Legal News & Views

In Ramla vs National Insurance Company Limited, while enhancing the amount claimed by the family of the deceased and proceeding to order a compensation higher than the amount claimed, the Supreme Court referring to the judgments in (a) Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & (b) Magma General Insurance v. Nanu Ram (c) Ibrahim v. Raju, held that there is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award “just compensation”. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A “just compensation” is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time­ barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The Courts are duty bound to award just compensation.

In Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed Al Ghurair v. Star Health and Allied Insurance Company Ltd., the plaintiffs, resident nationals of Dubai, had filed a derivative action on behalf of a company incorporated in Dubai. They held 34% shareholding in the said company, whereas the defendants held 66% of the shares. The defendants also held around 6.16% shares in Star Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd., a company incorporated in Chennai, India. According to the plaintiffs, these shares actually belonged to the company registered in Dubai mentioned above. Since Star Health was incorporated in Chennai, the plaintiffs instituted a suit in Madras High Court to protect an declare the beneficial interest of the Dubai company in the said 6.16% shares. A Single Judge of the High Court admitted the suit; however, on appeal by the defendants, the Division Bench held that it had no territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter. Aggrieved thus, the plaintiffs filed the instant appeal. On perusal of th

In Rajeev K Aggarwal Vs Panipat Texo Fabs Pvt. Ltd., the appellant as a shareholder of the Corporate Debtor assailed the order of moratorium and appointment of the IRP before the NCLAT on the ground that the goods against which the Corporate Debtor had failed to pay were defective and substandard and the same was communicated to the Operational Creditor and the NCLT had refused to accept the dispute. The NCLAT on perusing the records found that while raising the dispute at this late stage, the appellant had not been able to substantiate the claim with any evidence. Agreeing with the NCLT that this appeal is a mere sham to delay the process, the NCLAT held that raising of dispute in regard to quality of goods being inferior/substandard or defective for the first time in reply to demand notice or in response to notice served by the Adjudicating Authority would not constitute a prior and pre-existing dispute contemplated under law as a defence to the initiation of Corporate Insolvenc

In Vimla Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., a claim was lodged by the family and heirs of the deceased against against the Insurance Company, driver and owner of the offending truck under Section 166 Motor Vehicles Act before MACT claiming to award reasonable compensation for loss on account of untimely death of the deceased, their only bread earner. Appellants along with the claim petition had filed all the requisite documents against the driver. Tribunal had dismissed the appellants claim petition stating that claimants failed to prove the accident for want of evidence and the one adduced was not exhibited and hence was of no use. Aggrieved by the same, the claimants approached the Rajasthan High Court wherein their appeal was dismissed and therefore filing of the present appeal in Supreme Court arose. The Supreme Court allowing the appeal held that in a series of cases that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted to give solace to the victims of the motor acciden

In Union of India vs Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & Ors., the appeal was filed by the Petitioner and the principal ground urged by the Union of India was that the right, title and interest in the suit property had vested absolutely in the Central Government by virtue of Section 3(1) of the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act,1995, Act. Nevertheless, in the subject suit for possession filed by the Trust, Union of India had not been impleaded as a party­ defendant. Notably, the Trust had impleaded Union of India as a party defendant in both the previous suits filed including for eviction under the provisions of the 1947 Act. That pre­supposes that the respondents were cognizant of the effect of the statutory vesting of the tenancy absolutely in favour of the Central Government. The Supreme Court held that as per Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  any person considering himself aggrieved would have locus to file a review petition, while Order XLVII of CPC restate

In K A NAGAMANI vs NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, the question before the Supreme Court was whether a Revision Petition under Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act is maintainable against an order passed by the State Commission in an appeal preferred against an order of the District Forum with regard to enforcing the orders passed in respect of the consumer complaint. The petitioner contends that the proceedings to enforce an order passed in a consumer complaint is not an order in a consumer dispute and, therefore, a Revision Petition under Section 21 of the Act to challenge such order(s) would not lie before the NCDRC. The background to the matter is that a claim for compensation demanded by the petitioner reached the Supreme Court and the order of the Supreme Court was transmitted to the District Forum for enforcement of the order. The only controversy arising before the District Forum was with regard to the calculation of the amount payable to the petition

