Legal News & Views

In SRI U. M. RAMESH RAO vs Union Bank Of India, the issue was whether, coffee plantation is agricultural land within the meaning of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act and therefore, the said Act does not apply to coffee plantation. The High Court observed that the expression, agricultural land, is not defined under the Act and therefore, the meaning of the said expression would have to be discerned with reference to the plain and dictionary meaning as well as other legislations which deal with the agricultural land. The High Court decided that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal vs. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy and other related judgments would not be of much assistance in interpreting the phrase ‘agricultural land’ under Section 31(i) of SARFAESI Act. For that, it is necessary to deduce the meaning and connotation of the said expression from State laws relating to ‘agriculture’ and thereby unravel the meaning of ‘agricultural land’ in Section 31(i

In W.P. No 2230 of 2021, the Madras High Court referred unfavourably to the practise of publishing notifications in less known newspapers. In this W.P., the court was specifically looking into the matter of notification of acquisition is published in a certain aaily called 'Trinity Mirror', which is said to have wide circulation in Hosur Taluk. The High Court observed that not only the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, even the State Enactments on the land acquisition require newspaper publication atleast in one English and one Vernacular newspapers having wide circulation in that locality. The point here is, while the word 'locality' is not defined, whether it will mean a particular village where the property is situated, or the Taluk or the District concerned. Secondly, it is not known whether this daily 'Trinity Mirror' has such wide circulation throughout the District, and what is the

In Kirti & Anr. Etc. vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., a married couple died in an accident leaving behind as dependents two elderly parents and 2 minor children. During the course of the litigation, one of the parents died. The matter subsequently came up before the Supreme Court on the issue of compensation. The Supreme Court in an elaborate judgment held - 1) Claims and legal liabilities crystallise at the time of the accident itself, and changes post thereto ought not to ordinarily affect pending proceedings. Just like how appellant­claimants cannot rely upon subsequent increases in minimum wages, the respondent­insurer too cannot seek benefit of the subsequent death of a dependent during the pendency of legal proceedings.  2) Any compensation awarded by a Court ought to be just, reasonable and consequently must undoubtedly be guided by principles of fairness, equity, and good conscience. 3) Preserving the existing standard of living of a deceased’s family is a fundamental en

In M/s. Padia Timber Company(P) Ltd. vs The Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust Through its Secretary, the short question involved in this appeal is, whether the acceptance of a conditional offer with a further condition results in a concluded contract, irrespective of whether the offerer accepts the further condition proposed by the acceptor. In this matter, a tender was floated by the Respondents against which the Appellant had submitted its offer which some specific conditions. The Appellant did not accept Clauses 15 and 16 of the Tender and rather made a counter proposal. In accordance with the terms and conditions of the tender, the Appellant deposited Rs.75,000/- towards earnest deposit, along with its quotation. There were several rounds of correspondences between the parties primarily on the objection/condition raised by the Appellate which was inconclusive and finally the Appellant rejected the proposal of the Respondent and requested return of the earnest money. How

In M/s. N.N. GLOBAL MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. vs M/s. INDO UNIQUE FLAME LTD. & OTHERS, interesting issues with respect to the application of the doctrine of separability of an arbitration agreement from the underlying substantive contract in which it is embedded; whether an arbitration agreement would be non-existent in law, invalid or un-enforceable, if the underlying contract was not stamped as per the relevant Stamp Act; and, whether allegations of fraudulent invocation of the bank guarantee furnished under the substantive contract, would be an arbitrable dispute. The issues which have arisen for our consideration are : i. Whether an arbitration agreement would be enforceable and acted upon, even if the Work Order is unstamped and un-enforceable under the Stamp Act? ii. Whether allegation of the fraudulent invocation of the bank guarantee is an arbitrable dispute? iii. Whether a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution would be maintainable to challenge an Order r

In Phoenix Arc Private Limited vs Spade Financial Services Limited & Ors., the appeal filed by the Petitioner was to bar the Respondent from participating in the COC as they were related parties as far as the Corporate Debtor was concerned while the contention of the Respondent was that they were related at some time in the past but presently were not and therefore the bar as per Section 21(1) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act would not apply to them. The Petitioner had countered that the Respondents had tried to circumvent the bar by entering into collusive transactions with the Corporate Creditor in order to take the identity of a financial creditor. Collusive Transactions The Supreme Court observed that  money advanced as debt should be in the receipt of the borrower. The borrower is obligated to return the money or its equivalent along with the consideration for a time value of money, which is the compensation or price payable for the period of time for which the money is lent.

