Legal News & Views

In MOHAMMED ZAKIR vs SHABANA & ORS., the appellant is aggrieved since the High Court passed an order under Section 362 Cr.P.C. dated 28.04.2017 recalling its own order dated 18.04.2017. The High Court in its order decided that notwithstanding section 362 of Cr.P.C., the order rendered by this Court earlier on 18.04.2017 is found to be patently erroneous and therefore the order is withdrawn. The petition is restored to file and the registry is directed not to webhost the order passed earlier and to take note of the fact that the order is withdrawn. The Supreme Court  setting aside the order decided that the High Court should not have exercised the power under Section 362 Cr.P.C. for a correction on merits. However patently erroneous the earlier order  be, it can only be corrected in the process known to law and not under Section 362 Cr.P.C. The whole purpose of Section 362 Cr.P.C. is only to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. What the High Court sought to do in the i

In THE STATE OF BIHAR vs BIHAR RAJYA BHUMI VIKAS BANK SAMIT, the question before the Supreme Court was whether prior notice to the other party before filing an application to set aside an arbitral award is mandatory or directory. By an amendment brought in 2016, a subsection (5) has been inserted to Section 34 of the Act, which states that application to set aside arbitral award shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. The Bombay and Calcutta high courts held that the provision is directory, largely because no consequence has been provided for breach of the time limit specified. The high courts of Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and Gauhati have all taken the view that Section 34(5) is mandatory in nature. The Patna High Court’s view in this regard, which also held that the provision is mandatory, was challenged before

In Rajendra Kumar Poddar vs M/S. Subham Constructions, the State Commission has dismissed the complaint on the ground of having been filed after two years from the date of cause of action and therefore appeal before NCDRC. Learned counsel stated that the possession was taken on 18.05.2012 and after taking the possession the complainant noticed that there were several defects in the construction and the complainant was pursuing the matter with the opposite parties.  The opposite parties were giving assurance for rectification of the defects, however, when no rectification was done the complaint was filed on 08.01.2015. The State Commission has considered the period of limitation from the date of possession whereas the fact is that complainant was pursuing with the opposite parties and it was continuing cause of action as all the defects were not noticed initially and later on more defects came to the light, therefore, the limitation should be counted from the date of awareness of a

In COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT), MUMBAI  vs M/S. DILIP KUMAR AND COMPANY & ORS., the Supreme Court Constitution bench was set up to examine correctness of Judgment in Sun Export Corporation, Bombay v. Collector of Customs case by a three-Judge bench. In the said judgment, it was held that an ambiguity in a tax exemption provision or notification must be interpreted so as to favour the assessee claiming the benefit of such exemption. The five judge bench concluded that the Sun Export judgment created confusion and resulted in unsatisfactory state of law and decided that any ambiguity in a taxing statute should enure to the benefit of the subject/assessee, but any 66 ambiguity in the exemption clause of exemption notification must be conferred in favour of revenue – and such exemption should be allowed to be availed only to those subjects/assesses who demonstrate that a case for exemption squarely falls within the      parameters enumerated in the notification and that t

In Deepa Sanjeev Pawaskar vs State Of Maharastra, the doctors were accused of criminal negligence due to the death of a pregnant woman at the nursing home run by the doctors. The Bombay High Court held that doctors failure to exercise the degree of care and skill that a physician or surgeon of the medical specialty would use under similar circumstances would amount to malpractice. An error in diagnosis could be negligence and covered under section 304A of the Indian Penal Code.  But this is a case of prescription without diagnosis and therefore, culpable negligence. The element of criminality is introduced not only by a guilty mind but by the practitioner having run a risk of doing something with recklessness and indifference to the consequences. It should be added that this negligence or rashness is gross in nature. Negligence becomes actionable on account of the injury resulting from the act or omission to commit the act amounting to negligence i.e. criminal negligence. Th

The Supreme Court in Shyam Sunder Agarwal vs. P Narotham Rao has held that clauses inserted in the agreements to prevent disputes from occurring and to ensure smooth implementation of the agreement will not be an arbitration agreement. The court found that the clause in the MOU referred to by the appellant while referring to two persons as Mediators/Arbitrators but the same persons have also been appointed as escrow agents for smooth and successful completion of the transaction. Referring to the the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation vs. Encon Builders (I) (P) Limited wherein it was decided that a clause which is inserted in an Agreement for the purpose of prevention of a dispute will not be an arbitration agreement, the court said that in this MOU it is clear that the wording of the Agreement, as has been held by us above, is clearly inconsistent with the view that the Agreement intended that disputes be decided by arbitration.