In CCI Projects (P) Ltd.vs Vrajendra Jogjivandas Thakkar, Hemali Vrajendra Thakkar had booked a residential flat with CCI Projects (P) Ltd. Later allotment was transferred her in favour of her mother-in-law Kumudben Thakkar who in turn gifted the same to Vrajendra Jogjivandas Thakkar. The complaint was filed by Vrajendra and the consumer court granted him reliefs including compensation for delay. The appellant, in this case, relying on Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Raje Ram,  contended that the complaint was not maintainable as the original allottees had transferred their interest. The Supreme Court decided that the said Haryana Urban Dev judgment was not applicable here. Said decision of this Court related to cases where the original allottees had transferred the allotment in favour of total strangers with the permission of the authority and as found by this Court, the subsequent allottees were aware that there was delay in delivering the allotted plots on account of tim

In PALANI vs STATE OF TAMIL NADU, the appeal was filed by the appellants complaining that  there was delay in registration of FIR and that the FIR reached the court only at 05.00 AM on the next day i.e. on 20.08.1996 after the inquest was over. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that only after the inquest was over, complaint was prepared and FIR was registered and that is why, the FIR is verbatim repetition of the inquest report. The Supreme Court while noting that the said complaint have been heard and dismissed by the lower courts, held that delay in setting the law into motion by lodging the complaint is normally viewed by the courts in suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against the accused. In such cases, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay in registration of FIR. But there may be cases where the delay in registration of FIR is inevitable and the same has to be considered. Even a long delay can be

In M.ASHRAF vs KASIM.V.K, the question before the Kerala High Court was whether seeking an interim measure of protection, maintainable before the Court, after passing of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal but before it is enforced. The Court held that three sections of the Arbitration Act guides this matter. Section 9(1)(ii) provides that a party may at any time before the award is enforced, apply to a Court, for an interim measure of protection while Section 9(3) states that court can entertain an application under sub-section (1), only if remedy provided under Section 17 is not available and Section 17(1)(ii) provides that a party may at any time before the award is enforced, apply to the arbitral tribunal, for an interim measure of protection. Holding that such an application is maintainable, the court held that the jurisdiction of the Court to grant interim relief does not automatically get barred on constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. Exercise of power by the Court und

In NATIONAL BUILDING CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED vs UNION OF INDIA, a petition was filed before the Delhi High Court by the National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. a Public Sector Undertaking, challenging a 2015 letter from the DGCEI, according permission to its additional director general of Lucknow zone to probe tax evasion cases of all NBCC branches. NBCC has allegedly failed to pay service tax on the Project Management Consultancy Charge and also for quashing of notice/summons issued to it in January this year, for production of documents and details, issued by DGCEI’s assistant director of Meerut unit, contending that they were “unwarranted and arbitrary”. NBCC has not opted for centralized registration for service tax purposes, and has 88 service tax registrations in different Commissionerates and the primary issue raised by the NBCC was whether the DGCEI  can centralize investigation with DGCEI, Lucknow at one place with all India jurisdiction, though the petitioner ha

In Radius Infratel Pvt. Ltd. Vs Union Bank of India, appeal was filed by M/s Radius Infratel Pvt Ltd, which challenged an order passed by Adjudicating Authority admitting an application under Section 7 of the IBC moved by a financial creditor. The NCLAT referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd vs ICICI Bank and others, wherein it was held that once an insolvency professional is appointed to manage the Company, the erstwhile Directors who are no longer in management, obviously cannot maintain an appeal on behalf of the Company.  Based on the above judgment, the NCLAT reiterated that corporate debtor cannot maintain appeal. However the NCLAT granted liberty to shareholder or director of the corporate debtor to file appropriate application, if not barred by limitation.

