Legal News & Views

The Supreme Court in State Of Kerala vs Rasheed,  listed out ‘practical guidelines’ to be followed by trial courts in the conduct of a criminal trial, ‘as far as possible’. The bench said that following factors must be considered, while deciding an Application under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C :- Possibility of undue influence on witness(es); possibility of threats to witness(es); possibility that non-deferral would enable subsequent witnesses giving evidence on similar facts to tailor their testimony to circumvent the defence strategy; possibility of loss of memory of the witness(es) whose examination in chief has been completed; Occurrence of delay in the trial, and the non availability of witnesses, if deferral is allowed, in view of Section 309(1) of the Cr.P.C. The Court has listed out ‘practical guidelines’ to be followed by trial courts in the conduct of a criminal trial, as far as possible :- A detailed case-calendar must be prepared at the commencement of th

In Sangeeta Bhakuni v. Pushkar Singh Bhakuni, the Uttaranchal High Court noted that were several inconsistencies in the appellant’s statements – on one hand, she stated that she wanted to live with her husband and on the other hand, she stated that she has a threat to her life from him. Further, the appellant had failed to produce any witness or documentary evidence in support of her bare allegations of harassment, torture, and demand for dowry.  The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal filed against the judgment of Family Court, granting a decree of divorce, for want of substantiation of the appellant-wife’s allegations against the respondent-husband.

In NATIONAL INSURANCE SPECIAL VOLUNTARY RETIRED/RETIRED EMPLOYEES  ASSOCIATION vs UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD., the appellants were ex-employees of the respondent Insurance Companies, who initially joined as Assistants, between 1972 to 1980, and went out of service taking advantage of the General Insurance Employees’ Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2004. The bone of contention was the plea of these appellants, that they are also entitled to certain benefits arising under the earlier scheme known as The General Insurance (Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995, which inter alia provided that the qualifying service of an employee, retiring under that 1995 Scheme, would be increased by a period not exceeding five (5) years, subject to certain conditions. The Supreme Court found that SVRS-2004 Scheme specifically excludes the benefit of additional five (5) years’ service of the 1995 Scheme and held that if the employees avail of the benefit of such a Scheme with their eyes open, they

In JHARKHAND STATE HOUSING BOARD vs DIDAR SINGH & ANR., the appeal before the Supreme Court was against the decision of the High Court allowing the Respondent to file suit for injunction without declaration of title when the Board had alleged that the dispute property has been acquired by the Board through land acquisition. The Supreme Court held that it is well settled by catena of Judgments of this Court that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. A suit for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction. In the facts of the case the defendant­Board by relying upon the land acquisition proceedings and the possession certificate could successf

In S. SAROJINI AMMA vs VELAYUDHAN PILLAI SREEKUMAR, the short question involved in this appeal before the Supreme Court was whether a document styled as gift deed but admittedly executed for consideration, part of which has been paid and the balance promised to be paid, can be treated as formal document or instrument of gift. Another related question is whether a gift deed reserving the right of the donor to keep possession and right of enjoyment and enforceable after the death of the executant is a gift or a will. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the document styled as gift deed was to come into effect only after the death of the appellant and her husband. The appellant is a childless widow aged 74 years whose husband expired on 06.06.2015. The respondent is the nephew of the appellant (brother’s son). In the expectation that the respondent will look after the appellant and her husband and also for some consideration, the appellant executed a purported gift deed

In Capt. Anila Bhatia vs State of Haryana, an appeal was filed before the Punjab & Haryana High Court challenging the condition in the order granting her anticipatory bail, that she should surrender/deposit her passport with the police or the court, and shall not leave India without prior permission of the trial court. The High Court decided that the trial Court cannot impound a passport. Section 104 Criminal Procedure Code states that the Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it but this provision will only enable the Court to impound any document or thing other than a passport as impounding a “passport” is provided for in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. It is a settled law that the special law prevails over the general law. The Passports Act is a special law while the Criminal Procedure Code is a general law. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Criminal Procedure Code though it can impound any

In Asar Mohammad vs The State of U.P.,  the Supreme Court referring to the judgment in Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, it is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence.”

