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Summoning Order for an Offence u/s. 420 IPC in a Cheque Complaint is not Sustainable

In ALOK RAJGARDIA VS. STATE OF U.P., ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT, the objection of the appellant was that against a complaint under the Negotiable Instrument Act, the  learned Magistrate by means of the impugned order has proceeded to summon the Drawer for offences punishable under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act as well as Section 420 IPC. As the Drawer did not respond to the summons, warrants of arrest were issued by the Magistrate by an order dated 04.10.2004. 

The High court opined that a contextual analysis of the provisions of Section 145 of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the special procedure enabling the complainant to give evidence on affidavit notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure is a procedure available only in relation to a complaint for an offence punishable under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act. In the opinion of the Court, the said special procedure cannot be utilized or invoked by a complaint, the Drawer, in this case, to prosecute the accused for an offence under Penal Code; in this case, the Payee under Section 420 IPC. Thus, the impugned order summoning the applicant to stand his trial for an offence punishable under Section 420 IPC on the basis of affidavit evidence received by the learned Magistrate with the aid of Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is manifestly illegal and cannot be sustained. Thus, the impugned order in so far as it relates to summoning the applicant for an offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed.

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