Skip to main content

Mere use of word ''shall' would itself not make the provision in an act mandatory

Citation : M/S SJS Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs State Of UP

Date of Judgment/Order : 2022.06.04

Court/Tribunal : High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Corum : Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha,J. & Hon'ble Mrs. Saroj Yadav,J.


Background

Bank account of the petitioners was frozen on the instructions of the Investigating Officer by the Axis Bank as a sequel to the F.I.R. lodged by the Chief Manager of the Management of Monuments, Museum, Parks, Garden etc. for offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C.

The Petitioner argued through their writ petition that the Investigating Officer has not reported the seizure/debit freezing of the petitioners' account to the Magistrate concerned having jurisdiction as mandated under Section 102 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and therefore the freezing is illegal.

The Govt. Advocate referring to the order of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 11201 of 2021 : Amit Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, decided on 18.04.2022, argued that the question as to whether Section 102 (3) Cr.P.C. is mandatory or directory 

Judgment

Time schedules specified in acts are generally not mandatory for Public officials

Section 102 of the CrPC deals with the power of police officer to seize certain property. While subsection 3 of the said section says - "Every police officer acting under Sub-Section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction........"

The Supreme Court referring to the judgment in Amit Singh (supra) observed that the said judgment goes gone into details on whether Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. is mandatory or directory in nature?

The Amit Singh (supra) judgment had observed that it is well settled that non-observance of a mandatory condition is fatal to the validity of the action. However, non-observance would not matter if the condition is found to be merely directory. In other words, it is not that every omission or defect entails the drastic penalty of invalidity. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory can be ascertained by looking at the entire scheme and purpose of the provision and by weighing the importance of the condition, the prejudice to private rights and the claims of the public interest, therefore, it will depend upon the provisions of the statute and mere use of word ''shall' would itself not make the provision mandatory. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Versus Raghuveer Dayal (Supra) has held that the use of word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the enactment, on consequences to flow from such construction would not so demand.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Nasiruddin and Others Versus Sita Ram Agarwal; AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1543, has held that it is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that the use of the expression ''shall or may' is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character. It has further been held that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified.

The consequences of non reporting about the seized property have not been provided under the section. In addition, the requirement of reporting in the manner, as stated, is on the part of a public functionary and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as noticed above, the same is required to be held to be directory unless the consequences thereof are specified. Since the consequences have not been specified, it would be safe to hold that requirement of Section 102(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be termed as mandatory but would be directory in nature.

Based on the above, the High Court in the current matter found itself in full agreement with the view expressed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad vide judgment and dismissed the writ petition.


Comments

Most viewed this month

Deposit Of Minimum 20% Fine/Compensation U/s 148 NI Act Mandatory

In OP(Crl.).No.348 OF 2019, T.K.SAJEEVAN vs FRANCIS T.CHACKO, the appeal was filed against the order of the lower court to deposit 25% of the fine before filling of appeal. The appellant argued that the deposit introduced through the Section 148 of the NI Act after amendment was directory in nature as it used the term 'may' while mentioning the issue of deposit. The Kerala High Court however disagreeing held that in view of the object of the Legislature while incorporating Section 148 into N.I. Act, the word 'may' will have to be read as 'shall'. The imposition of payment contemplated under Section 148 N.I. Act cannot be restricted to some prosecutions and evaded in other prosecutions. Since the amount directed to be deposited being compensation, undoubtedly, it is liable to be ordered to be deposited irrespective of the nature of the prosecution. Therefore, the word 'may' can only be taken to have the colour and meaning of 'shall' and there

NCLT - Mere admission of receipt of money does not qualify as a financial debt

Cause Title : Meghna Devang Juthani Vs Ambe Securities Private Limited, National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai, CP (IB) No. 974/MB-VI/2020 Date of Judgment/Order : 18.12.2023 Corum : Hon’ble Shri K. R. Saji Kumar, Member (Judicial) Hon’ble Shri Sanjiv Dutt, Member (Technical) Citied:  Carnoustie Management India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CBS International Projects Private Limited, NCLT Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors. (2019) Sanjay Kewalramani vs Sunil Parmanand Kewalramani & Ors. (2018) Pawan Kumar vs. Utsav Securities Pvt Ltd 2021 Background Application was filed under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 alleging loan of Rs, 1.70 cr is due. The Applicate identified herself as the widow and heir of the lender but could not produce any documents proving financial contract between her Late husband and the CD but claimed that the CD has accepted that money was received from her husband. The applicant subsequently filed rejoinder claiming the debt t

Jurisdiction of consumer forum is not ousted even if the other party has filed suit on the same matter in Civil Court

In Yashwant Rama Jadhav v. Shaukat Hussain Shaikh, First Appeal No. 1229 of 2017, decided on 18.11.2017,  the grievance of the petitioner before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was that appellants/complainants had entered into agreements with the respondents for purchase of residential flats, which the respondents were to construct and despite paying the substantial amount to the respondents, the construction of the flats had not been completed. The State Commission dismissed the complaints and ruled in favor of respondents against which the appellants approached the National Commission. The NCDRC held that Section ‘3’ of the Consumer Protection Act, to the extent it is relevant provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Thus the remedy available under the Consumer Protection Act is an additional remedy, which Parliament has made available to a consumer. Even