Skip to main content

Sec. 17 of Limitation Act Can’t Be Invoked To Condone Delay In Filing Application To Set Aside Arbitration Award

In P. RADHA BAI vs P. ASHOK KUMAR, an interesting question of law was put to the Supreme Court concerning the applicability of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of a delay caused on the account of alleged fraud played on the objector (party challenging the award) beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act.

The background of the issue was that the litigants were in a property dispute which went for arbitration and an award was passed. 236 days after the passing of the award, the Respondents herein approached trial court for condonation of delay and alleged fraud being committed on them by the Appellants herein.

The Trial court however dismissed the application stating that condonation of delay beyond the limit prescribed by the Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is being its power. On appeal the High Court remanded the matter back to the lower court with the instruction to consider delay in the light of the fraud angle against which this appeal was filed.

The Supreme Court disagreeing with the High Court held that in this case there has been a considerable delay in resolving the dispute. The very purpose of speedy justice delivery mechanism would be frustrated by such delays if the matter is allowed to linger before the courts. The Arbitration Act is a “special law” which prescribes a specific period of limitation in Section 34(3) for filing objections to an arbitral award passed under the 1996 Act and consequently the provisions of Arbitration Act would apply and there is no provision under the Limitation Act dealing with challenging an Award passed under the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court further went on to hold that Section 34 is the only remedy for challenging an award and Section 17 of the Limitation Act does not work with the Arbitration Act.


Comments

Most viewed this month

Deposit Of Minimum 20% Fine/Compensation U/s 148 NI Act Mandatory

In OP(Crl.).No.348 OF 2019, T.K.SAJEEVAN vs FRANCIS T.CHACKO, the appeal was filed against the order of the lower court to deposit 25% of the fine before filling of appeal. The appellant argued that the deposit introduced through the Section 148 of the NI Act after amendment was directory in nature as it used the term 'may' while mentioning the issue of deposit. The Kerala High Court however disagreeing held that in view of the object of the Legislature while incorporating Section 148 into N.I. Act, the word 'may' will have to be read as 'shall'. The imposition of payment contemplated under Section 148 N.I. Act cannot be restricted to some prosecutions and evaded in other prosecutions. Since the amount directed to be deposited being compensation, undoubtedly, it is liable to be ordered to be deposited irrespective of the nature of the prosecution. Therefore, the word 'may' can only be taken to have the colour and meaning of 'shall' and there

NCLT - Mere admission of receipt of money does not qualify as a financial debt

Cause Title : Meghna Devang Juthani Vs Ambe Securities Private Limited, National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai, CP (IB) No. 974/MB-VI/2020 Date of Judgment/Order : 18.12.2023 Corum : Hon’ble Shri K. R. Saji Kumar, Member (Judicial) Hon’ble Shri Sanjiv Dutt, Member (Technical) Citied:  Carnoustie Management India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CBS International Projects Private Limited, NCLT Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors. (2019) Sanjay Kewalramani vs Sunil Parmanand Kewalramani & Ors. (2018) Pawan Kumar vs. Utsav Securities Pvt Ltd 2021 Background Application was filed under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 alleging loan of Rs, 1.70 cr is due. The Applicate identified herself as the widow and heir of the lender but could not produce any documents proving financial contract between her Late husband and the CD but claimed that the CD has accepted that money was received from her husband. The applicant subsequently filed rejoinder claiming the debt t

Jurisdiction of consumer forum is not ousted even if the other party has filed suit on the same matter in Civil Court

In Yashwant Rama Jadhav v. Shaukat Hussain Shaikh, First Appeal No. 1229 of 2017, decided on 18.11.2017,  the grievance of the petitioner before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was that appellants/complainants had entered into agreements with the respondents for purchase of residential flats, which the respondents were to construct and despite paying the substantial amount to the respondents, the construction of the flats had not been completed. The State Commission dismissed the complaints and ruled in favor of respondents against which the appellants approached the National Commission. The NCDRC held that Section ‘3’ of the Consumer Protection Act, to the extent it is relevant provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Thus the remedy available under the Consumer Protection Act is an additional remedy, which Parliament has made available to a consumer. Even