Legal News & Views

In Lakshmi Narayan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank, appeal was filed before the NCLAT against the order of the NCLT, Hyderabad admitting an applicant under Section 7 of the Insolvency Code against the Corporate Debtor−Saptarishi Hotels (P) Ltd. The appellant was the promoter/suspended director of Saptrishi Hotels (P) Ltd and had filed the appeal as an 'Aggrieved Person'. Appellant said that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ was sanctioned ‘Consortium Loan’ by the 1st Respondent/Punjab National Bank and Punjab Sind Bank as per ‘Consortium Loan Agreement’ and ‘Sanction Letters’. It is represented on behalf of the Appellant that the 1st Respondent/Punjab National Bank had sanctioned credit facilities amounting to INR 90 Crores and Punjab Sind Bank had sanctioned facilities totalling INR 80 Crores on 11.08.2011 as per ‘Consortium Agreement’ dated 11.08.2011. Further, the date of ‘CoD’ was extended upto 01.02.2016 by the ‘Consortium’ on 26.12.2014 and that the 1st Respondent/Punjab National Ban

In DARCL Logistics Ltd. v. Mercedes Benz India (P) Ltd., complaint was filed against Mercedes Benz India Private Limited and T&T Motors Limited. The complainant 1 had purchased a ‘Mercedes Benz C 220’ Car from OP 2 for the personal use of Complainant 2, being Vice president of the company. The said car broke down during the rainfall in Delhi and was sent to OP 3 for repair. However, till the finding of the present complaint, the complainants received more than five estimates for repair of the said car from the opposite parties, which in total amounted to more than the value of the car. The car was not delivered by the OPs even after the lapse of 3 months due to which the complainants raised grievances to the OPs, alleging manufacturing defect in the vehicle resulting in deficiency of service and unfair trade practice. OPs contended that the complainants cannot be stated to be a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act 1986 as the said car was purchased by the company for its Vice

In Angel Click v. State of Karnataka, the petitioners were rice traders in Nagpur (Maharashtra). Their godowns in Nagpur were raided by the Karnataka Police under the authority a search and seizure warrant issued by the Judicial Magistrate, Gangavathi (Karnataka). A considerable number of rice bags of a particular brand were seized and taken away by the Karnataka Police from their godowns. Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the Bombay High Court. Territorial jurisdiction of High Courts Respondent Nos.1 and 5 contend in support of their preliminary objection that the entire cause of action comprising the registration of the offences, investigation into the offences and the issuance of search warrant having arisen in the State of Karnataka, this Court cannot entertain this petition. The Court held that even as regards registration of crime in the present case, we are of the opinion that part of the cause of action has also arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court for t

In LALIT KUMAR JAIN vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS., The common question which arises in all these cases concerns the vires and validity of a notification dated 15.11.2019 issued by the Central Government. At some stage or the other, these petitioners (compendiously termed as “the writ petitioners”) had furnished personal guarantees to banks and financial institutions which led to release of advances to various companies which they (the petitioners) were associated with as directors, promoters or in some instances, as chairman or managing directors. In many cases, the personal guarantees furnished by the writ petitioners were invoked, and proceedings are pending against companies which they are or were associated with, and the advances for which they furnished bank guarantees. In several cases, recovery proceedings and later insolvency proceedings were initiated. The insolvency proceedings are at different stages and the resolution plans are at the stage of finalization. In a few cases, t

In Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (BESCOM). vs E.S. Solar Power Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., the deciding on the interpretation of contracts, the Supreme Court observed that before embarking on the exercise of interpretation of the agreement it is necessary to take stock of the well- settled canons of construction of contracts. Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Limited vs. West Bromwich Building Society summarized the broad principles of interpretation of contract as follows:  (1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. (2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the "matrix of fact," but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it

In P. MOHANRAJ & ORS. vs M/S. SHAH BROTHERS ISPAT PVT. LTD., appeal was filed against the NCLAT order holding that Section 138, being a criminal law provision, cannot be held to be a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section 14 of the IBC. whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be said to be covered by the moratorium provision, namely, Section 14 of the IBC. The Supreme Court observed that in Section 14(1)(a) of IBC, it will be noticed that the expression “or” occurs twice in the first part – first, between the expressions “institution of suits” and “continuation of pending suits” and second, between the expressions “continuation of pending suits” and “proceedings against the corporate debtor...”. The sweep of the provision is very wide indeed as it includes institution, continuation, judgment and execution of suits and proceedings. It is important to note that an award of an arbitration panel or an order