In M/s. Supertech Ltd. VS Rajni Goyal, The dispute concerned a project named ‘Capetown’ developed by the builder in Noida. A flat was allotted by the builder in this development to one Ms. Rajni Goyal in May, 2012, with the Allotment Letter stating that possession would be handed over in October, 2013. The letter allowed extension upto a maximum period of six months due to unforeseen circumstances. However, the builder handed over a Pre​-Possession Letter to Ms. Goyal only in October 2015, for completion of formalities, before possession could Learn more be handed over. With the letter, she was called upon to pay Rs. 12,35,656 towards the balance cost of the flat and several other charges. She, however, failed to pay the charges. Ms. Goyal, then, after over fifteen months, in March, 2017, filed a Consumer Complaint before the National Commission which was allowed. Review petition filed against the said order was dismissed after which the builder approached the Supreme Court.

In Govindammal vs. Vaidiyanathan, the father of the plaintiff and father of defendant were co-defendants in an earlier suit and had pleaded or given evidence to the effect that the entire property was purchased by the father of the defendant by way of court auction. In the suit filed by the plaintiff, the issue of res judicata was raised. The suit was finally decreed by the high court rejecting the res judicata argument. In this context, the Supreme Court observed that since the question of inter se title between the defendant’s father and the plaintiffs’ father was not in issue and was also not required to be decided in the disputes then raised, obviously, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied between such co-defendants.

In Randhiraj Thakur, Director, Mayfair Capital Private Ltd vs Jindal Saxena Financial Services and Mayfair Capital Private Ltd., wherein appeal was preferred by the appellant seeking, inter-alia, setting aside order passed by the Adjudicating Authority whereby the application preferred by the 1st Respondent (Financial Creditor) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has been admitted. The NCLAT noted that an ‘Inter Corporate Deposit Agreement’ was arrived at between Jindal and Mayfair, which is a non-banking financial company. It further noted that Mayfair had undertaken financial services by accepting deposit from Jindal, in terms of Section 3(16) of the Code. It thereby asserted that it cannot be held that the amount was accepted towards public deposits. Therefore M/s. Mayfair Capital Pvt. Ltd. cannot be treated to be ‘Corporate Debtor’ and ‘M/s. Mayfair Capital Pvt. Ltd.’ (2nd Respondent) being a ‘financial service provider’ and having excluded from the def

In OM PRAKASH AGARWAL vs VISHAN DAYAL RAJPOOT, the  Landlord/Appellant filed an eviction suit before Civil Judge (Senior Division), Small Cause Court, in 2008. As the valuation was beyond Rs. 25, 000, the District Judge transferred the suit to Additional District Judge (ADJ). While the suit was pending, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Small Cause Court was raised to Rs. 1 lakh vide Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015. But the ADJ proceeded to decide the suit and finally decreed it in 2016. The tenant moved the high court by filing revision petition which was allowed. The matter was remanded back the revision for a fresh decision by Small Causes Court presided over by a Civil Judge (Senior Division). Landlord challenged this judgment before the apex court. On the question, whether the court of Additional District Judge where the suit in question was pending could still have pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the suit or suit ought to have been

In Vedanta Ltd. vs Shenzen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd., the arbitral tribunal adopted a dual rate of Interest. If the amounts awarded were paid within 120 days’ from the passing of the Award, the awarded sum would carry a 9% rate of Interest on both the components of the Award i.e. the amounts payable in INR and EUR. However, if the awarded amounts were not paid within 120 days’, the arbitral tribunal imposed a higher rate of further Interest @ 15% the date of realization of the amount. The appeal against the order of the tribunal was rejected by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court and the divisional bench as well. On appeal the Supreme Court decided that the discretion of the arbitrator to award interest must be exercised reasonably. An arbitral tribunal while making an award for Interest must take into consideration a host of factors, such as:  (i) the ‘loss of use’ of the principal sum;  (ii) the types of sums to which the Interest must apply;  (

