Legal News & Views

In Hero Electric Vehicles (P) Ltd. v. Lectro E-Mobility (P) Ltd., the applicant had filed application before the Delhi High Court seeking a decree of permanent injunction on a trade mark issue while the defendants filed application seeking reference of the disputes, forming subject matter of the suit, to arbitration. The Delhi High Court referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., wherein it was held inter-alia that the scope of examination by the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 8 or under Section 11, is prima facie in nature. The Court is not to enter into the merits of the case between the parties. It is only to examine whether the dispute is prima facie arbitrable under a valid arbitration agreement. This prima facie examination is intended to weed out manifestly and ex facie non-existent or invalid arbitration agreements or non- arbitrable disputes, thereby cutting the deadwood and trimming off the side branches, in cases wher

In PANDURANG GANPATI CHAUGULE vs VISHWASRAO PATIL MURGUD SAHAKARI BANK LIMITED,  reference was made to the 5-judge bench of the Supreme Court in view of conflicting decisions in Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd., (2007) 6 SCC 236, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 166, T. Velayudhan Achari v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 582 and Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association, (2002) 4 SCC 275. The Supreme Court held that in our opinion, the activity of banking by such bankers is covered by Entry 45 of List I considering the Doctrine of Pith and Substance, and also considering the incidental encroachment on the field reserved for State is permissible. Co­operative bank’s entire operation and activity of banking are governed by a law enacted under Entry 45 of List I, i.e., the BR Act, 1949, and the RBI Act under Entry 38 of List I. In a 159-pages long verdict, the 5-judge concluded, 1) The co­operative banks registered u

In Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd, the question before the Supreme Court was whether NCLAT can interfere with the decisions of COC ? The Supreme Court referring to K. Sashidhar vs Indian Overseas Bank & Others, Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited and Maharashtra Seamless Limited vs. Padmanabhan Venkatesh and others, observed that it is thus clear, that the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) Report of 2015 was of the view, that for deciding key economic question in the bankruptcy process, the only one correct forum for evaluating such possibilities, and making a decision was, a creditors committee, wherein all financial creditors have votes in proportion to the magnitude of debt that they hold. The BLRC has observed, that laws in India in the past have brought arms of the Government (legislature, executive or judiciary) into the question of bankruptcy process. This has been strictly avoided by the Committee and it has been provided, that the

In Sodexo India Services Pvt. Ltd. vs Chemizol Additives Pvt. Ltd., appeal was filed before the NCLAT against the order of the NCLT whereby the Adjudicating Authority without admitting the Application filed under Section 9 of the Insolvency Code, disposed an Application by directing the Respondent - Corporate Debtor, in the first instance, to make endeavours for resolution in respect of outstanding debt, failing which the Appellant would be at liberty to invoke arbitration clause contained in Agreement. The NCLAT observed that on plain reading of the Section 9, it emerges that the Adjudicating Authority is required either to admit the Application, if the same is complete, there is no payment of the unpaid operational debt, the invoice or notice for payment has been delivered to the Corporate Debtor and no notice of dispute has been received by the Operational Creditor or there is no record of dispute in the information utility. The Adjudicating Authority may reject the Application, if

In Amitabha Dasgupta vs United Bank of India & Ors., the issue before the Supreme Court was the result of a bank breaking open a locker without authorisation or due process and the locker holder  The Supreme Court decided that the following issues arise for consideration in the present appeal: 1) First, Whether the Bank owes a duty of care to the locker holder under the laws of bailment or any other law with respect to the contents of the locker? Whether the same can be effectively adjudicated in the course of consumer dispute proceedings? 2) Second, irrespective of the answer to the previous issue, whether the Bank owes an independent duty of care to its customers with respect to diligent management and operation of the locker, separate from its contents? Whether compensation can be awarded for non­compliance with such duty? Noting that each bank is following its own set of procedures and there is no uniformity in the rules, the Supreme Court decided that it is imperative to lay d

