Legal News & Views

In RENAISSANCE HOTEL HOLDINGS INC. Vs B. VIJAYA SAI AND OTHERS, the Supreme Court while elaborating on the issue of infringement of trademark and passing off issues and disagreeing with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court observed that there are  two important principles of interpretation. The first one being of textual and contextual interpretation.  Referring to the judgment in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Others, the Court said that one  may well say if the text is the texture, context is  what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both  are important. It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions of a statute, it is necessary that the textual interpretation should be matched with the contextual one. The Act must be looked at as a whole and it must be discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute

In Arunachala Gounder (dead) By Lrs v. Ponnusamy And Ors, issue before the Supreme Court was the inheritance of property standing in the name of issueless Hindu woman since deceased. The Supreme Court observed that as the woman has died in 1967, the entire issue would come under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and that the legislative intent of enacting Section 14(I) of the Act was to remedy the limitation of a Hindu woman who could not claim absolute interest in the properties inherited by her but only had a life interest in the estate so inherited whereas the basic aim of the legislature in enacting Section 15(2) is to ensure that inherited property of a female Hindu dying issueless and intestate, goes back to the source. The scheme of sub-Section (1) of Section 15 goes to show that property of Hindu females dying intestate is to devolve on her own heirs, the list whereof is enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 15 (1). Sub- Section (2) of Section 15 carves out exceptions only w

In Jose Samuel vs M/s Royals International Trade and Allied, application file before the NCLT, Kochi under Section 9 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code by the Operational Creditor/ applicant, Mr. Jose Samuel, proprietor of M/s Thankam Cashew Factory against the Corporate Debtor/ CD for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against them for the defaulted payment. Background The OC alleged that the Corporate Debtor initially issued 2 cheques against certain transactions with the OC but on presentation were returned due to “Insufficient Funds” in the account of the Corporate Debtor who subsequently cancelled them issued 3 new cheques in the name of M/s Thankam Cashew Factory and another cheque in the name of M/s Kripa Cashew Exports.  The OC stated that M/s Kripa Cashew Exports,the sister concern of the OC had filed application  before this Tribunal on 19.11.2020 for recovering the Operational debts due to it. However, it was dismissed due to the absence of privity of contr

In UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD vs SMT ANITA DEVI AND ORS, appeal was filed before Delhi High Court against the order of the Tribunal allowing compensation to the owner of the insured vehicle. The appellant submitted that since the vehicle was stolen and driver was a professional thief there was no liability on the insurance company to pay the amount. The question that arose for consideration is as to whether the insurance company is absolved of the liability to pay the amount in a case where the vehicle is stolen and unauthorisedly being driven by somebody else. Judgment In the instant case, Tribunal has found that the vehicle was  stolen and there was no willful breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy by the insured. The Supreme Court of India in United India Insurance Company vs. Lehru and Ors, 2003(3) SCC 338 has held that in order to avoid the liability, the insurer must establish that there was a willful breach on the part of the insured. The Delhi High Court

In ATLANTA LIMITED THR. ITS MANAGING vs UNION OF INDIA, appeal against yet another challenge to an arbitration award and subsequent order against the same by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, the Supreme Court gave some further insights into the process of challenging a arbitration award. Referring to judgments in Kwality Manufacturing Corporation v. Central Warehousing Corporation, State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd.,  Arosan Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India and NTPC Ltd. v. Deconar Services Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court observed that :- It is also a well-settled principle of law that challenge cannot be laid to the Award only on the ground that the Arbitrator has drawn his own conclusion or failed to appreciate the relevant facts. Nor can the Court substitute its own view on the conclusion of law or facts as against those drawn by the Arbitrator, as if it is sitting in appeal. Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come