In Dukhi Mirdha v. Ramdas Mirdha, the main issue before the Jharkhand High Court was whether the period of filing written statement can be extended beyond the time period which is prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The petitioners application seeking extension had been rejected by the trial court. The High Court observed that as per the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi, the parties to a dispute are bound by the time frame provided under Order-VIII Rule 1 for filing written statement, however the Court is not bound by the same. The Court further cited the case of Kailash v. Nanhku, and held that the provision under O.VIII R-1 is merely directory in nature and the Court can, in appropriate cases extend the time frame provided under this provision. It further held that the dispute revolved around a property admeasuring 22 acres and hence the petitioner had substantial interest in it. Further, the petit

In Sunita Agarwal v. State of U.P, petitioner’s agricultural land was declared as non-agricultural.  It was found on a spot inspection conducted by Revenue Inspector that the plot was vacant and no agricultural work was being done.   Aggrieved by the same, petitioner filed an application under Section 82 of the Code for cancellation of the above declaration. The aforementioned application was dismissed stating that by canceling the declaration, petitioner was trying to save stamp duty. Later, a revision petition filed by petitioner on the dismissal of above application was also dismissed and for the same, this writ petition was filed. The Single Judge Bench agreeing with the appellant held that if a land is vacant it could never be concluded that it would never be used for agriculture. Unless a building comes up the land could always be used for agriculture.

In Oriental Insurance Company vs Mahendra Construction, the respondent / complainant obtained an insurance policy from the appellant in respect of a hydraulic excavator machine. The said machine having been set on fire by Naxalites, a claim was preferred before the appellant. The claim was rejected as the vehicle was earlier insured with M/s New India Assurance Co. Ltd., prior to obtaining insurance from Oriental Insurance, after the gap of approx. eleven months since the expiry of previous policy. The State Forum allowed the complain and awarded compensation. Appeal was filed before NCDRC against said order. The NCDRC partly allowed the appeal and referring to various judgments including the judgement of the NCDRC in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Jindal Poly Buttons Ltd., held that as per Section 18 & 19 of the Contract Act, particularly the exception under Section 19, even if the insurance policy is obtained by misrepresentation or silence, the contract of insu

In SAS HOSPITALITY PVT LTD & ANR. vs SURYA CONSTRUCTIONS PVT LTD, a suit for declaration was filed before the Delhi High Court by SAS Hospitality Pvt. Ltd seeking a declaration that the allotment of shares to some defendants is null and void. The defendants had contended that suit is not maintainable before the High court in view of the bar contained in Section 430 and Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013. The Delhi High Court has held that National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) is empowered to decide the issues relating to allotment of share capital, alteration and rectification of the register of members and a civil suit before the High court would not be maintainable. The court, referring to provisions of Company Act, 2013, observed that the NCLT is not merely exercising the jurisdiction of a company court under the new Act, but is also vested with inherent powers and powers to punish for contempt. It said that the NCLT having being vested with all the trappings o

In SRI C.S.MAHESH vs SRI NAGAPRASAD SRINIVASAN, the Kerala High Court answered in the negative the question whether a Judge, other than a Judge of the High Court, is empowered to delegate the duty of examining and impounding any instrument under Section 33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 to any other officer.

In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs M/S. Jamia Hamdard, EPABX system installed at the office ofrespondent was insured under Fire & Special Perils Insurance Policy  for a sum insured of Rs.15,00,000/- . On 02.10.2004, it was reported that the said EPABX went out of order since 2.10.2004 and was claimed to be total loss. The surveyors inspected the affected machine on 28.10.2004.  A claim for Rs.9,24,000/- was submitted by respondent to the surveyors.  The Service Engineers of the insured machine had confirmed that the damage has taken place to the system cards due to very high voltage due to lightning and the surveyor agreed with the views of the Service Engineers.   In view of the exclusion being applicable, the claim was not within the scope of the policy and was repudiated by letter dated 10.2.2005. The respondent complained before the District Forum which allowed the claim  directed the petitioner to pay to the respondent Rs.15 lacs with compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- for mental

