The regis trar of the trade union did not al low it. The Pun ja

Perfumery compounds prepared for applying to incense sticks are subject to excise duty, though the final product, agarbattis, may be exempted, the Supreme Court has said. This is because the compound is capable of being sold as is and it wasn’t necessary to prove that the compound was indeed sold; “marketability is the test of dutiability”, the Supreme Court stated in its judgment, Commissioner of Central Excise vs Karnataka Soaps & Detergents. The court set aside the decision of the Excise Appellate Tribunal, which held the opposite view. In this case, the firm manufactured odoriferous compound in Bengaluru and trans ported it in liquid form to Mysuru, where it was ap plied to in cense sticks to complete the manufacturing process. The revenue authorities demanded excise duty on the perfume compound be cause it was capable of being sold as a product. They pointed out that the compound was in fact sold to Tibetan Handicraft Centre in Mysuru. The firm contended that it was applied t