Legal News & Views

In R. JANAKIAMMAL vs. S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED), the Respondents approached the Supreme Court with the objection that a certain residential property was not part of their family's compromise settlement and that although in the name of defendant No.1 but it was acquired from joint family funds hence the appellant had also share in the property.  The family originally had 3 branches. The Respondents objection was that after the partition dated 07.11.1960, the three branches had separated and joint family status came to end. He submitted that partition dated 07.11.1960 is the registered partnership deed which partition was accepted by trial court in its judgment. The partition of joint family of three branches having been accepted on 07.11.1960 there was no joint family when the Tatabad house property was purchased in 1979.  The points for consideration before the Supreme Court was that as to whether at the time when the suit property was acquired by defendant No.1 whether all three b

In R. JANAKIAMMAL vs S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED), a decree issued on a compromise settlement was challenged through a separate suit before various courts and after being rejected by the lower courts, finally reached the Supreme Court. The objection raised by the plaintiff was that the compromise settlement was fraudulent and should be rejected while the defendants claimed that the suit was barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC and that the only remedy open for the plaintiff was to either file an application in suit No.37 of 1984 or file an appeal against the Compromise decree. Agreeing with the Respondents, the Supreme Court observed that Order XXIII Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit. In Rule 3 amendments were made by Act No. 104 of 1976 by which a proviso and an explanation was added. Order XXIII Rule 3 as amended is to the following effect:-  Compromise of suit. - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawfu

In IDEAL SURGICALS vs NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, KOCHI, writ petition was filed before the Kerala High Court alleging that the appeals appeals and stay petitions of the Petitioner against the order of the NCLT in the matter of the Corporate Resolution of PVS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL are not being taken up by the NCLAT as the NCLAT is on leave. That the appeals have been accepted by the NCLAT, but are yet to be numbered and posted for admission. The Petitioners alleged that  in the meanwhile, if the resolution process is continued in accordance with the order of the NCLT, the appeals will be rendered infructuous. In such circumstances, the High Court can, in the interest of justice, exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to safeguard the interest of the petitioners, till the appeals are taken up for consideration. Objecting to the petition, the Respondents refuted that the averment in the writ petitions that the appeals are not being taken up. The appeals are defective and will be tak

IN THE MATTER OF: Tudor India Pvt. Ltd. (Operational Creditor) vs Servotech Power Systems Limited (Corporate Debtor), query was raised from the Corporate Debtor as to how the Demand Notice based on invoices issued in Form 3 is in compliance of Rule 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 and whether the Demand Notice based on invoices sent by the Operational creditor was in compliance of Rule 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 ? Rule 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, the contents of which reads as below - Demand notice by operational creditor 5. (1) An operational creditor shall deliver to the corporate debtor, the following documents, namely :- (a) a demand notice in Form 3; or (b) a copy of an invoice attached with a notice in Form 4. According to the Operational Creditor, the wording of Rule 5 which gives a choice to the Operational

In Webfil Ltd. vs Dipesh Kumar Bagchi, writ application was filed by the employer (Webfil Limited) challenging an award  passed by the 8th Industrial Tribunal, state of West Bengal wherein the tribunal passed the award in favour of the employee for payment of all the back wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary etc. The tribunal also held that the termination of the employee by the employer with effect from 31.03.2010 is not justified and the employee is entitled to get reliefs as prayed for. On appeal before the Calcutta High Court, the Hon'ble Court took strong exception to the fact that while terminating the petitioner only a clause in his appointment letter was used to terminate his service and there was no domestic enquiry against the employee.  Referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh vs Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, the court held that such clause of termination of service by giving one month‟s notice is not an acceptable situa

In  Mubarak Masih vs v. M/S Gautam Construction Company, the complainant had alleged before the Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh, that he has been made to pay excess amount relative to the quality of work done by the opposing party and that the opposing party has refused to provide bills  or inform him about the work done by producing any bills. For this the complainant agreed to have the alleged work accessed by an independent accessor. The State forum ordered the said assessment overriding the objection of the opposing party who also confirmed that the opposing party has overcharged the complainant. Under above circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the complainant was right in seeking bills from the opposite parties towards the work done in the building, when he noticed that excess money has been extracted from him. By not providing the said bills, the opposite parties were deficient in providing service. It is significant to mention here

In RIZWAN PASHA vs STATE OF KARNATAKA, the Karnataka High Court has issued the following guidelines/directions on preventive detention: (i) That whenever an order of detention is followed by an order of confirmation of detention made by the State under Section 12 read with Section 13 of the Act, liberty is reserved to the detenu to make a representation; (ii) In such a case, the representation would have to be considered by the State under Section 14 of the Act in the context of revocation or modification of the order of detention; (iii) Such a representation, when made to the Jail Superintendent/Jail Authority by the detenu, must be transmitted to the concerned officer/authority who is vested with the responsibility/obligation to consider such a representation at an earliest possible time. The use of technology in this regard has to be underscored. Such a representation can be scanned or sent in any other instantaneous mode by the Jail Authority to the concerned officer or authority;

In Rajesh Soni vs Mukesh Verma, appeal was filed against the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, directing the Petitioner (Accused of offence under NI Act) to pay 20% of the cheque amount as compensation, failing which proceeding under sub-section (v) of Section 143A will be initiated against petitioner. The Petitioner referring to the term 'may' in the wording of the Section 143A, objected to the order claiming that the power to direct such interim compensation was discretionary and should not be ordered for each and every matter. The High Court however disagreed and referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bachahan Devi & another Vs. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur and Surinder Singh Deswal alias Colonel S.S. Deswal & others Vs. Virender Gandhi, observed that it has been conclusively held by the Apex court that whether a legislature is discretionary or mandatory would depend on the object of the Act irrespective of the fact the word 'may' is as per d