Legal News & Views

In LIGY PAUL vs MARIYAKUTTY, before the Kerala High Court, one C.L.Mathachan, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants got patta in respect of 2.47 acres of land as per P.F.No.192/1981. 62.682 cents of this property was lying on the southern side of Edamalayar- Illithodu road. The property lying on the southern side of the said 62.682 cents is belonging to the plaintiff and one Susan P.Aliyattukudy. C.L.Mathachan, along with the 1st defendant, who is his wife, entered into an agreement on 22.6.1984 to sell out the said property to the said persons. Since there was a bar against the sale of the property for a period of 12 years from the date of issuance of patta, no time was specifically fixed and it was tentatively agreed to execute the sale deed after 10 years. The plaintiff agreed to purchase 28.672 cents out of the said property and the rest by Susan.P.Aliyattukudy. The said 28.672 cents is the plaint schedule property. The possession of the property was handed over to the purp

In S.P. SINGLA CONSTRUCTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED vs CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN SERVICES, UTTAR PRADESH JAL NIGAM, the dispute before the Delhi High Court was with the venue and seat of arbitration as defined in the contract made between the two parties. The petitioners argued that Clause 26.3 of the Contract is specific that the arbitration shall be held “in accordance with the Rules of the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution, New Delhi” and that by incorporating the Rules of ICADR, New Delhi into the Contract in question, the parties have expressly chosen the seat /place of arbitration at New Delhi. To submit that where parties expressly choose to incorporate the rules of an arbitral institute into their arbitration clause, while failing to specifically agree on a “seat” of arbitration, they are deemed to knowingly have chosen and relied on the seat selection clause of the institutional rules, reliance is placed upon Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s decision in Imax Corporation Vs

 B. V. Byre Gowda vs Nisar Ahmed, the appellant had objected before the Karnataka High Court, to 2 separate FIRs filed on the same incident.  In the case, the allegations were that govt. officials were not allowed to complete their assign work and further they were assaulted. The appellant argued that the time of offence, place of offence and the incident which has triggered in registering the complaints, all of them happened between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m. Therefore, there can be only one complaint on this incident and there cannot be multiple complaints for a solitary incident. On the other hand, the Respondents argued two FIRs are permissible on 2 incidents as they are for different allegations - one which happened when the buntings were sought to be unauthorizedly put up incurring offences under the Representation of People Act or the Disfigurement Act. Staff/Officers were assaulted which was at 7.45 a.m. and this became a second FIR. The High Court agreeing with the Appellant observed t

The position has been crystalised by this Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and others, to summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under: (a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and  substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. B

In Shakuntala Shukla vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, the Supreme Court being dissatisfied with the  lack of clarity in the High Court order, went at length to define judgment and explain the proper manner in which an order/judgment should be written and what it should include. What is “judgment”. “Judgment” means a judicial opinion which tells the story of the case; what the case is about; how the court is resolving the case and why. “Judgment” is defined as any decision given by a court on a question or questions or issue between the parties to a proceeding properly before court. It is also defined as the decision or the sentence of a court in a legal proceeding along with the reasoning of a judge which leads him to his decision. The term “judgment” is loosely used as judicial opinion or decision. Roslyn Atkinson, J., Supreme Court of Queensland, in her speech once stated that there are four purposes for any judgment that is written: i) to spell out judges own thoughts; ii) to

In M/S. INDSIL HYDRO POWER AND MANGANESE LIMITED vs STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS, the imposition of royalty or charges on controlled supply of water on the ground of absence or lack of jurisdiction and some ancilliary issues was challenged the appellant before the Supreme Court.To address this issue, the Court referred to the following precedents which discussed the difference between royalty/cess and tax.  1) Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and Others vs. State of Orissa and Others (1961) 2 SCR 537 2) State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Limited and Ors (2004) 10 SCC 201 3) State of Himachal Pradesh and Others vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Another 4) Jindal Stainless Limited and another vs. State of Haryana and others 5)  Union of India and others vs. Motion Picture Association and others The court held that the essential characteristics of a tax are that: (i) it is imposed under a statutory power without the taxpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law; (ii) it is