Legal News & Views

In Dhirendra Singh v. State of U.P, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Allahabad High Court to set aside the summon issued by the Ld. Trial Court. It had been alleged that the petitioner had taken a loan and the cheques issued by the petitioner against the same had bounced/dishonoured due to insufficiency of   funds. The primary objection of the petitioner was that the complainant / respondent was wholly incompetent to lodge the prosecution as cheques were issued by the firm M/s Rashmi Arosole & Chemicals and petitioner is proprietor of this firm but the firm is not arraign as an accused. Dismissing the petition, the High Court observed that a plain reading of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act makes it clear, if the person committing the offence is a "company", in that event every natural person responsible for such commission as also the artificial person namely the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and be liable to be proceeded again

In Brahm (Alloys) Ltd. & Anr.vs West Bengal Financial Corporation & Ors., three sale notices were issued against the assets of the Petitioner/Borrower. On each of the earlier occasions, the borrower had prayed for and been given time to repay but had failed. Against this latest notice, the borrower in its appeal submitted that the petitioners are already in touch with an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC) regarding the loan being taken over by the said ARC. Such action on the part of the petitioners was already communicated to the respondent no.1. However, the respondent no.1 is taking a plea that there had been previous nonfulfillment by the petitioners of the liberty granted to the petitioners to repay the loan and that there is no provision in the State Financial Corporation Act for transferring such loan to an ARC. The petitioners through the present application again sought some time to finalize the arrangements with the ARC for the purpose of repayment of the loan advance

In STATE OF UTTARAKHAND vs SMT. SURESHWATI, the Respondent filed a complaint before the School contending that she had worked continuously upto 07.03.2006. She alleged that on 8th March, 2006 her services were illegally retrenched without granting her any hearing, or payment of retrenchment compensation. She claimed that she was illegally terminated, without holding any enquiry, or granting her personal hearing. She contended that she had worked for not less than 240 days in the preceding year before her alleged termination. Since the work was of permanent nature, she was entitled to re-instatement with continuity of service. The School contended that the claimant had since 01.07.1997 remained continuously absent from the School, since she had got married and was residing in Dehradun. It was specifically averred that she had never joined back the School. The Labor court agreed with the School and held that the claimant had concealed material facts, and had not approached the Court with

In B. SANTOSHAMMA & ANR. vs D. SARALA & ANR., the Appellant (Vendor) sold a property of 300 yards to the Respondent (Vendee) against which some advance was taken. Meanwhile another person, Pratap Reddy, claimed that a portion of the property of 100 yards has already been sold to him by the Vendor. All claims were backed by some form of agreements. Suits were filed with multiple claims at cross purpose, accusing each other. The trial court by a common judgment and decree, for specific performance was allowed, in part, holding that the Vendee, was not entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement in respect of 100 sq. yards covered by the sale deed dated 25th May, 1984, but entitled to relief of specific performance in respect of the remaining 200 sq. yards of the suit land. The Vendee’s suit for declaration against Pratap Reddy was dismissed for non-joinder of the Vendor. Both Vendor and the Vendee appealed before the High Court which was dismissed. In the appeal before

In M/S BANGALORE CLUB vs THE COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX & ANR., for assessment years 1981-82 and 1984-85 upto 1990-91, the Wealth Tax Officer, Bangalore, referred to the fact that Bangalore Club is not registered as a society, a trust or a company and came to the conclusion that the rights of the members are not restricted only to user or possession, but definitely as persons to whom the assets of the Club belong. After referring to Section 167A, inserted into the Income Tax Act, 1961, and after referring to Rule 35 of the Bangalore Club Rules, the assessing officer concluded that the number of members and the date of dissolution are all uncertain and variable and therefore indeterminate, as a result of which the Club was liable to be taxed under the Wealth Tax Act. On appeal, the appellate authority ruled Section 21AA would not be attracted to the case of the Bangalore Club and as per Rule 35, since members are entitled to equal shares in the assets of the Club on winding-up after