In Deific Abode LLP vs Union of India & Ors., while discussing on the issue of interim order staying the operation of an impugned order and the quashment of an impugned order, the Calcutta High Court observed that :- These salient principles emerge: i. As per the law laid down in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd (supra) by the Supreme Court, the effect of an interim order staying the operation of an impugned order and the quashment of an impugned order are considerably different from one another. While the former merely ensures that the order impugned would not be operative from the date of the passing of the order of stay, without annihilating the said impugned order from existence, the latter ensures that such quashment results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date the impugned order was passed, with the impugned order ceasing to exist in the eyes of the law. ii. Quashment of such impugned order would revive the appeal before the appellate authority and would be con

In M/s Radha Krishan Industries vs State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., an appeal filed by the Appellant was rejected by the High Court at Himachal Pradesh as according to the High Court alternate remedy is available to the Appellant. The Supreme Court while looking into the matter held that it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai, a two judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted: “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”. 15.Un

In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA  Vs. TAPAS D.  NEOGY, DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/09/1999 BENCH: G.B.Pattanaik, N.S. Hedge JUDGMENT: PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 9.4.97 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 826 of 1996. The said criminal application along with four other criminal writ petitions involving the same question of law were decided together and disposed of by the common judgment which is being impugned in this appeal. The short question that arose before the High Court is whether a Police Officer, investigating into an offence can issue prohibitory order in respect of the bank account of the accused in exercise of power under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code? So far as Crl. Application No. 826 of 1996 is concerned, the short facts are that one Tapas D.Neogy was an Architect & Town Planner in the Department of Town Planning of the Union Territory of Daman and Diu. The CBI, ACB, Mumb

In M/S. HIRA SWEETS & CONFECTIONARY PVT. LTD. vs HIRA CONFECTIONERS, the applicant filed an application for condonation of delay of 582 days by claiming unawareness of the ex-parte decree and various  others reasons before the Delhi High Court. The High Court while rejecting the application held that -  Insofar as the scope of an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is concerned, the Court has to see whether the summons in the suit were duly served or not and/or whether the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called for hearing. In the present case, the defendant was duly served with the summons in the suit and had appeared. “Sufficient Cause” is an elastic expression and no hard and fast guidelines are prescribed. The Court, in its discretion, has to consider the “sufficient cause” in the facts and circumstances of every individual case. Although in interpreting the words “sufficient cause”, the Court has wide discretion but the sam

In (Deceased) Satish Chand Sharma vs Manoj, appeal was filed at the behest of the claimant (now deceased) through his legal representatives, challenging the judgment and decree passed  passed in 2018 by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 15, Ghaziabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’). The appeal is preferred for enhancement of the compensation awarded under the impugned award. The Allahabad High Court observed that the accident occurred on 22.2.2005. The claimant was admitted in hospital from the date of accident and, thereafter was discharged. The claimant filed claim petition on 14.9.2005 after being discharged from hospital. On petition being filed, summons were issued to respondents. Though disputed by owner, the respondent No.1-owner was served with the summons on 13.1.2007 as mentioned by the Tribunal in its judgment dated 27.9.2010. The matter proceeded ex parte against the owner namely Manoj Kumar. The owner and driver of the offending

In SHITAL FIBERS LTD.  vs  INDIAN ACRYLICS LIMITED, as per the respondent, appellant had made a payment of Rs.61,83,218/­. However, there was an outstanding balance of Rs.8,92,723/­ as on 28.7.2008. Since despite repeated requests, balance amount was not paid, the respondent issued a statutory notice to the appellant. The same was duly responded to. As the payment was not made despite notice being duly served on the appellant, the respondent filed the aforesaid Company Petition seeking winding up of the present appellant for its inability to pay admitted debts. The learned Company Judge vide order dated 28.9.2015 admitted the Company Petition. However, while doing so, the learned Company Judge observed, that since the appellant was an on­going concern, an opportunity should be granted to it to settle the accounts with the respondent by 31.12.2015. Only in case of failure of the settlement, the citation was directed to be published. On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court, while