In THE COMMISSIONER BRUHATH BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE & ANR. vs FARAULLA KHAN & ANR., appeal was filed by the Petitioner against a Karnataka High Court judgment   directing it to mutate a property in the name of some parties. The Petitioners had argued that a title suit is presently pending between the petitioners and Lakshminarayana Charitable Trust, where the title to the suit property is under adjudication and therefore pending the decision of the title suit, the High Court ought not to have issued a direction for mutation. Its appeal before the Division Bench was also dismissed. The Supreme Court agreeing with the Division Bench observed that the High Court has clarified that the direction for mutation will be subject to the pursuit of any other remedy available under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act 1956 and it is open to the Bruhath Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike to establish its title by following due process of law. With the clarification which has been issued by

In Adrian Pereira v. Anita Ronald Lewis, the appeal was filed by the Appellant - Opposite Party under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the order dated 29.09.2015 passed by the Maharashtra State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, wherein the Complaint was partly allowed and the Opposite Party was directed to handover possession of the subject flat to the Respondent - Complainant after receiving the balance consideration amount from the Respondent - Complainant. On 07.12.2001, a registered agreement was executed between the parties for sale consideration of Rs. 16.50 lakh. Though not written in the agreement, it was understood that possession was to be delivered to the Complainant by December 2002. But, no satisfactory progress was made up to 15.02.2003. The Opposite Party assured possession of the flat within three months i.e. on or before 31.05.2003. Despite the assurance, no progress was made and therefore the Complainant wrote a letter on 26.05.2003 to the

In Amrita Chatterjee v. CPIO, Income Tax Officer, against the question whether the appellant claiming to be the legally wedded wife of Mr Suman Chatterjee is entitled to seek details of his income tax returns i.e. Form 16, the Appellate Commission referred to the Delhi High Court decision in Vijay Prakash v. UOI,  wherein it was clarified that in a private dispute between husband and wife, the basic protection afforded by virtue of exemption from disclosure enacted under Section 8(1)(j) cannot be lifted or disturbed unless the petitioner is able to justify how such disclosure would be in ‘public interest’. Bench noted that in the present matter, the appellant did not succeed in establishing the information sought was for a larger public purpose. Commission decided that since the filing of income tax returns by an individual is not a public activity and rather it is in the nature of an obligation which a citizen owes to the State. The said information cannot be disclosed to the appellan

In Madhuben Rameshchandra Shah vs Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn., the Petitioner had applied for allotment of shed pursuant to the advertisement of Respondent No.1. Petitioner submitted an application and was allotted Shed vide allotment letter. The Petitioner paid an amount of Rs.1,76,000/- towards allotment of the shed, as an initial payment. The Petitioner was informed that he would be able to get connection from the Gujarat Electricity Board in due course. After the transfer of possession of the allotted shed ,vide letter dated 14.10.1999, the Petitioner came to know, vide letter dated 30.06.2000, from Respondent No.-3 that the previous allottee of the shed had to pay Rs.1,26,479/- to the Gujarat Electricity Board for the shed purchased by him. The Petitioner, vide letter dated 17.09.2001 intimated Respondent No.-2 that dues of previous allottee were also pending towards the municipal tax of Surat Municipal Corporation. The Petitioner requested Respondent No.2 to clear outst

In Nitai Majumder vs Tanmoy Krishna Das, appeal was filed before the Tripura High Court against the conviction order passed by the lower courts against the petitioner for having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. One of the objections raised by the petitioner against the order of the lower court was that service of statutory notice on the accused petitioner after dishonor of the cheque from the bank was not also proved. The High Court observed that after the cheque presented by the Respondent was returned by the bank due to insufficiency of funds, a demand notice was then issued by the respondent to the petitioner through his lawyer demanding payment within 15 days and such notice was sent to his known residential address through post registered with AD. The postman entrusted with the service of the notice visited the house of the petitioner several times. Every time the house inmates of the petitioner refused to receive the registered letter and told the pos