In National Co-operative Development Corporation vs. CIT, the appeal was filed before the Supreme Court after travelling through various courts and tribunals for 44 years Background The functions of the appellant-Corporation are set out in Section 9 of the NCDC Act, which is, inter alia, to advance loans or grant subsidies to State Governments for financing cooperative societies; provide loans and grants directly to the national level cooperative societies, as also to the State level cooperative societies, the latter on the guarantee of State Governments. The appellant-Corporation is required to maintain a fund called the National Cooperative Development Fund (for short ‘the Fund’) which is, inter alia, credited with all monies received by it by way of grants and loans from the Central Government, as well as sums of money as may from time to time be realised out of repayment of loans made from the Fund or from interest on loans or dividends or other realisations on investments made fr

In Kurvan Ansari alias Kurvan Ali & Anr v. Shyam Kishore Murmu & Anr, appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in relation to the compensation awarded by the High Court for the accidental death of a 7 year old boy. Background The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, as per Schedule-II of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which is applicable to the claims made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, considering notional income of the deceased (being a non earning member) at Rs.15,000/- per annum, by applying multiplier ‘15’, awarded compensation of Rs.2,25,000/- with interest @6% per annum from the date of judgment. Since the driver of the offending motorcycle Mr.Sunil Gurum was not possessing valid driving licence at the time of accident, the Tribunal directed respondent No.2 -Insurance Company to pay the compensation to the claimants and recover the same from its owner. The High Court partly allowed the appeal o

In Phoenix Arc Private Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Ors, while elaborating on the issue of the power of High Courts under Article 226 when alternate remedy is available, the Supreme Court referred to Mathew Varghese Vs. M. Amritha Kumar and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 610, wherein the Court had held that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 ]. Exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy are where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure,

In Sunil Todi & Ors v. State Of Gujarat & Anr, one of the questions before the Supreme Court was whether the dishonor of a cheque furnished as a security is covered under the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act Background On 19 December 2015, a Letter of Intent was issued by the Appellant/Company to the second respondent for providing uninterrupted power supply at the plant of the company situated at Aurangabad in Maharashtra. A cheque post-dated 28 August 2017 in the amount of Rs.2,67,84,000/- was issued with the following endorsement on its reverse: to be deposited after confirmation only for security purpose. The power supply commenced from 1 July 2016. On 4 July 2016, the company addressed a communication to its banker, Karur Vysya Bank, requesting to stop payment of the above two cheques. As per agreement, three LCs favouring the second respondent were issued by Punjab National Bank at the behest of the company but were found to be not in correct format. The Appellant/

In E S Krishnamurthy & Ors v. M/s Bharath Hi Tech Builders Pvt. Ltd, on a petition  instituted by the appellants (and others) under Section 7 of the IBC for initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in respect of the respondent, the NCLT declined to admit the petition and instead directed the respondent to settle the claims within three months. The NCLAT found no merit in the appeal against the NCLTs order.  the Adjudicating Authority noted that it had listed the petition for admission on diverse dates and had adjourned it, inter alia, to allow the parties to explore the possibility of a settlement. Evidently, no settlement was arrived at by all the original petitioners who had instituted the proceedings. The Adjudicating Authority noticed that joint consent terms dated 12 February 2020 had been filed before it. But it is common ground that these consent terms did not cover all the original petitioners who were before the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating

In SIDDHARTH vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR, the issue was whether Section 170 Cr.P.C. prevents the trial court from taking a chargesheet on record unless the accused is taken into custody.  The Supreme Court observed that to insist on the accused to be taken into custody on each and every situation is wrong interpretation of law and there are judicial precedents available on the interpretation of the aforesaid provision showing the correct procedure. In Court on its own motion v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2004 (72) DRJ 629 , the Delhi High Court, held that it appears that the learned Special Judge was labouring under a misconception that in every non-bailable and cognizable offence the police is required to invariably arrest a person, even if it is not essential for the purpose of investigation.  Rather the law is otherwise. In normal and ordinary course the police should always avoid arresting a person and sending him to jail, if it is possible for the police to comple