In Prabha Tyagi vs National Insurance Co. Ltd., the insured had a personal accident cover of Rs. 2 Lakhs but filed an accident claim of Rs. 1 Lakhs which was allowed by the District Forum. The insured then filed another claim of additional Rs. 1 Lakhs stating that the insurer was under the wrong impression that the policy was for Rs. 1 Lakhs and the said claim was allowed by the District Forum. However, the State Commission has accepted the appeal of the Insurance Company and disallowed complaint on the ground of constructive res judicata and on the ground of limitation. On appeal before the NCDRC, the forum while dismissing the claim of the insured and referring to Order II Rule 1 & 2  of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 held that the complainant was required to include his whole claim in the original complaint itself.  These rules are framed to prevent further litigation between the same parties. Thus, no ground is made out for filing another complaint on the same cause of

In EMAAR MGF LAND LTD vs GOVIND PAUL, a review petition was filed by the builder before the NCDRC against the order of the State Forum. The complainant, Mr. Govind Paul, had entered into an agreement with Emaar in September 2011 for a property that was supposed to be handed over in 36 months. After a delay of about 20 months, Paul approached the consumer commission of Chandigarh seeking refund of his payment and compensation for the delay. The State Commission had ordered refund of the principal amount of Rs 38.9 lakh at 15% interest compounded quarterly and Rs. 3 lakh compensation to be paid by Emaar. It had further directed the builder to pay Rs. 25,000 to Paul as cost of litigation. The builder argued before the National Forum that the builder-buyer agreement allowed compensation of Rs. 5 per sq. per month. The NCDRC while dismissing the review petition has ruled that builders cannot shield themselves behind the clause in the builder-buyer agreement to pay Rs. 5 per sq. fee

The question before the 5 judge bench of the Kerala High Court in PAREED PILLAI vs ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., was  "Does the law declared by a Full Bench of this Court in Augustine V.M. Vs. Ayyappankutty @ Mani  stand correct in declaring that, the absence of 'Permit' or 'Fitness Certificate' to the transport vehicle is only a 'technical breach' and not a 'fundamental breach', in so far as it stands contrary to the law declared by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Vs. Challa Bharathamma (later corrected as National Insurance Company Vs. Challa Upendra Rao. For having not made even a reference to the decision of the Apex Court, is not the above verdict liable to be declared as 'per incurium' ? And has the Full Bench considered the necessity for having a 'Fitness Certificate', 'Permit', 'Certificate of Registration' and 'deemed absence of Registration', as envisaged under Section 56 of the M.V.

In RADHA CHEMICALS vs UNION OF INDIA, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the court while deciding a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act has no jurisdiction to remand the matter to the arbitrator for a fresh decision. The bench set aside a Calcutta High Court order that remanded the matter to the arbitrator in order to decide the point of limitation afresh. The division bench of the high court had affirmed the single bench order of remand. Article referred: https://www.livelaw.in/a-court-deciding-section-34-petition-has-no-jurisdiction-to-remand-the-matter-to-arbitrator-for-fresh-decision-reiterates-sc-read-order/

In  PNB METLIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs VINITA DEVI, the claim of the respondent on death of her husband-the insured was repudiated by the insurer on th ground of suppression of material facts. The respondent claimed heart failure as cause of death while the insurer claimed that the insured had suppressed the fact that he suffered from severe kidney problems. However, the records provided by the insurer were found not be dependable. The District as well as the State Forum has found the insurer to have been deficient in their service. The NCDRC referring to the judgment of the Commission titled  Sushil Kumar Jain Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.  I which has attained finality, held that it has been observed in the said judgment  that the doctor’s prescriptions have to be substantiated by an Affidavit of the said doctor,  specially in the light of the fact that it is being disputed by the Complainant. In the instant case the Insurance Company has not produced the affidavit

In TATA AIG GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs RAJBALA, the claim of the insured was repudiated by the insurer due to failure of the insured to take reasonable steps to safeguard the insured vehicle. The said repudiation was partially disallowed by the District Forum and the appeal against the said order was rejected by the State Forum. The insurer filed a revision before the NCDRC after a delay of 95 days. The  petitioner stated that the delay has occurred due to time taken in getting the legal advice first and then to obtain the instructions of the head office for filing the revision petition.  The delay was not intentional and would not cause prejudice to other party if the same is condoned. The NCDRC referred to judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General &Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd., Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV, CicilyKallarackalVs. Vehicle Factory, IV &   R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, wherein it has