In M/S. NANDHINI DELUXE vs M/S. KARNATAKA CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION LTD., the dispute before the Supreme Court pertains to the use of mark ‘NANDHINI’.  The respondent adopted the aforesaid mark ‘NANDINI’ in the year 1985 and under this brand name it has been producing and selling milk and milk products. It has got registration of this mark as well under Class 29 and Class 30. The appellant herein, on the other hand, is in the business of running restaurants and it adopted the mark ‘NANDHINI’ for its restaurants in the year 1989 and applied for registration of the said mark in respect of various foodstuff items sold by it in its restaurants. The objections of the respondent on the ground that it is deceptively similar to the mark of the respondent and is likely to deceive  the  public  or  cause confusion were dismissed by the Deputy Registrar of the Trade Mark. The appeal of the respondent was allowed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and the subsequent wri

In Tek Chand v. Bhakra Beas Management Board, the petition was filed before the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh that the Board (respondents) was not promoting him. The respondents contended that the appreciation letter per se did not confer any automatic right to claim promotion, as the promotion had to be made strictly in accordance with the Board’s management Regulations, thus, the Petitioner could not claim an out of turn promotion as he was listed at a rather lower rank. The Court held that in a case of selection based on merit-cum-seniority, it is a well settled principle that merit has to be given precedence over seniority. Accordingly, appeals were dismissed.

In Anil v. State of Haryana, High Court of Punjab and Haryana allowed the petition, wherein the petitioner prayed for grant of regular bail under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure code, 1973. The petitioner was alleged to have committed crime under Sections 307, 506, 120-B, 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 and under several provisions of SC/ST Act, 1989 and Arms Act, 1959 for which he was in prison for 1 year and 6 months. The petitioner was already on bail in another case in which he was charged under Section 398/401 of IPC. The petitioner contended that he has the right to a speedy trial where he had already been imprisoned for more than a year. The Court observed that petitioner’s involvement in another case should not be a hindrance to the bail petition filed in this case and made it clear that it’s not giving any opinion on the merits, but only deciding on whether the petitioner should be released on bail. 

In Renesco India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Eastern Coalfields Limited and Ors, the Calcutta High Court was to decide on the challenge by the Appellants to the tender process of ECL claiming that its technical bid was wrongfully rejected by the ECL Authorities. It is well settled that so long as the bid has not been accepted, the highest or lowest bidder as the case may be, acquires no vested right to have the tender concluded in his favour. In case of a tender there is no obligation on the part of the person issuing the tender notice to accept any of the tenders or even the lowest/highest tender as the case may be. The Government must have freedom of contract. Fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision should be tested by the application of Wednesbury principles of reasonableness, must be free from arbitrariness and must not be affected by bias or actuated by mala f

In INDIAN BANK vs K PAPPIREDDIYAR, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court while referring to the decision of the court in ITC Limited v Blue Coast Hotels Limited, held that The classification of land in the revenue records as agricultural is not dispositive or conclusive of the question whether the SARFAESI Act does or does not apply.  The question as to whether the land is agricultural has to be determined on the basis of the totality of facts and circumstances including the nature and character of the land, the use to which it was put and the purpose and intent of the parties on the date on which the security interest was created. 