In M/s. Ashirbad Industries & others vs State of Odisha & Others, the petitioners were successful bidders in a tender process. However, as there was delay in finalizing the tender process, the Petitioners filed writ petitions which were disposed of by the Orissa High Court with direction to Respondents to consider and dispose of the representation of the Petitioners by passing a reasoned and speaking order after affording reasonable opportunities of hearing to the Petitioners. Since the direction of this Court has not complied in time, contempt petition were preferred by the Petitioners. In the meantime, the tenders were rejected by the Respondents as they were found to be defective and having discrepancies. The Petitioners again filed writ praying for finalizing the tender are pending adjudication, the order of cancellation is erroneous and hit by the principles of lis pendens. His further contention is that, when the Petitioners have been selected as successful bidders, the u

In The High Court of Judicature at Madras Rep. by its Registrar General vs M.C. Subramaniam & ors., several petitions and appeals were filed by both parties before the High Court. While the appeals were still pending consideration before the High Court, the parties entered into a private out­ of­ court settlement, thus resolving the controversy between them. In view of this, Respondent No. 1 filed a memo before the High Court, seeking permission to withdraw Appeal Suits Nos. 876/2012 and 566/2013. Such permission, along with a direction to refund the court fee deposited by Respondent No.1, was granted by the High Curt. Despite the above stated orders of the High Court, the Registry orally refused Respondent No.1’s request for refund of court fees, on the ground that such refund is not authorised by the relevant rules. The Respondent appealed to the High Court which directed the Registrar to initiate the refund. The Registrar challenged the order before the Supreme Court. Petitioner

In COMPACK ENTERPRISES INDIA (P) LTD. ...PETITIONER vs  BEANT SINGH, the Supreme Court  once again summarised the law governing further litigation after a consent decree. The Court said that it is well­ settled that consent decrees are intended to create estoppels by judgment against the parties, thereby putting an end to further litigation between the parties. Resultantly, any court be slow to unilaterally interfere in, modify, substitute or modulate the terms of a consent decree, unless it is done with the revised consent of all the parties thereto. For this the Court referred to Gupta Steel Industries v. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd. & anr.,; Suvaran Rajaram Bandekar & ors. v. Narayan R. Bandekar & ors., (1996) 10 SCC 255). However, the court further observed that this formulation is far from absolute and does not apply as a blanket rule in all cases. Supreme Court, in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & ors., (1992) 1 SCC 31, has held that a consent

In DAKSHIN HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD. vs M/S NAVIGANT TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD., the issue which has arisen for our consideration is as to whether the period of limitation for filing the Petition under Section 34 would commence from the date on which the draft award dated 27.04.2018 was circulated to the parties, or the date on which the signed copy of the award was provided. The arbitral tribunal orally pronounced the award [2:1] on 27.04.2018, whereby the claims of the respondent company were allowed. The parties were informed that the third arbitrator had disagreed with the view taken by the majority of arbitrators, and would be rendering his separate opinion. A copy of the draft award was provided to the parties to point out any computation, clerical or typographical errors in the award on the next date of hearing. On 12.05.2018, a copy of the dissenting opinion was provided by the third arbitrator to the parties (even though the opinion was dated 27.04.2018). The matter was then

In M. Jaishankar v. Sree Gokulam Chits and Finance Corpn. (P) Ltd., the Madras High Court observed even when a person defaults on payment of his debt and a cheque issued by a wife in discharge of that debt is dishonoured, the husband being the non-issuer of the cheque cannot be prosecuted for the dishonoured/bounced cheque as per Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act.

In New India Assurance v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., reference was made before the 5 judge bench of the Supreme Court relating to the grant of time for filing response to a complaint under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 wherein the answers to the following questions were sought: 1) whether Section 13(2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act, which provides for the respondent/opposite party filing its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory; i.e., whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days. 2) what would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under the aforesaid Section. Answering the first question,  the Court held that the decision rendered by a 3-judge bench in Dr. J. J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 635, to be correct in law, wherein it