In B.K. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED vs PARAG GUPTA AND ASSOCIATES,  appeal was filed against the order of the NCLAT where in reply to the question as to whether the Limitation Act will apply to applications that are made under Section 7 and/or Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and from its commencement on 01.12.2016 till 06.06.2018, till   the Appellate Authority has held that the Limitation Act does not so apply. The issue accrued from Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, which was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 with effect from 06.06.2018. The Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Code from the inception of the Code, Article 137 of the Limitation Act gets attracted. “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred u

In  NEELAM CHOPRA vs LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA, the claim registered on the death of the insured was repudiated by the insurer as the insured at the time of applying had suppressed information. The claim was allowed by the District Forum but disallowed by the State Forum. On appeal the NCDRC, referring to the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Hari Om Agarwal Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, wherein it was held that the insurance claim cannot be denied on the ground of these life style diseases like diabetes and high blood pressure that are so common but it does not give any right to the person insured to suppress information in respect of such diseases. The NCDRC also referred to the  Supreme Court in Sulbha Prakash Motegaonkar And Ors. Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India wherein it was held that  suppression of any information relating to pre-existing disease if it has not resulted in death or has no direct relationship to cause of death, would not completely di

In VIVEK KISHORCHANDRA MEHTA vs PURANIK BUILDERS PVT. LTD. & ANR., this appeal was filed by the appellant against the order of dismissal of the complaint by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra.   The complainant alleged that an amount of Rs.40,00,000/- were paid as booking advance on 25.4.2014.  However, the complainants came to know on 22.3.2015 that there was no three BHK flat in the project though the booking was made for three BHK flat.  Accordingly, the complainants objected to issue of any allotment letter by the opposite parties and sought refund of the paid amount.  Opposite parties agreed to repay on current market price or atleast 18% p.a. interest on the paid amount.  The actual amount was refunded from August, 2015 to October, 2015.  However, no interest has been paid by the opposite parties though the money remained with opposite parties for over a year.  The State Commission mentioned that the amount of refund was received by the com

In  Rajasthan Cylinders v. Competition Commission of India,  the appellants were suppliers of LPG cylinders to Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) and other Oil Marketing Companies [OMCs].  It was alleged that the appellants indulged in bid rigging by quoting same prices in their bids. The Director General (Investigation) (DG) discerned a pattern wherein parties submitted their bids in various states at the same level to prove price parallelism. The DG in its report indicated instances when the appellants met to allegedly discuss the tender prices. Based on these findings, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), as well as the Appellate Tribunal, confirmed the allegation of bid rigging and imposed penalties. The Supreme Court while deciding the case has adopted a different approach. While observing the instances of price parallelism, the Court has held that a key test which needs to be identified while investigating cases of bid rigging is the market situation. The Apex Court

In Sushil Kumar Agarwal vs Meenakshi Sadhu, the respondent appealed against the judgment of the Division Bench Of The Calcutta High Court, wherein the High Court dismissed instituted a suit for specific performance of a development agreement, against the respondents, who are owners of the premises. In the instant case, the appellant had entered into a development agreement with the owners/respondent for the development of a property, wherein the conditions were that the appellant would at their own expense apply for sanction of the plan of a proposed building to the Calcutta Municipal,  submit plan of the building, deposit with the respondent an amount of ₹ 4,00,000/- without interest which shall be refundable upon the completion of the building, if for any reason the construction cannot take place, the appellant shall refund the deposit in addition to all costs, charges and expenses, the respondent shall retain 42% of the total constructed area as ‘sole owned’ and the balance 58%

In CHOLAMANDALAM MS GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs TANUSREE MONDAL, revision petition was filed by insurer against order of the State Forum. In this matter, the respondent–complainant had taken an insurance policy for a sum of Rs.1,16,000/- for her vehicle (Tata Sumo) from the revisionists – opposite party – insurance co., which was in force till 08.08.2008.  Premium of Rs.6,435/- has been paidThe complainant’s vehicle was stolen on 29.06.2008. F.I.R was lodged by the complainant and the contention of insurance co. was that the complainant intimated about the theft of vehicle after expiry of 14 days and as such she had violated the conditions of the insurance policy. The contention of the complainant was that there was no delay in informing the insurance co. about the theft as she intimated the insurance co. on 01.07.2008 over phone but she was advised to report the theft in writing with a copy of the FIR. The complainant got the copy of the FIR on 10.07.2008, and immediate