In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Shiv Pujan Kushwaha, the contention of the petitioner was that the vehicle in question was a Bolero Pick-up goods carriage vehicle and was meant only for carrying goods.  Only two passengers including the driver were allowed to travel in the vehicle. The vehicle met with accident, claim was filed but the claim was however, rejected on the ground that a goods vehicle had with an accident while carrying passengers, thereby committing breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The District Forum having dismissed the complaint, the complainant approached the concerned State Commission by way of an appeal The State Commission allowed the appeal as also the National Commission. The Commission referring to Hon'ble Apex Court in Lakshmi Chand Vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. and B.V. Nagaraj Vs. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. held that the insurer was liable to pay the claim, unless there was a fundamental breach of the terms and c

In Prabodh K. Mehta v. Charuben K. Mehta, while deciding the issue that whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign Court for the offence committed in that country can be taken notice of by the Courts or authorities in India while exercising their judicial and/or quasijudicial powers; and whether such a conviction would be binding on the Courts and authorities in India while exercising their judicial and/or quasijudicial powers, the three-Judge Bench of Bombay High Court, answered the former question in affirmative, and while addressing the latter issue, the Bench observed that the Courts and authorities, while exercising their judicial and quasijudicial powers will have to take a call on the facts and circumstances of each case and take a decision as to the effect of such a judgment and order of conviction.

In Ramvati Vs. Sukhbir Singh Chauhan and Ors., the High Court of Delhi referring to the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Yashwant Singh Negi held that, once the Court has refused to entertain the review petition and the same is dismissed, there is no question of any merger and the aggrieved person has to challenge the main order and not the order dismissing the review petition because to the dismissal of the review petition the principle of merger does not apply. Reference was made to DSR Steel (Private) Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan laying down that, when the review petition is dismissed, the order of which review was sought, suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification and anyone aggrieved by the order of which review was sought shall have to challenge the same and not the order dismissing the review petition. Applying the said principles, the SLP preferred against the order of dismissal of review petition, without challenging the order of which

Interpreting Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat vs. Navinbhai Chandrakant Joshi, has observed that once the prosecution has established that the accused was possessing the bribe money, it is for the accused to explain that how the bribe money has been received by him and if he fails to offer any satisfactory explanation, it will be presumed that he has accepted the bribe. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/acceptance-of-bribe-can-be-presumed-if-accused-fails-to-give-satisfactory-explanation-for-possessing-bribe-money-sc-read-judgment/

In Satyaprakash Aggarwal v. Vistar Metal Industries (P) Ltd., the petitioners were financial creditors of the respondent company. They filed an application under Section 7 for initiating the insolvency resolution process. However, such an application was rejected by the Adjudicating Authority observing that the application did not disclose ‘dates of default’. The petitioners were in appeal against the said order of the Adjudicating Authority. The NCLAT after considering the record held that the impugned order was not sustainable. The application was rejected on technical grounds. As stated by the petitioners, there was only a typographical defect as to the dates mentioned in the application, which could have easily been corrected. The Tribunal held that before rejecting petitioners’ application, the Authority must give opportunity to the applicants to rectify defect. In absence of such an opportunity, the impugned order was set aside. Appeal was accordingly disposed of. 

In M/s Suvarn Rajaram Bandekar v. Armando Cardozo, the trial court to allow all amendments in the prayer except the prayer with respect to compensation/mesne profits. On appeal, the High Court held that once the substantive amendment had been granted, the trial court could not have refused to allow introduction of a prayer claiming mesne profits. It stated that “the matters about grant of future mesne profits i.e. from the date of filing of the suit till the delivery of possession are exclusively within the discretion of the Trial Court.” Future mesne profits were held to be of two types: from the date of the filing of the suit till the decree is passed and from the date of the decree till actual delivery of the possession. The amendment was subsequently allowed.

In Navin Chander Anand v. Union Bank of India, the Delhi High Court relied on Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate and Jagdish Dutt v. Dharam Pal to hold that one co-owner/co-landlord is not entitled on his own, in the face of opposition from other co-owners/co-landlords, to terminate the tenancy for seeking possession of the tenanted property and/or mesne profits.

In Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. v. Sree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd., it was an admitted fact that the Bombay High Court had already ordered the winding of the corporate debtor. Referring to various judgments, the Tribunal, held that an application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process was not maintainable. The Tribunal observed that winding up order is the second stage and corporate insolvency resolution process is the first. Therefore, the order for initiation of the first stage cannot be passed after order directing the compliance of the second stage had already been issued. As a result, the NCLAT dismissed the company appeal preferred by the appellant.

In M/s Bhash Software Labs Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Mobme Wireless Solutions Ltd., the appellant challenged the order passed by NCLT admitting the application preferred by the respondent firm under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (I&B Code) for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against the appellant. The Appellant alleged violation of rules of natural justice as no notice was served on the appellant under Section 8 of the I&B Code or under Rule 5(3) of the I&B (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016. It was also contended that since there existed a dispute as to the debt amount, the application under S. 9 was not maintainable. The NCLAT perused the impugned order and found that the notice sent by the respondent was not served on the appellant. The Adjudicating Authority, instead of directing the respondents to issue fresh notice on correct and present address, observed, “However, the petition was sent to proper address”. 

In Lepton Projects (P) Ltd. v. Sanghvi Movers Ltd., A two-member bench of the NCLAT allowed an appeal filed against the order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal whereunder application under Section 9 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, preferred by the respondent was admitted and Insolvency Resolution Professional was appointed. The appeal was filed by the Director of Lepton Projects (P) Ltd. which was the ‘Corporate Debtor’. The respondent Sanghvi Movers Ltd. was the ‘Operational Creditor’. An application was filed by the Operational Creditor under Section 9 of the I&B Code, after the admission of which ‘Moratorium’ was passed and ‘Insolvency Resolution Professional’ was appointed by NCLT in terms of the Code. However, the appellant challenged the said order of NCLT contending that no notice in terms of Section 8(1) of the Code was given to the appellant before such order was passed. NCLAT found favour with the contention of the appellant and the order was se

In Indian Motion Picture Producers’ Association v. Federation of Western India Cine Employees, the Commission clarified that its orders are in rem and not in personam. If an order was issued for market correction, the Commission was of the view that it was not obligated to take cognizance of successive informations brought by different parties’ agitating the same issue. To order investigation repeatedly on the same issues would result in sub- optimal utilisation of the resources of the Commission, and the same would cause wastage of public money besides being a futile exercise. Thus, the Commission concluded that no further deliberation upon the allegations was required as they have been dealt with in the aforesaid decision of the Commission.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mahesh Pahade vs. State of MP has held that a victim of crime has a right to seek cancellation of bail/order of suspension of sentence. The accused, who was convicted by the trial court for sexually exploiting his niece, had preferred appeal before the high court. The application filed by the accused seeking suspension of sentence was allowed by the high court. The victim, then approached the high court contending that he was granted bail on the basis of additional document, which could not have been taken into consideration at the stage of consideration of the application for suspension of sentence and that too without giving any opportunity to the victim to controvert the allegation, which was pertaining to the age of the prosecutrix. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/victims-of-crime-can-seek-cancellation-of-bail-holds-mp-hc-read-order/

In MANKIND PHARMA LTD. vs CHANDRA MANI TIWARI & ANR., the Delhi High Court drew a distinction between cases of infringement by use of ‘trade name’ under Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, and the cases of infringement by use of ‘trademark’ under sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 29. The Court held that to make out a case of infringement by use of ‘trade name’ under Section 29(5), mere similarity or deceptive similarity with the registered trademark was not sufficient, and that there has to be exact use of registered trademark or part of it as the trade name of the business. The Court further expounded that the test of “similarity or deceptive similarity” was applicable only for cases of infringement by use of ‘trade mark’ covered by sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 29. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/use-of-a-trade-name-similar-or-deceptively-similar-to-the-registered-trade-mark-would-not-constitute-infringement-under-section-295-of-trade-marks-act-delhi-hc-read-