In SANJAY JAIN vs NATIONAL AVIATION CO. OF INDIA LTD., appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the dues claimed by the Appellant after resigning. The appellant had resigned from service with the necessary 30 days notice and subsequently on claiming his PF and other dues was informed by the Respondent that since his resignation had not been accepted, he was asked to report for duty. His complain was rejected by the centralized grievance cell and the High Court. The Supreme Court referring to the Standing Order of Air India held that the appellant has rightly terminated the relationship by serving the requisite notice for resignation. To resign is a right of an employee who cannot be forced to serve in case he is not willing until and unless there is some stipulation in the rules or in the terms of appointment or disciplinary proceedings is pending or contemplated which is sought to be avoided by resigning from the services.

In South Delhi Municipal Corporation vs SMS AAMW Tollways Private Ltd., the Appellant-South Delhi Municipal Corporation challenged before the Supreme Court, the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court allowing the Petition filed by the Respondent-SMS AAMW Tollway Private Ltd.  under Section 11(6) of the ArbitrationAct after the initial appeal for arbitration had been rejected by the Appellant on the ground that no arbitration clause existed in the agreement between the parties. The Respondent had relied on Clause 16.3 of the agreement while filling the arbitration petition. The Supreme Court found that the clause 16 provided for the resolution of disputes at two stages. If a case arises wherein a contractor finds that if the work demanded is outside the scope of the agreement or feels the need to dispute any decision of the competent officer or if any record created by him is unacceptable, he may request the competent officer to decide its represen

In COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION vs STATE, the Delhi High Court has ruled that the rejection or acceptance of anticipatory bail of an accused by the High Court is not relevant for consideration of the regular bail of the accused under Section 437(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However the court also clarified that in this case it is dealing with a specific fact situation, namely, where the accused in respect of a cognizable non- bailable offence is not arrested during investigation by the police, and the charge sheet is filed before the Magistrate without such arrest/ detention and the  discussion is relevant to this situation. Article referred: https://www.livelaw.in/rejection-acceptance-of-anticipatory-bail-not-relevant-while-considering-regular-bail-application-delhi-hc-read-judgment/

In Sudhi Sachdev Vs APPL Industries Ltd. appeal filed by the promoter of the corporate debtor, M/s Auto Décor Pvt. Ltd.  against the moratorium ordered by NCLT with reference to the application under Section 9 of the Code filed by the respondent (Operational Creditor). The appellant had now asserted that the application should not have been accepted, as a dispute existed in view of the fact that APPL had instituted cases under Section 138/441 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which are pending in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Gurgaon. The NCLAT, however, did not agree with this contention and referred to Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank and Ors., where it was held that as per Section 8 of IBC Code, the Corporate Debtor is to bring to the notice of the operational creditor the existence of a dispute or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceedings, which is pre-existing – i.e. before such notice or invoice was received by the corporate

In Shankar Lal Jaiswal vs Asha Devi & 10 Others and several other applications, the common question was whether Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked for transfer of a Motor Accident Claim Petition pending before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Rejecting the transfer application, the Allahabad High Court opined that Section 24, Civil Procedure Code, which has been invoked in these transfer applications, confers a general power of transfer and withdrawal of a suit, appeal or proceeding upon the High Court or the District Judge, pending in any Court subordinate to them. From a conjoint reading of the provisions noticed above, it emerges that the Motor Vehicle Act is a complete code in itself. It is also clear from a bare reading of Rule 221 that Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application to matters before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The words "subordinate to it" occurring in Section 24 (1) (b) are, in my considered opinion, cruc

In Bharati AXA General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Aandi. & others, the Madras High Court was hearing a bunch of appeals challenging an award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which had, while granting compensation to eighteen victims of a road accident, directed the insurance company to pay the compensation to unauthorised passengers as well, with liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The claimants in the case at hand, had engaged a goods vehicle to travel for a wedding, and were therefore, unauthorized passengers. The court noted that following a 1994 amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 147 of the Act restricts an insurer’s liability in case of motor vehicle accidents to a third party; the owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in a goods vehicle; and the passenger of a public service vehicle. It also noted that Section 149 (2)(a)(i)(c) of the Act allows insurance companies to be exempted from liability if th