In CHOLAMANDALAM MS GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs TANUSREE MONDAL, the appeal was filed by the insurer against the concurrent findings of the District Forum and the State Commission wherein the two fora below found deficiency in service on the part of the insurance co. In this case, the respondent/insured's car was stolen against which she filed FIR. The insurer disputed her claim on the sole ground that the complainant intimated about the theft of vehicle after expiry of 14 days and as such she had violated the conditions of the insurance policy. The  respondent/insured complained before the District Forum which allowing the complaint held that the reason for rejection by the insurer is too fragile to merit acceptance. A man of common prudence shall primarily lay emphasis on extensive search of the stolen vehicle. Complainant left no stone unturned in search of the vehicle. Local P.S. was informed, P.S. case was started. This prompt action on the part of the complaina

In SUZUKI PARASRAMPURIA SUITINGS PVT. LTD. vs THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF MAHENDRA PETROCHEMICALS LTD. (IN LIQUIDATION), an appeal was filed against the order of the company judge rejecting the application of the appellant to be substituted in place of another litigant. Background:- An application for winding up of M/s MPL was filed by M/s IFCI and others as secured creditors. After the winding­ up order, IFCI assigned its dues to the appellant for a sum of Rs.85 lacs only and informed the official liquidator thereafter. The appellant then filed Company Application No.248 of 2014 with a prayer for substitution in place of IFCI as a secured creditor of M/s. MPL. The Company Judge rejected the application on 31.07.2015 holding that the appellant was neither a Bank or Banking company or a financial institution or securitization company or reconstruction company and therefore could not be substituted in place of IFCI as a secured creditor for the purpose of the SARFAESI Act. In the

In Sharad Hiru Kolambe Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors, the accused was charged and convicted by the High Court under several major criminal acts/sections. While he had served the required time in prison, he was not released due to inability to pay the fines imposed under the said acts/sections and the penalty for such non-payment is prison term of 10 years. The Ld. counsel for the convict pleaded that while all other sentence were run concurrently as ordered by the Court, the default sentence should also run concurrently. The Supreme Court at the outset, noted that default sentence is not to be merged with or allowed to run concurrently with a substantive sentence. It further observed that theoretically, if the default sentences awarded in respect of imposition of fine in connection with two or more offences are to be clubbed or directed to run concurrently, there would not be any occasion for the persons so sentenced to deposit the fine in respect of the second or further o

In The State Of Maharashtra vs Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan, FIR was filed against the Respondent under Food and Safety Standards Act as well as IPC. The Respondents in the above appeals filed Criminal Writ Petitions and Criminal Applications in the High Court of Bombay for quashing the FIRs. The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the Respondents and declared that the Food Safety Officers can proceed against the Respondents under the provisions of Chapter X of the FSS Act.  On appeal the Supreme Court held that there is no dispute that, Section 55 of the FSS Act provides for penalty to be imposed for non compliance of the requirements of the Act, Rules or Regulations or orders issued thereunder by the Food Safety Officer. The High Court is clearly wrong in holding that, action can be initiated against defaulters only under Section 55 of FSS Act or proceedings under Section 68 for adjudication have to be taken. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offe

In Ambaji Ganu Gurav v. Sachin Chandrakant Narkar, the appellant had lodged a complaint against the respondent alleging the commission of various offences but when the matter was posted for recording of appellant’s evidence, he did not appear for three consecutive dates. The respondent moved an application under Section 256 CrPC which was allowed by the trial court and therefore the complaint was dismissed for want of prosecution. This order of the trial court was impugned in the instant appeal. The Bombay High Court perused the record and considered the submissions made by the parties. Although the counsel for the respondent-accused vehemently opposed; however, the Court was inclined to remand the matter back to trial court for a decision on merits. It was observed that primary function of the Court is to adjudicate the dispute on its own merit rather adhering to technicalities of law. On perusal of the roznama, the High Court was satisfied that the appellant was diligent in pro