In Bhawish Chand Sharma v. Bawa Singh, the case of the complainant was that he had sold a property to the accused for an agreed sale consideration of Rs. 20 lakhs. The accused had paid Rs.15 lakhs in cash and for the balance consideration, the cheque was issued. On presentment, the cheque got dishonoured, and the complaint was filed when the accused failed to discharge the liability after the statutory notice. The accused admitted that the sale consideration was Rs.20 lakhs, and stated that he had paid Rs.16 lakhs in cash. He put forth a defence that he had issued cheques for Rs.4 lakhs, but those cheques were returned by the complainant stating that he had no bank account. The accused further stated that he had paid the balance in cash and that a cheque for Rs.5 lakhs without writing the name of payee was handed over to the broker as security for discharging certain electricity dues on the property. According to the accused, that cheque was misutilized by the complainant to cause

In Indian Galvanics Cyrium Foils Ltd. vs Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, the appellant company incurred an expenditure of Rs.11,76,540 under the head ‘management training and development expenditure’. It was incurred for the higher education and training of one Harsh Kumar who had been sent to the USA for the course in Business Administration. Harsh is the son of one of the directors in the company. It was the appellant’s case that an agreement was executed by the employee concerned, who then had committed to serve the company for 10 years. It was brought to notice of the Income Tax Officer that after completing education and training, Harsh had been serving the company for three years. It is on this premise that it was claimed that expenditure then incurred on his education and training was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. His explanation was rejected by the assessing officer in an order dated February 28, 2000. The company challenged the said order

In Durga @ Raja Versus State of Madhya Pradesh, directing the state to compensate accused in an abduction case for false implication, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed that if because of poor investigation and tainted prosecution, the accused suffers and it is apparent that he is innocent then he deserves compensation from the state under Right to Life. Granting a compensation of Rs. 1 lakh each to the acquitted accused, the court also said although no such provision exists in the CrPC for compensating the accused, certainly the state cannot wriggle out from its constitutional and tortious liability. Article referred:  http://www.livelaw.in/person-falsely-implicated-by-state-in-criminal-case-deserves-to-be-compensated-madhya-pradesh-hc-read-judgment/

In MOTIRAM PADU JOSHI Versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, the high court had reversed the order of acquittal of the trial court. The trial court had found favour with the argument that the eye witnesses did not go to the rescue of the deceased and it is quite unbelievable that on seeing the accused who were armed with weapons, both of them went inside the house. The Supreme Court on appeal referring to Rana Partap v. State of Haryana agreed with the High Court and held that the evidence of eye witnesses cannot be doubted on the ground that they did not intervene in the attack nor made attempts to save the deceased. On witnessing a crime, each person reacts in his own way and their evidence cannot be doubted on the ground that the witness has not acted in a particular manner. While appreciating the evidence of witness, approach must be whether the evidence of witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth and consistent with the prosecution case or to find out whether it is a

In Kalim Khan vs Fimidabee & Others, a person had died when a piece of rock fell on him from an adjacent field where blasting operations for the digging of a well had been going on. The blasting machine was powered using the battery of a tractor. The issue before the Court was whether the accident caused by blasting operations powered by the battery of an immobile tractor could be termed as “arising out of use of vehicle” within the phraseology of Section 165 of MV Act. The Tribunal held that accident had a causal connection with the use of the vehicle. The Tribunal also found that use of the tractor for blasting operations to dig a well in an agricultural field was incidental to agricultural operations, and hence not a commercial activity. In an appeal by the insurer, the High Court reversed the findings. The High Court found that the batteries were detached from the vehicle, and hence it could not be said that the accident had any causal link with use of a vehicle. The High

In M/s Ravechee and Co v Union of India, the sole issue before the Supreme Court was the legality of the grant of pre-award interest by the arbitrator. The appellant, M/s Ravechee and Co, was awarded a contract with respect to mining work for Western Railways. When disputes arose out of the contract, arbitration was resorted to. The arbitrator allowed the claim of the appellant and awarded interest on the claim for the period between the date of claim and the date of award. The award was challenged in the high court. The high court set aside the award in so far as it ordered pendente lite interest. The Supreme Court has held that a clause in an agreement excluding interest on security deposit does not act as a bar on the arbitrator to award pendente lite interest. A claimant becomes entitled to interest not as compensation for any damage done but for being kept out of the money due to him. Obviously, in a case of unascertained damages such as this, the question of interest would a