In Caravel Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Premier Sea Foods Exim Pvt. Ltd., the argument of the plaintiff was that since the Bill of Lading was not signed, it is not bound by the arbitration clause contained in that document. It was contended that Section 7(4) (a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, requires an arbitration agreement to be in a document that is signed by the parties. The Supreme Court referring to the judgment in Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas vs. Mrs. Goolbai Hormusji, held that an arbitration agreement needs to be in writing though it need not be signed. The fact that the arbitration agreement shall be in writing is continued in the 1996 Act in Section 7(3) thereof. Section 7(4) only further adds that an arbitration agreement would be found in the circumstances mentioned in the three sub-clauses that make up Section 7(4). This does not mean that in all cases an  arbitration agreement needs to be signed.

In North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs Smt. Sujatha, the appeal was filed by the employer against the dismissal of the appeal filed by the employer against the order of the Labour Commissioner. Interestingly, the Supreme Court found that while there is no error in the impugned orders, the lower courts caused error as far as question of law is concerned by not following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo Vs. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. and Kerala State Electricity Board & Anr. Vs. Valsala K. & Anr. on awarding interest on compensation issue and decided that even though the respondent did not challenge this direction by filing any appeal in the High Court nor challenged it by filing any appeal in this Court too, yet the question being a pure question of law, this Court with a view to do substantial justice to the respondent consider it just and proper to modify the order of the Commissioner in respondent's favour so as to make the

The question before the Full Bench of the High Court of Kerala was when it is settled law that the liability of the insurer to indemnify the third parties subsists unless the insurance coverage is cancelled by the insurer and intimation thereof has reached the insured and the registering authority, then on whom does the burden lie to prove that the insurer has so intimated about the cancellation on the dishonour of the cheque received towards premium? The bench while referring to the judgment in United India Insurance Company Limited vs Laxmamma and others, has clarified that once the insurer shows that it has intimated the cancellation of insurance policy to the insured through post addressed to him, then the burden to show that the intimation was not received shifts to the insured.

In M/S HINDON FORGE PVT. LTD. vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, the appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the full bench of the Allahabad High Court wherein the high court had held that a securitisation application under Section 17(1) of the Act is maintainable only when actual/physical possession is taken by the secured creditor or the borrower loses actual/physical possession of the secured assets. The high court had further held that taking “symbolic possession” or issuance of possession notice, cannot be treated as “measure”/s taken under Section 13(4) of the Act and, therefore, the borrower at that stage cannot file application under Section 17(1) of the Act. While referring to all previous major judgments including Mardia Chemicals, Travancore & Nobel Kumar, the Supreme Court actually turned the clock back on the often disputed issue of Symbolic &  Physical Possession by setting aside the order of the Full bench. The Court decided that after

In KAMIL VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, the accused contended that charge under Section 302 IPC was not framed against him and therefore the conviction of the appellant/accused under Section 302 IPC is not maintainable. Referring to Section 464 CrPC, the bench observed that absence of charge would vitiate the conviction only if it has caused prejudice to the accused and has in fact been occasioned thereby. Perusing the charge sheet filed in this case, the bench said though specific charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was not framed, the gist of the charge sheet filed against the accused clearly shows that the accused has been charged for the offence under Section 302.

In LABHUJI AMRATJI THAKOR & ORS. vs THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR., the Supreme Court held that merely because a court has power under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to proceed against any person who is not named in the F.I.R. or in the Charge Sheet, it does not mean that whenever in a statement recorded before the Court, name of any person is taken, the Court has to mechanically issue process under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court said that the Court has to consider substance of the evidence, which has come before it and as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Others, has to apply the test, i.e., “more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.”