In Prem Vs. Maninder Kaur Kwatra, an ejectment application was filed by the respondent-landlady seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the demised premises on the grounds that he had failed to pay or tender the rent for the demised premises since January 2016 and further that the respondent-landlady bonafidely required the demised premises for her own personal use and occupation and that the respondent-landlady or her son were not occupying any other such building in the urban area of SAS Nagar and had also not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in the urban area of Mohali. The ejectment application was contested by the petitioner-tenant contending that the same had been filed to cause harassment and financial loss to the petitioner-tenant by dragging him in unwanted litigation on the basis of false allegations merely to increase the rent of the demised premises. Preet Inder Singh, son of the

In AVITEL POST STUDIOZ LIMITED & ORS. vs HSBC PI HOLDINGS (MAURITIUS) LIMITED, the Supreme Court was hearing an appeal from the interlocutory judgment and order passed in the appeal under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Bombay High Court in a dispute between HSBC and Avitel India. HSBC had alleged that the Appellants had committed fraud by siphoning off the funds provided by them. As the agreement entered into by HSBC and the Appellants contained arbitration clause, HSBC approached the Singapore Arbitration Centre and the arbitration committee so formed executed award in favour of HSBC who filed application before the Bombay High Court for execution of the award. The Appellants contended objected to the award on various grounds and further argued that as fraud has been alleged, the dispute cannot be arbitrated.  The Supreme Court has held that “serious allegations of fraud” as a ground for exemption from arbitral proceedings arise only if either of th

In DECCAN PAPER MILLS CO. LTD. vs REGENCY MAHAVIR PROPERTIES & ORS., the Appellants before the Supreme Court had entered into an agreement with a firm for the development of a property and there was no arbitration clause in the agreement. The said firm with the approval of the Appellants entered into an agreement with the Respondent for the development. The Appellants allegation was that they had entered into all these agreements only with the understanding that one particular individual who was then a partner of the first firm would remain involved in the development process. However, when there was delay in development, the Appellants on enquiring found that the same person had long since left the firm and was not involved in the development process at all. It should be noted that none of the agreements mentioned the need for this person to be present in the development process. The Appellants claimed fraud has been done against them as the non-participation of this person as vio

In THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEES, COCHIN PORT TRUST vs M/S AREBEE STAR MARITIME AGENCIES PVT. LTD. & ORS, a reference was made to the larger bench of the Supreme Court by Division Bench in lieu of appeals filed before the Supreme Court against the original judgment dated 27-9-2011 [Arebee Star Maritime Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Cochin Port Trust, Original Petition No. 21041 of 1999, decided on 27-9-2011 (Ker)] of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in a batch of writ appeals and original petitions, preferred by various shipping agents. The question before the High Court was whether the liability to pay “ground rent” on containers unloaded at Cochin Port, but not cleared by the consignees/importers and refused to be destuffed by the Port, on the ground of inadequate storage space, can be imposed on the owners of the vessel/steamer agents beyond the period of 75 days, fixed by the Tariff Authority of Major Ports [TAMP], a statutory body constituted under Section 47-A of the Major

In L&T Housing Finance Limited Vs. Trishul Developers and Ors., the first Respondent - a partnership firm took a term loan of Rs. 20 crores for completion of its project ("Mittal Palms, Phase-I") from the Appellant and for that all the relevant documents were signed by the Respondents. It may be relevant to note that the sanction letter dated 07th August, 2015 (P1) duly signed by the authorised signatory of "L & T Housing Finance Ltd." for execution of the Facility Agreement and effecting all compliance as required to the satisfaction of the lender was accepted and signed by the authorised signatory on behalf of the first Respondent and also by the guarantors clearly demonstrates that on the top of the letterhead towards right, the name of the company is mentioned "L & T Finance (Home Loans)" and in the bottom towards left, it was mentioned "L & T Housing Finance Ltd." with registered office at Mumbai and this is the letterhead wh

In Paramount Prop Build Pvt. Ltd vs. State Of U.P. And Others, as the petitioner, who is the promoter, could not deliver possession of the flats to the allottees in time and there occurred delay, the allotees filed complaint before Uttar Pradesh Real Estate Regulatory Authority, who passed the impugned orders awarding interest. The petitioner appealed before the High Court of Allahabad, claiming that the impugned orders are without jurisdiction inasmuch as the power to grant interest, does not vest with the authority. The High Court however observed that  as per Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, which deals with of return of amount and compensation in case the promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, plot or building, Sub-section (1) of Section 18 provides for two different contingencies. In case the allottee wishes to withdraw from the project, the promoter shall be liable on demand to return the amount received by