In Nishar Hussain vs State of Chattisgarh, the police had sealed a shop on the ground that the properties stored in the shop in relation to which there existed suspicion of some cognizable offence having been committed in relation thereto, could not be conveniently transported to some other place or because of the difficulties in securing proper accommodation for the custody thereof. The Jharkhand High Court referred to a judgment of the same court in Bishwanath Paul v. State of Jharkhand which had held that "Keeping in mind the ambit and scope of Section 102 of the CrPC and the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sudhir Vasant Karnataki Mohideen Mohammed Sheik Dawood (supra), this Court is also of the considered opinion that under Section 102(1) of the CrPC the police have no power to seal the immovable property and the word seize under Section 102 of the CrPC used under Section 102 of the CrPC would mean only actual taking possession of the movable

In OM PRAKASH SINGH vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS, the appellant purchased fully automatic Biochemistry Analyser of foreign make which was found to be defective. Thereafter as suggested by the local vendors of the the said company, the appellant purchased a more expensive type of the same machine of the same manufacturer through the same vendor. But when this machine also proved to be defective and the vendor did not show any concern, the appellant lodged an FIR against which charge sheet was submitted before the Magistrate, who took cognizance of the offences. However, the High Court of Judicature at Patna quashed the cognizance order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Thereafter the appellant contacted the Italian manufacturer who directed them to a third party service provider who found several parts to be replaced by duplicates and also submitted a report on the same. The appellant again lodged an FIR against which charge sheet was again submitted before the Magistrate, wh

In Kishan Rao vs Shankargouda, a loan of Rs. 2 Lacs was given by the complainant to the accused against which a postdated repayment cheque was provided which bounced. Before the trial court the accused denied the claim stating that the cheque had been stolen and signature forged.The trial court found that the accused have failed rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act and sentenced him.  The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal but the High Court  allowed the revision by setting aside the conviction order. The High Court held that the accused has been successful in creating doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the existence of the debt or liability. Hence the complainant took the matter to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court on grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court in State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri and  Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke

In Shyam Narayan Prasad vs Krishna Prasad, one Gopalji Prasad was the common male ancestor of the parties. The appellant is the sons of Gopalji Prasad. The family property was partitioned on 31.7.1987 between Gopalji and his five sons, namely, Laxmi Prasad, Ayodhya Prasad, Shyam Narayan Prasad, Dr. Onkarnath Gupta and Suresh Kumar. In the partition Gopalji has retained some of the properties for his personal use till his death. Laxmi Prasad got his share of property along with half portion of existing two-storey RCC building situated at Singtam Bazar, East Sikkim, wherein presently a liquor shop is being run. Shyam Narayan Prasad was allotted a shoe shop at Manihari which is run on a rented premises owned by Gouri Shankar Prasad. He was also allotted other properties in the partition. After the partition, the sons of Gopalji were put in possession of their share of the properties. However, Laxmi Prasad and his brother Shyam Narayan Prasad (defendant No.1) executed an agreement dat

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Indiro Devi, the deceased while employed with the Food Corporation of India met with an accident when the three-wheeler he was travelling in collided with a Signature Not Verified rashly driven Canter truck and died. The claimants claimed compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal which passed an award for compensation.  The issue in this case revolves around the income of the deceased. On behalf of the accounts section of the employer of the deceased, it was deposed that the deceased was getting Rs. 8848/- as gross monthly salary. The deponent proved the salary certificate. The amount of salary was not questioned. The Tribunal passed the award on the basis that the salary he was receiving i.e. Rs. 8848/-. The Tribunal did not take into account the fact that the Income Tax Returns of the deceased showed an income of Rs. 2,42,606/- per annum for the assessment year 2004-05 and Rs. 2,17,130 for the assessment year 2003-04. The T